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THE REVOLT OF
1857
IN HARYANA

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HARYANA IN 1857



THE REVOLT OF 1857 IN HARYANA

62604



K. C. YADAV

M.A., Ph.D.

*Reader, Department of History
B. N. Chakravarty University
Kurukshetra*



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For

My Teacher

DR. H. R. GUPTA

Formerly Professor & Head
Department of History
Punjab University
Chandigarh

PREFACE

There is perhaps no other event in the history of India which has interested both amateurs and professional historians so much as the Uprising of 1857. This has resulted in the proliferation of historical literature on the subject.* A careful study of these writings shows that the whole story has not yet been told, however; and many gaps still remain to be filled. The role of the people of Haryana in the great Uprising, with which this study is concerned, represents a case in point.

Like any modern study this work rests upon a triple base: material from the Public Archives (the National Archives of India, New Delhi; the Punjab State Archives, Patiala); private papers; and books. I must confess, however, that most of the material used here is primarily British. The Indians did not leave behind the accounts of their exploits. In such circumstances an author, who is supposed to approach his subject 'as a judge', to draw a picture in colours true to history—after listening to both sides involved in the case, must find his task rather difficult. Nevertheless, I have attempted to put all available evidence, as in the court of law, to a critical cross-examination in order to ascertain the truth. But how far I have succeeded in this task is for the readers to judge.

Many are the debts of the gratitude which I have acquired during the preparation of this work. The most significant is the debt of my revered teachers, Dr. H.R. Gupta and Dr. Satish Chandra who gave me valuable guidance and insights. Professor V. N. Datta, Dr. N. G. Barrier, Dr. J. N. Singh and Shri N.K. Jain read the text and offered their criticisms; Dr. (Mrs.) Dolores Domin translated for me certain materials from the

* For a useful description and critique of this literature, see Landendorff, *The Revolt in India 1857-58: An Annotated Bibliography* (AG Switzerland: Inter Documentation Company, 1968).

German language; and my wife Shashipriya assisted me in many ways. I am thankful to all of them.

I am also obliged to the staff of the following public Archives and Libraries for their help : the National Archives of India, New Delhi; the Punjab State Archives, Patiala; the National Library, Calcutta; the Rajasthan University Library, Jaipur; the Naziria Library, Delhi; and the B.N. Chakravarty University Library, Kurukshetra.

I am also grateful to the ICHR, New Delhi for giving financial support towards publication of this work; and to Shri Ramesh C. Jain, my publisher, for his unflagging interest and cooperation in bringing out in such a short time.

Kurukshetra
1 January, 1977

K.C. Yadav

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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

I

Haryana, literally 'the green country',¹ is situated in the north-western part of India, bounded by Panjab and Himachal Pradesh in the north; by Uttar Pradesh in the east; and by Rajasthan in the south and west. Delhi,² the capital of India, stands conspicuously on its south-eastern extremity on the right bank of the river Yamuna.

This region, Haryana, was not conceived administratively as a distinct area by the British³ in the 1850s. A large position of it coinciding with the present districts of Gurgaon, Mahendargarh, Rohtak, Sonapat, Jind, Bhiwani, Hissar, Sirsa, and tehsil Panipat of Karnal, together with Delhi, formed a separate administrative division—Delhi Division, of the North-Western Provinces (modern Uttar Pradesh). It consisted of five districts, and seven princely states, the number of towns, villages, area and population of which were as indicated in Table 1 given overleaf.⁴

The present districts of Ambala, Kurukshetra and tehsil Karnal formed a part of the *cis*-Sutlej States of Punjab. Administratively, this region (the so-called 'upper region') was divided into two districts and three princely states, the number of towns, villages, area and population of which were as outlined in Table 2.⁵ Though a part of Panjab, 'this upper region' was socio-culturally more akin to the Delhi Division. The people here shared a common language, tradition, and history with their brethren living in the Delhi Division. This, position has always been conceded by both the British authorities of Panjab and the people of Haryana.⁶

As against this, the people in the Delhi Division differed to some extent from the *parwas* (the people living beyond the Yamuna) in other divisions of the North-Western Provinces.

2 *The Revolt of 1857 in Haryana*

The points of difference between them were again the same, language, tradition and history.

TABLE 1

No. of towns, villages, area and population of the districts and states of the Delhi Division.

District	No of towns & villages	Area (sq. miles)	Population	No of persons per sq. mile
Panipat	538	1,270	3,89,085	306
Hisar	653	3,294	3,30,852	100
Delhi	568	790	4,35,744	552
Rohtak	300	1,340	3,77,013	281
Gurgaon	1,274	1,939	6,62,486	342
States				
Bahadurgarh	28	48	14,400	300
Ballabhgarh	121	190	57,000	300
Dujana	31	71	6,390	90
Farrukhnagar	18	22	4,400	200
Jhajjar	250	1,230	1,10,700	180
Loharu	54	200	18,000	90
Pataudi	40	74	6,660	90
Total	3,875	10,468	23,13,730	212

TABLE 2

No. of towns, villages, area and population of the districts and states in the upper region.

District	Towns/ villages	Area (sq. miles)	Population	No. of persons per sq. mile
Ambala	1,792	1,832	7,82,017	426
Thanesar	1,181	2,336	4,96,748	213
States				
Buria	20	80	11,920	149
Chhachhrauli	179	63	9,387	149
Jind	165	376	55,024	149
Total	3,337	4,687	13,56,096	1,086

In short, the people of the 'upper region' and the Delhi Division though administratively in different provinces, were closely bound together by socio-cultural ties.⁸ In fact, geography,⁹ as so often happens, had unified¹⁰ what man chose to keep apart.

II

The Haryanavi society in the 1850s was predominantly rural in character, about nine out of ten people living in villages.¹¹ Western education was yet to spread here; and even indigenous education was far from satisfactory. A report for the year 1826-27 which held good right upto 1857 will make the position clear.

In the lower region, i.e., the districts of Rohtak, Hissar and Gurgaon there were 27 Muslim schools with 289 pupils and 24 teachers and 70 Hindu schools with 886 pupils and 70 teachers. In the district of Delhi there were 247 schools, most of them being in the city itself. In Sonapat there were but 3 schools. In the town of Panipat there were several ill-supported and thinly attended schools. In the town of Karnal (20,000 inhabitants) there was only one school. Elsewhere in 18 mosque schools there were 227 pupils.¹²

In the absence of Western education, the economic change and social mobilization which took place at that time in various other regions were conspicuous by their absence in the Haryanavi society. People here led a traditional life, carried on agriculture with primitive plough and bullocks, and handicrafts with simple, crude instruments. Their society was covered up by religious and caste divisions which hindered its class division.¹³

Religion-wise, the Hindus formed a great majority (over 70 %) of the population.¹⁴ They were divided into a number of heirarchically ranked endogamous social units called *jatis* (castes) where the Brahmanas (8%) occupied the highest rung of the social ladder. The Brahmanas in turn were divided into four main groups: the Gaurs, Saraswats, Khandelwals and Dhima. The Gaurs believed that they came originally from Bengal, but it is much more likely that they came as *purohitas* or family priests of the various immigrant agricultural tribes among whom they

were settled. The Saraswats were, however, the original settlers of this region (the Saraswati valley). They were of high rank, but in 1850s they were apparently below the Gaurs who neither ate, drank nor intermarried with them. The Khandelwals and Dhima, who in all probability had migrated from Rajasthan in later times, were ranked a little below the Gaurs and Saraswats.

The Brahmanas lived in every village and town, mostly working as *purohitas*, though some of them had also adopted agriculture and were not directly engaged in religious functions. But priest or peasant, the Brahmana was held in esteem by the Hindus everywhere—out of respect for his high socio-religious status, he was called *dada* (grandfather).¹⁵

The second position in the social heirarchy was occupied by the Banias (6%), who were divided into three main divisions: Agarwals, Oswals and Maheshwaris. These three divisions appeared to be real tribal divisions, because none of these intermarried, ate or smoked with each other. All the three divisions claimed their origin from Rajasthan and it does not seem unlikely that they migrated from there.

Like Brahmanas, the Banias also lived in almost every village and town in Haryana, controlling business, trade and banking. They were mostly well off and for that reason commanded respect in the society.¹⁶

The third position in the social heirarchy was claimed by the peasant castes of whom Jats (15%) were the most important. They were concentrated in Rohtak, Hissar, some parts of Gurgaon and Karnal, and the states of Jhajjar, Pataudi, Farrukhnagar and Jind. The Jats were late settlers in this region; their earliest habitat was Rohtak where they had settled about 700 or 800 years ago in the wake of 'a return movement, from the north-west'. Moreover, the Karnal Jats do not find mention in the *Ain-i-Akbari* even. This puts their settlement later than sixteenth century. Similarly most of the Jats in Hissar and Jhajjar were immigrants from Rajasthan who were uprooted from there by severe famines in the later medieval times.¹⁷

The Jats were 'a bold peasantry, their country's pride, accustomed to handle the ploughshare and wield the sword

with equal readiness and success, second to no other race in industry and courage'.¹⁸ They called themselves, proudly, '*Zamin-dars*' (husbandmen). In the social hierarchy they occupied the same position as was claimed by other cultivating castes such as Ahirs, Gujars, Rajputs, Rors. They ate and smoked with them without any reservations.

Next came the Ahirs (popularly known as *Abhiras* in history) who formed about 7% of the population. They were for the most part concentrated in the region around Rewari and Narnaul which, because of their preponderance came to be known as 'Ahirwal' or 'the Abode of Ahirs'. In the districts of Rohtak, Hissar and Panipat, they numbered only a few thousands.²⁰

We cannot say for certain when the Ahirs settled in Haryana. The *Mahabharata* places them here with another tribe called *Shudra*.²¹ Obviously, it is on the basis of such evidences that V.V. Mirashi has suggested that probably the original habitat of the *Abhiras* (Ahirs) was the region between the Sutlej and the Yamuna. From there some of them migrated beyond Mathura in the east and Maharashtra in the south.²²

Tall, wiry and smart, the Ahirs made first-rate agriculturists. The early British writers have spoken very highly of them as farmers.²³ In the social hierarchy they stood on an equal footing with the Jats, Rajputs, Gujars, Rors, Sainis, Sunars and Barhis, who would both eat and smoke with them without any hesitation.²⁴

Like Ahirs, the Gujars also constituted 5 per cent of the population. Being a pastoral tribe their settlements were mostly found in the riverine low lands along the hills in the south and Shivaliks in the north. The region around Jagadhari and Buria, where they lived in large numbers, was called 'Gujarat' until recently.²⁵

The Gujars were a martial people who had been struggling for the preservation of their freedom for centuries. Denzil Ibbetson probably means to say the same thing in different words: "The Gujars have been turbulent throughout the history. . . . They were constant thorns in the side of the Delhi Emperors and are still ever-ready to take advantage of the bonds of discipline".²⁶ Surely, it was for this reason that the

Gujars were not recruited in the armies of the sultans and Mughal emperors. Then their only means of economy was agriculture and pasturage. But the hilly and riverine tracts which they occupied denied them any opportunities of earning enough for subsistence. As a result, they took to daring but anti-social activities as dacoity, thievery, etc. The early British writers have surprisingly put the cart before the horse while dealing with this aspect of the Gujar character. The compiler of the *District Gazetteer* of Delhi, for instance, observes: "They (Gujars) occupied the hills because no one else cared to do so. . . . Because their solitary inaccessible tracts afforded better scope for the Gujars' favourite avocation, cattle-lifting."²⁷ The truth is, in fact, the other way round.

Slightly fewer in number than the Gujars were the Rajputs (5%) who were scattered from north to south down the Yamuna valley and the westward through Rohtak and Hissar. They occupied a 'big place in the society', because in early medieval times some of their kinsmen, such as Tomaras, Chauhans, Mandhars and Pundirs had been rulers in this region. This not only boosted their morale psychologically, but also made them economically quite well off. Tall, strongly-built, smart and brave, they made first-rate soldiers in the armies of their ruling kinsmen, enjoying good salaries and other privileges. But during the Muslim rule, they were deprived of such opportunities, being an 'enemy community' whom they (the Muslims) had replaced. They had perforce to take to agriculture, the only respectable calling they could think of. But, although in possession of large holdings, want of industry and false pride (looking down upon manual labour as degrading) made them poor farmers. As a result, they were reduced to wretched conditions very soon: their villages almost everywhere presented 'pictures of insolvency'.²⁸

The other important peasant castes were Rors and Sainis. The former (2%) were settled in Kurukshetra and Karnal where they had their 84 villages (*Chaurasi*). Amin, a small village near Kurukshetra, was their headquarters (*rika*). They were good farmers and stood on the same social footing as the Jats, Ahirs, Rajputs and Gujars.²⁹ The Sainis (2%) also lived in the same region alongwith the Rors and enjoyed the same social status.³⁰

The artisan castes (4%), Sunars, Barhis, Lohars and Kumbars, occupied the next position in the caste hierarchy. And Harijans (12%) the Chamars, Dhanaks, Mehatars came last of all. They were treated as 'out-castes' by the rest of the (Hindu) castes.³¹

The Muslim formed the second important community (24%).³² Although Islam does not permit casteism, the Haryana Muslims were divided into a number of castes. The Syeds and Sheikhs, numbering only a few, stood at the highest rung of the hierarchical ladder. They were followed by the peasant castes of whom the Meos (8%) were the most important. They were settled in the southern parts of district Gurgaon.

The Meos were organised into 12 *pals* and 52 *gotras*, and presented a happy combination of Hinduism and Islam. They celebrated *Holi*, *Diwali* and many other Hindu festivals; their men, women dressed themselves in the old Hindu fashion; on the occasions of marriage, birth, death and other ceremonies, they adhered to Hindu customs and traditions; and like Hindus they avoided *sagotra* marriages.³³

The major occupation of the Meos had been agriculture; but the barren and hilly tracts of land which they occupied did not yield enough for their subsistence. Naturally, therefore, gifted with such qualities as daring, courage, adventure and hardihood, they took to dacoity and thievery like Gujars, and Ranghars.³⁴

Unlike the Meos, the Muslim Rajputs (6%) were scattered all over the region, though they hardly commanded any important socio-political status anywhere, except in Sirsa and Hissar. Here, of course, the Bhattis, Wattus, Joyas and Mahars held enviable status. Like their Hindu counterparts they were a martial people, engaged in agricultural pursuits.

Interestingly, though these people had given up the religion of their forefathers long ago, they still retained, like Meos, most of their age-old customs and rituals. They avoided *sagotra* marriages; preserved the custom of *Karewa* intact; celebrated many a Hindu festival like *Holi*, *Diwali* and *Dussehra*; and both men and women donned their Hindu garments. The Brahmana *purohitas* still conducted most of their social and religious ceremonies.³⁵

Another important Muslim caste was that of the Ranghars (6%), who were probably the Regars of old, and not Rajputs as some early British writers would have us believe.³⁶ They had embraced Islam during the medieval times and lived in large villages in the Districts of Rohtak, Hissar and Panipat. Financially they were throughout in bad shape. Thus poor and needy they took to anti-social activities almost everywhere. They became freebooters and thieves, never caring for law and violating it with great ease.

The Muslim Gujars (6%) were mostly settled in the low-lying lands along the Yamuna and were financially poor. They were mostly cattle-grazers and some of them who took to agriculture made poor farmers. Like their Hindu counterparts they loved thieving and stealing.³⁷ Next came the Kasabs, Telis, Dhobis (7%) who occupied the lowest position in the social heirarchy. They served high caste Muslims and Hindus alike.³⁸

The Sikhs, although found in some numbers (4%) in the northern parts of Ambala and Thanesar, did not differ much at that time from Hindus. They were in fact considered a sect (*Nanakpanthis*) within Hinduism itself.³⁹ Same was the case with Jains who were in no big way different from the Hindu Banias.⁴⁰

A stranger viewing the Haryanavi society would perhaps characterize it in terms of lack of cultural continuity. That is not true, however. This society, in fact, presented a tolerably good picture of homogeneity. In the first place, the simple Marxian fact that 'mankind first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion'⁴¹ was operative. Everyone in the village had his special function assigned; in fact he was born and brought up to it. The peasants took to the tilling and harvesting of crops which provided food for the entire village; and the other members of the community 'contributed to the productive powers in a subsidiary manner'. The Khatis (carpenters) made ploughs and other implements, the Lohars (blacksmiths) supplied the iron parts of the agricultural implements and effected their repairs; the Kumhars (potters) provided the household utensils; the Chamars (cobblers) made the plough harness and shoes; the Mehatars

(sweepers) did cleaning work. In short, everyone in the village had "his contribution to make; the washerman, the barber, the cowherd, the milkman, the water-carrier, even the beggar-priest, the astrologer, the popular doctor and the magician."⁴²

Thus the entire village population — the peasants, artisans, menials and others—was economically bound together. The material wealth produced by them was distributed among themselves by their mutual consent. There was, thus, left hardly any room for social antagonism in the society. Nor did religious or communal conflict disturb their homogeneity in any way. In fact, both the communities, Hindu and Muslim, lived cordially, worshipping common village deities and performing various other common religious and cultural formalities. Women in general played an important part in this regard. A Muslim woman who had not made offerings to the goddess of smallpox (*Sitala Mata*) would feel that she had deliberately risked the life of her child. On special occasions she would feed Brahmana priests. Similarly, a Hindu woman would regularly make offerings at the shrines of Muslim saints on Thursdays and also at the time of marriage in the family. Besides, many Muslims utilized the services of the Brahmanas for arranging their betrothals and as *purohitas* on ceremonial occasions. The Hindus on their part respected the Muslim *faqirs* and *pirs*. Needless to say, such measures created strong ground for homogeneity in the society.⁴³

Yet another factor which further reinforced the bonds of unity among the villagers was psychological, the feeling of security and safety provided to its members by the village community. Coercion and harassment of one member by the other were almost foreign to the villagers. The following words of T. Fortescue, the Civil Commissioner of Delhi support this fact:

No instances occur of a proprietor being driven from the village by oppression or violence of one or any number of other sharers; on the contrary, it is observable that they tender each other the most friendly and essential aids when in distress. They will supply cattle, till the lands themselves, contribute money when a sharer has been really unfortunate

and they will assist him in the disposal of his produce, in providing seeds, bullocks and implements, should they be satisfied with them. This feeling is extended to the widow and necessitous family of a deceased sharer and its effects scarcely surpassed.⁴⁴

The artisans and menials also received similar protection from the village community.

The above discussion shows that the Haryana villages presented a fairly good picture of social homogeneity based on reciprocity between the peasants (*jajmans*) and the artisans and menials. This is, however, not to suggest that there was never anything like inter or intra group or caste conflict in the society. But these conflicts were mostly quite short-lived and the general assembly of the villagers settled them no sooner than they appeared on the surface. Obviously, this homogeneity without social antagonism provided the key to the vigour of the Haryanavis which helped them fight their enemies.

III

The British East India Company acquired the Haryana region on 30 December 1803 from Marathas *vide* the Treaty of Sirijianjan Gaon.⁴⁵ David Ochterlony,⁴⁶ a military officer in the Company's service, was given temporary charge of the territory to manage its affairs as a Resident, under the directions of the Governor-General-in-Council. However, those were troubled times and for full one year the Resident could not make the people feel his presence: he was very busy all through these days preventing the raids of Holkar and Jats,⁴⁷ as also maintaining peace in Delhi, where his headquarters was located.

When the situation eased after 1805,⁴⁸ a permanent solution of the problem of the management of Haryana was worked out. The historic city of Delhi and a small wedge of territory on the right bank of the river Yamuna, comprising the parganas of Panipat, Sonapat, Samalkha, Ganaur, and Haveli Palam,⁴⁹ to which were added subsequently, the parganas of Nuh, Hatheen, Tijara, Bhora, Tapukara, Sohna, Rewari, Indiri, Palwal, Nagina, and Ferozepur, was placed under the direct control of the Bengal Government.⁵⁰ Ochterlony was made permanent Resident to run the political, civil, financial and judicial

business in the territory under the direct supervision of the Governor-General-in-Council. The Mughal emperor was left with no jurisdiction, except within the four walls of the Red Fort of Delhi. The Emperor received an annual pension of Rs. 90,000/- (later raised to Rs. 1.25 lakhs in 1833).⁵¹

The rest of the territory was given to a number of chiefs who had rendered meritorious services to the British against the Marathas in the last war. Nawab Ise Khan of Farrukhnagar and Raja Umed Singh of Ballabgarh⁵² were confirmed in their respective old Jagirs; Faiz Talab Khan received the pargana of Pataudi;⁵³ Ahmed Bakhsh Khan got the parganas of Loharu and Ferozepur-Jhirka;⁵⁴ Rao Tej Singh received an *istamarari* jagir of 87 villages in the Rewari pargana;⁵⁵ the parganas of Hodal and Palwal were granted to Murtaza Khan and Muhammad Ali Khan;⁵⁶ Hatheen was given to Faizullah Beg;⁵⁷ Bhawani Shankar got the pargana of Najafgarh,⁵⁸ whereas Jhajjar, Dadri, Kanond, Narnaul and Bawal were given to Nawab Nizabat Ali Khan.⁵⁹ The parganas of Rohtak, Meham, Beri, Hissar, Hansi, Agroha, Tosham, Barwala, and Jamalpur were granted first to Bambu Khan,⁶¹ and later on to the *rakil* of the Raja of Alwar; but on account of the serious opposition of the people they 'resigned their uncomfortable positions.'⁶² After that, these parganas were transferred to another chief, Abdus Samad Khan, but he too was obliged to exchange them with 'the lesser turbulent' parganas of Nahar, Bahu and the village of Dujana.⁶³ The Company ultimately took charge of the region.⁶⁴ Muhammad Ali of Muzaffarnagar (U.P.) received some villages in the pargana of Karnal in exchange of his jagir at the former place;⁶⁵ Nawab Rehmat Khan was confirmed in his jagir of Kunjpura⁶⁶, whereas Begum Samru of Sardhana was given a pargana each in Karnal and Gurgaon.⁶⁷

The Sikh chiefs of Jind, Ambala, Ladwa, Thanesar, Buria Kalsia and Kaithal, were left to continue as independent chiefs on the Maratha *sanads*.⁶⁸ But four years later, in 1809, this policy was changed, for the British at that time feared a serious threat to their existence as a political power in the East from their enemies, the French, the Turkish and the Persian Emperors, who supposedly were seriously thinking of the subjugation of India in coalition, if necessary, with Maharaja Ranjit

Singh, the ruler of the Panjab.⁶⁹ In such an eventuality, the northern region in the hands of petty chiefs, belonging to the same religion as Ranjit Singh, outside the British influence, might present a great danger to the British. Accordingly, they wished to change their old policy. But the question was: How to tackle the sovereign independent chiefs beyond the Yamuna? Fortunately, before the British could work out any solution Ranjit Singh solved the problem for them. Harassment and the fear of total extinction at his hands⁷⁰ forced these chiefs to come to them (the British) for help.⁷¹ The British at once took all the chiefs under their protection (1809).⁷²

IV

The foregoing discussion indicates that by 1809, the British had established their full control over the Haryana territory. The new administrative system which the British introduced here was not different from the one it had replaced. In fact their newly established administrative unit was quite akin to the Mughal *suba* of the old times. The Resident was its governor and in him were vested great powers: he was a magistrate, judge, collector and a police official all rolled into one. He was assisted by junior officials called Assistants whose number varied from two to four. They were somewhat like *amlis* of old regimes.⁷³

The Bengal Government had been fortunate in the Residents deputed in Delhi. At the initial stages, Archibald Seton, a man reputed for his ripe experience in revenue, judicial and public work,⁷⁴ did his job well. In May 1811 he was succeeded by another brilliant man, C.T. Metcalfe.⁷⁵ Though still in his twenties, Metcalfe was full of wisdom and patience. He gave to the territory a novel system of administration—'the Delhi system', a combination of 'native practice and regulation spirit'. The merits or demerits of the system have been described elsewhere;⁷⁶ it is enough for the present to note that the 'Delhi system' of Metcalfe lasted upto 1819. Then it underwent some changes after Metcalfe's departure. First of all the civil and political functions of the Resident were separated and given to two persons—the Resident and the Commissioner.⁷⁷ Secondly, the territory from Delhi to Rewari

and Hansi-Hissar, too unwieldy to be administered as a single administrative unit, was divided into three divisions: (i) Northern Division, including Panipat, Sonapat, Rohtak, Hansi, Hissar; (ii) Central Division, including the city of Delhi and its environs; and (iii) Southern Division, including Palwal, Hodal, Gurgaon, and Rewari.⁷⁸ In 1820, yet another, though not very significant, change took place: in view of the practical difficulties arising out of the plural control of the Resident and Commissioner, the designation of the latter was changed to Deputy Superintendent and he was placed under the Resident.⁷⁹

These arrangements did not last long. In May 1822 the Board of Revenue for the Western Provinces took over the administration of the territory. The Board was composed of three members, and its decisions were majority decisions subject of course to confirmation of the Bengal Government. It was expected that being somewhat broad-based the Board would run the administration more efficiently than the Resident. But, unfortunately, their expectations were not fulfilled.⁸⁰

The year 1833 brought another set of changes in the administration. By the Charter Act (1833) the North-Western Provinces was formed with its headquarters at Agra.⁸¹ In the new set-up, the Haryana territory was made one of the six divisions of the new province.⁸² Its official designation was 'Delhi Division' and it comprised the districts of Panipat, Hissar, Delhi, Rohtak and Gurgaon.⁸³ However, the administration of the upper parts of Haryana, i.e., the present districts of Karnal and Ambala, was conducted through the Superintendent of Political Affairs and Agent to the Government in the territory of the protected Sikh and Hill Chiefs, at Ambala,⁸⁴ until 1849 when they were placed under the charge of the Panjab Government. The former, i.e., the 'Delhi Division' remained a part of the North-Western Provinces until 1857.

How did this system of administration work? What were its effects on the people? Answers to these queries have been provided, at some length, in the following chapter.

NOTES

1. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 237. Also see *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* (hereinafter *IGI*), Vol. XIII, p. 54; Foreign Political Consultation, No. 34, 22 July 1809; and *Panjab Notes and Queries*, No. 547, I, p. 67 for similar views.

There are, however, other views too regarding the origin of the name Haryana. See Yadav, 'Haryana: The Land and People', *Glimpses of Haryana*, ed. Buddha Prakash, pp. 1-2.

2. The city of Delhi was founded by Raja Anangpal, a Tomara chief of Haryana in the 8th century.
3. Haryana was treated administratively as a distinct area by the Mughal Emperors. See Abul Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari* (Eng. tr. Jarret and corrected by Sarkar), Vol. II, pp. 283-314; Sakshena, *Chahar Gulshan*, f.35b; *Haryana Research Journal* (hereinafter *HRJ*), Vol. 1, 1969, No. 2, p. 4.
4. This is a rough estimate; but it has been carefully made on the basis of the 'Statistical Returns of Land Revenue, Area and Population in the Districts of the N.W.P.', vide *Selections from the Records of the N.W.P. Government*, No. XIII; and relevant data contained in *British Parliamentary Papers*, Reports from the Select Committee on Indian Territories (Irish University Press) Sessions 1852-53, 12, pp. 335-36; 16, pp. 122-32, and Montgomery, *History of the Indian Empire*, vol. I, pp. 514-20.

These figures were further tested with and in some cases supplemented by Griffin's figures as given in *Chiefs and Families of Note in Punjab* (revised by Massey *et al.*), vol. I, p. 62; vol. II, pp. 556-57; and data contained in the *District Gazetteers* (hereinafter *DG*) and *Settlement Reports* (hereinafter *SR*).

5. Besides the sources mentioned above (f. n. 4), the following sources have been consulted for these figures: *Selections from the Records of the Govt. of India* (For Deptt.), Report on the census in the Punjab Territories, No. XI.
6. For British viewpoint see *Punjab Administration Report*, 1892-93, pp. 14, 72; and Haryanavis' view, *The Weekend Review* (Delhi), 30 Sept, 1967; *Kurukshetra University Research Journal*, vol. I (1967), pp. 99-103.
7. The *Haryanavis* spoke Bangru, whereas the *parwas* spoke *Khadi-boli*. The two people differed in history and tradition too. For instance, the local historico-traditional heroes of the *Haryanavis* like Ratnasena, Sarwar, Narsibaz Pathan and Nihalde were not known to the *Parwas*; on the other hand, even such popular *Parwa* heroes like Alha and Uddal though well-known to the *Haryanavis* now-a-days were strangers to them in the 1850s.
8. Cf. the following statement of a well-known Haryana leader Deshbandu Gupta: "The Ambala Division, excluding Simla District

(i.e., Haryana), has never been a part of the Panjab throughout Indian History, and is distinct from Panjab in all respects. Tagged to Panjab by the accident of the haphazard growth of that Province, it has been a misfit, and owing to wide differences of language, culture, history, tradition and mode of life, no less than ethnical distinctions, the population of Ambala (Haryana) has remained an unassimilable constituent of the province". *Hindustan Times*, 9 December 1932).

9. For a detailed discussion of geographical borders, physical features and other allied points see Buddha Parkash (ed.), *Glimpses of Haryana*, pp. 1-5.
10. For a distinct Haryanavi culture see: Yadav (S. L.), *Haryana Pradesh Ka Loka-Sahitya*; Yadav (Ed.), *Haryana: Studies in History and Culture*; Prabhakar, *Haryana: Ek Sanskritik Adhyayna; Jan Sahitya*, 'Haryana Visheshanka', Patiala, 1966; *HRJ*, Vols. I-II; *Journal of Haryana Studies* (hereinafter *JHS*), Vols. I-VII.
11. See Part B, Statistical data in *DGS* of Haryana districts.
12. For details about education see Shankar and Kundu (ed.), *Education in Haryana: Retrospect and Prospect (1947-67)*, pp. 1-14.
13. This was a pre-capitalist formation. For details of such societies see Glazerman, *Historical Materialism*, pp. 10-11.
14. The account is based on the *District Gazetteers and Settlement Reports* of the Haryana districts.
15. See *DG Hissar*, pp. 77-79; *HRJ*, vol. I (1966), pp. 12-13.
16. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and NWFP*, Vol. II, pp. 59-62; *DG Hissar*, pp. 74-76; *HRJ*, Vol. I (1966), p. 12; Badli Ram, *Aggarwals*, pp. 1-6.
17. Rose, Vol. II, pp. 357-77; Risley, *The People of India*, pp. 60-61; *Soviet Features*, II, No. 231 of 1964; Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, pp. 10-21; Pandey, *Yaduvansha Ka Itihas*, p. 238; *HRJ*, Vol. I (1966), pp. 27-35; *SR Rohtak*, pp. 54-60.
18. Qanungo, p. 20.
19. Rose, Vol. II, pp. 357-77.
20. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 4-7.
21. *Mahabharata, Sabhaparava*, 29, VS. 9.
22. Mirashi, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. IV, p. 31.
23. The popular saying is :

बहोर, खेती की तदबीर

See *SR Rohtak*, p. 55.

24. Yadav, *Haryana Ka Itihas*, pp. 13-14.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 14; Majumdar, *Bhartiya Vidya, K. M. Munshi Commemoration Volume*, Vol., II, pp. 1-18; Munshi, *Glory That Was Gurjara Desa*, Vol. I, pp. 173-81; Khatana, *Gujar Gujarati Zaban-o-Adab*; Rose, Vol. II, pp. 306-7; *DG Delhi*, pp. 87-90; Pandey, p. 238.
26. Ibbeston, *Panjab Castes*, p. 184.
27. *Delhi DG*, p. 16.

28. Ibbetson, pp. 135-38.
29. Rose, Vol. III, pp. 384-85.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-61; 346.
31. Yadav, *Haryana ka Itihas*, pp. 163-64.
32. The account is based on the *District Gazetteers and Settlement Reports* of the Haryana Districts.
33. The Meos are an ancient people, probably the descendants of the Medas—Meda-Meas. However, for other different versions see Ashraf, *Meo Qaum aur Mewat ki Tarikh*, pp. 12-18; Abdul Shakur, *Tarikh Meo Chhatari*, pp. 93-112. Also see, Ibbetson, pp. 179-81; *Glimpses*, pp. 33-46; *JHS*, Vol. II (1970), pp. 18-26; Yadav, *Ahirwal*, pp. 30-32; *DG Gurgaon*, pp. 28-30; Abu Rashid, *Ashlah-i-Mewat*, pp. 2-38; Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. II, pp. 88-89.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Ibbetson, pp. 144-46; *DG Hissar*, p. 91.
36. Ibbetson, p. 139; *SR Rohtak*, pp. 56-57; *DG Hissar*, p. 91.
37. Yadav, *Haryana ka Itihas*, p. 145.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
39. It was in the 20th Century that points of difference between Hinduism and Sikhism came to assume serious form, and the latter became an independent faith. Earlier the Sikhs were regarded as a sect of Hinduism. See Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 237.
40. They could eat both *Kachhi* and *Pakki* with the Hindu Banias, and had inter-caste marriages too.
41. Glezerman, p. 17.
42. Ashraf, *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan*, pp. 114-15.
43. For details see *Glimpses*, pp. 115-19; *Census Report of India*, 1911, Vol. XIV, Panjab, Pt. I, p. 174.
44. *Ibid.*
45. For the full text of the Treaty see Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds*, Vol. IV, pp. 42-46.
46. He held temporary charge up to 1805 when he was confirmed.
47. That is, Jaswant Rao Holkar and Ranjit Singh, the Jat Raja of Bharatpur. Both of them joined hands and offered opposition to the British after the fall of Sindhia (1803). See Harsukh Rai, *Majmul Akhbar* (Elliot and Dowson), Vol. VIII, pp. 367.
48. Governor-General-in-Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 2 June 1805.
49. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 219, 31 January 1805.
50. Yadav, *Haryana: Studies in History and Culture*, pp. 72-73. Also see Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 137, 12 September 1803.
51. The Governor-General-in-Council to the Secret Committee, 2 June 1805.
52. File R-163 (Panjab State Archives, Patiala, hereinafter PSA), pp. 5-9.
53. Foreign Miscellaneous, No. 282, pp. 303, 326-27. Raja Bahadur

- Singh helped Col. Ochterlony before Delhi (1804). His brother Kr. Prithvi Raj fell fighting against the Marathas.
54. Aitchison, Vol. VII, pp. 120-21.
 55. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22; Hamilton, *Geographical, Statistical and Historical Description of Hindostan*, Vol. I, pp. 457-58.
 56. Rao Tej Singh was an ally of the Marathas. He opposed the British even after the fall of his allies (Marathas). In July 1805, however, he submitted to the British as the following abstract from a letter of the Resident at Delhi to Lord Wellesley, the then Governor-General, dated 1 July, 1805, shows: "I am happy to add that by letters from Capt. Campbell received this day, I am informed that Shah Tej Singh, the Chowdhary of Rewari influenced by the attack and fall of Neemrana has admitted a garrison into the Fort he had recently constructed and has intimated a desire of evincing his obedience by visiting me in Delhi" (Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 157, July 29, 1805).
 57. Foreign Political Proceedings, Nos. 17-20, 24 October 1805.
 58. Hamilton, Vol. I, pp. 408-9.
 59. *Ibid.*
 60. *SR Rohtak*, paras 31-33.
 61. *Ibid.*
 62. *Ibid.*
 63. *Ibid.*
 64. Aitchison, Vol. VIII, pp. 123-31; *SR Rohtak*, paras 31-33.
 65. *DG Karnal*, pp. 143-44; Baden-Powell, *The Land System of the British India*, Vol. II, pp. 684-86.
 66. *DG Karnal*, pp. 152-53.
 67. Yadav, *Haryana: Studies*, p. 75.
 68. Cunningham, *History of Sikhs*, pp. 124-29, 353-56.
 69. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
 70. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-29.
 71. *Ibid.*
 72. *Ibid.*, pp. 353-54.
 73. See Spear, *Twilight of Mughals*.
 74. He had served as an Agent to the Governor-General at Rohilkhand for quite some time before joining Delhi.
 75. For his life and work at Delhi see Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India* (Delhi, 1970); Spear, pp. 84-98.
 76. See next chapter.
 77. Foreign Political Proceedings, No. 52, 2 April 1819. Ochterlony was appointed Resident and Fortescue as Commissioner. The latter, however, could not live here for long; he left in 1820 owing to bad health.
 78. *Ibid.* The name of the territory was changed to 'Delhi Division'.
 79. Panigrahi, pp. 39-41.
 80. The members of the Board were: Ross, Elliot and Fraser. Ross, however, left Delhi in December 1822. Batson was appointed in

his place. Ever was an officiating member. For the working of the Board. See *ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

81. Yadav, *Haryana: Studies*, p. 83.

82. *Ibid.* The six divisions were: Delhi, Meerut, Rohilkhand, Agra, Allahabad and Benares.

83. See Montgomery, Vol. I, p. 514.

84. The Agency to govern them was created for the first time in April 1810. The Agent, who held the charge of the Agency, worked in subordination to the Delhi Resident. His headquarters was located at Ludhiana. In 1815, the Agency's designation was changed to the present designation and the headquarters were shifted to Karnal where they remained till March 1822, when finally these were moved to Ambala. For details see Farooqi, *British Relations with the Cis-Sutlej States, 1809-23*, Panjab Govt. Records, Monograph No. 19.

CHAPTER II

THE GATHERING STORM

Political scientists almost unanimously hold that no self-respecting people can be satisfied with a foreign rule no matter how wise or good it might claim to be. If proof was needed in support of this assertion, the British rule over Haryana from 1803 to 1857 would provide it. By their self-centred imperialist policy and actions the British rulers produced here in abundance what Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in his famous Essay 'of Seditions and Troubles' calls the 'causes and motives of sedition'.

I

For centuries past the people of Haryana had enjoyed the privilege of self-rule. Their village communities,¹ owning no obligation to the government or any other authority except for the payment of taxes,² managed all their affairs. According to C.T. Metcalfe, a British civil servant of high merit who served in Haryana for a long time in different capacities:

The village communities are like little republics having nearly everything they want within themselves and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, English are masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same. In times of troubles they arm and fortify themselves; a hostile army passes through the country, the village community collect their cattle within their walls and let the army pass unprovoked; if plunder and devastation be directed against themselves and the force employed be irresistible, they flee to friendly village at a distance, but when the storm has

passed over they return and resume their occupation. If a country remains for a series of years the scene of continual pillage and massacre so that the villages cannot be inhabited, the villagers, nevertheless return whenever the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass away but the succeeding generation will return. The sons will take the place of their fathers, the same site for the village, the same position for the houses, the same lands would be occupied by the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was depopulated; and it is not the trifling matter that will drive them out, for they will often maintain their post through times of disturbance and oppression and acquire strength sufficient to resist pillage and oppression with success.³

The basis of these corporate bodies were the peasant proprietors among whom there existed 'perfect equality, though some amongst them had more *bighas* of land and wealth than others'.⁴ Then came the other inhabitants, the Brahmanas who conducted religious services and told the lucky or unlucky days for seed-time, harvest and for every other type of agricultural work; the schoolmaster who taught the children reading and writing; the carpenter and the smith, who made and repaired agricultural implements; the potter, who made all the pottery of the village; the barber, who cut hair, and arranged marriages; the cobbler, who provided the villagers with shoes and water-bags (*charsa*), whips, etc.; the mehtar, who performed the cleaning work; and others.⁵ Both these groups, the peasant-proprietors and other castes, were 'locked by economic and religious ties into an intimate inter-dependence' and they knew that neither would or could exist without the other and therefore both cared for the existence and well-being of each other.⁶

How did these village communities manage their affairs? Through the *mugaddams*, 'the rustic philosopher kings', who were either selected by the villagers for being able to advance their interests more effectively or to have raised and elevated themselves to the office from their superior knowledge and address in making terms for the village with the officers of the government. Their post was neither hereditary nor permanent,

Any abuse of power by *mugaddams* could lead to their disqualification to hold the office. Indeed, they 'could not afford to be Venetian Council of Ten even if they wished it'.⁷

To sum up, nobody could become or continue to remain a *mugaddam* without the consent of the villagers. The post could not be purchased by any amount of wealth, influence or pressure. Neither poverty, nor low birth, could debar a person from it. We are informed by Thomas Fortescue, a civil servant of conspicuous merit, that in Haryana the *mugaddams* frequently suffered for affluence and material strength; 'they possessed at times but a small comparative property'.⁸

The *mugaddams* had, broadly speaking, two types of functions assigned to them by the village communities: first, collection of government dues and depositing them in the government treasury and second, conducting the internal affairs of the village. Both these jobs were quite difficult and therefore *mugaddams* were given helping hands. The village *patwaris*, who were usually the village banias, assisted them in the first business,⁹ whereas the village *panchayats*, a sort of tribunals consisting of several elderly persons chosen from amongst the villagers for their integrity and impartiality, helped them in the second.¹⁰

This arrangement, 'sprung up and proceeded from the people themselves', worked very well. It freed villagers from exploitation, coercion and disturbance. Even British administrators made frank admissions of its effectiveness:

No instances occur, they said, "Of a proprietor being driven from the village by oppression or violence of one or any number of other sharers, on the contrary, it is observable that they tender each other the most friendly and essential aids when in distress. They will supply cattle, till the lands them selves, contribute money when a sharer has been really unfortunate and they will assist him in disposal of his produce in providing seeds, bullocks and implements, should they be satisfied with him. This feeling. . . is extended to the widow and necessitous family of a deceased sharer and its effects scarcely surpassed."¹¹

The artisans, menials and other inhabitants of the village

also received similar treatment. Consequently, the entire village population felt happy and secure under this arrangement.¹²

The past rulers, the Afghans, Mughals, Marathas, Sikhs who ruled over this region always realized the worthwhileness of this arrangement and never disturbed it. The British, however, made a departure: at the very outset, they rejected the principle of granting full autonomy to the villages and their public officials, both revenue and police interfered in the internal affairs of the villages. Similarly, their courts took up the work of dispensing justice, throwing the *panchayats* and the traditional *panchas*, those rustic Ciceros and Demosthenes into oblivion.¹⁴

Had this change been for the better, nobody would have minded it. But it was not so. Even the contemporary British officials admitted that "our public officers, revenue and police have muddled with the villages. . . they do not seem to be wanted in them."¹⁵ Same was the case with the courts, for they dispensed justice most arbitrarily. Take for example Metcalfe, who while as a judge punished offenders without weighing their guilt or fault. He gave to one Roshan Khan, a policeman, life imprisonment accompanied by hard labour for having been accused of stealing 7 lbs. of thread. Another man Ramdiya was imprisoned for seven years, in 1815, on a similar charge of theft. His attempts to escape from jail thrice eventually increased the sentence to 56 years. Another man Makhan Singh was sentenced to 7 years rigorous imprisonment for forging the signatures of Metcalfe. In some other cases Metcalfe passed judgement on the absentee-offenders without giving them any chance of defence. In fact no trial was held and the judgement was passed privately—Metcalfe was, however, reprimanded for this lapse. Another official, Henry Middleton, Superintendent of the Delhi Territory, apparently gave his assistants powers of granting solitary confinement for life. Shockingly, even death penalties were awarded without printed regulations.¹⁶

The reaction of the people to this judicial system naturally was one of dread and hatred as the following statement of 'a native' made before Col. Sleeman, would show:

Your Court of Justice are the things we must dread Sir; and we are glad to escape from them as soon as we can. . .

The truth, Sir, is seldom told in these courts. There they think of nothing but the number of witnesses as if all were alike; here (in India), Sir we look to the quality. When a man suffers wrong, the wrongdoer is summoned before the elders (composing *Panchayats*). . . and the offender dreads their vengeance. In your *adwalat*, Sir, men do not tell the truth so often as they do among their own tribes or village communities; they perjure themselves in all manners, without shame or dread, and there are so many men about these courts, who understand the rules and regulations and are so much interested in making truth appear to be falsehood and falsehood truth, that no man feels sure that right will prevail in them in any case. The guilty think they have just as good a chance of escape as the innocent.¹⁷

In short, the official interference in the internal matters of the villages inflicted upsetting blows on the people of Haryana. They felt deeply disturbed and wished to have the old order restored. Surprisingly, many British officials also felt likewise. Thomas Fortescue for instance, made the following suggestions to his Government in 1820:¹⁸

- (i) The village societies be maintained;
- (ii) They be left to make their own *bachh* (adjustment of the public assessments upon themselves);
- (iii) They be left to decide their own disputes;
- (iv) The office of the *mugaddams* be maintained;
- (v) The *mugaddams* be continued as the channel of communication between the Revenue officers and the village;
- (vi) The village assemblies or *panchayats* be maintained;
- (vii) Our Revenue officers as Tehsildars, *Mutsadis*, etc., should interfere as little as possible with the internal arrangements of the villagers;
- (viii) The same principles of administration be continued, namely, good sense, good intention, and integrity, on the part of the European officers.

These suggestions of Fortescue, especially nos. i, ii, iii, vi, vii and viii, fell on deaf ears of the Government, and the village communities and *panchayats* met their doom. As was

to be expected, this caused great social confusion and instability throughout Haryana, seeing which even the British authorities like Sir Richard Temple were constrained to say:

I have always thought that a very great deal of harm has been done by the interference of our authorities, both executive and judicial with indigenous village corporations. I look upon the discouragement of the small indigenous municipalities as the great blot and weakness in our rule and think it is by no measures compensated.¹⁹

To sum up, the loss of the old world with no gain of the new one (Marx), made the situation quite dismal. As a result, the people felt insecure and unhappy.²⁰

II

Another factor which added injury to insult was economic. The new rulers followed a selfish economic policy based upon their well-known imperial principle of subordinating the local interests to the British interests. This policy hit almost every section of the Haryana economy very hard, the worst sufferer being agriculture on which about 90 per cent of the population depended directly or indirectly for their living.

Before we attempt a detailed discussion of the land policy adopted here by the British, it seems necessary to study in brief the policy which was in vogue before their advent. Thomas Fortescue has given a graphic description of the condition of the Haryana agriculture and the attitude and policy of the old rulers towards it in one of his write-ups dated 1820. According to him there was no person in Haryana so elevated as to be styled a *raja* or a *talukdar*. Nor did such a thing exist in this territory as a plurality of villages comprising the *zamindari* of an individual, nor of a single village even appertaining the proprietary right to one person. There were village communities instead which held the entire village land in common. The *muqaddams*, the managers and leaders of the villages adjusted the quota of each sharer and collected the government's share and deposited it in the government treasury through the agency of the *Qanungo*, the lowest government official deputed to collect revenues of a pargana.²¹

How much was the Government's share of the revenue which the *mugaddams* collected? This is a very difficult question to answer with any exactitude for the Government's share varied from place to place and from time to time. But in any case the Government assessment (*jama*) in those good old days never exceeded from 1/6 to 1/4 of the gross produce.²² We are informed that at many times especially during the Mughal times, the collections (*hasil*) made were far less than these rates. Bayazid tells us that in Akbar's reign the *hasil* of a jagir in Sunam (Hissar) was many times less than its *Jama*.²³ In the next reign, says Pelsaert, "in many regions only half the nominal assessment was generally realized".²⁴ During the reigns of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb the same practice was followed and no attempt was made by either sovereign to make the *Jama* correspond exactly to the *hasil*. "On the other hand", says Irfan Habib, the difference between them was recognized for a fact and the annually changing ratio between the receipts and the standing assessment was marked out for each *malat* and expressed in terms of month-proportions (*Mahawar*).²⁵ Thus where the current *hasil* equalled half *jama*, the jagir was styled "six monthly" (*shahmaha*), where it was one fourth, 'three-monthly' (*sihmaha*) and so on.²⁶ After the death of Aurangzeb, even this practice could not continue and the people hardly paid any revenue at all unless forced to do so militarily.²⁷

The situation, however, changed after the advent of the British. The new rulers started on a happy note. They declared:

From the earliest times to the present period the public assessment upon land has never been fixed, and according to established usage and custom, the rulers have exercised a discretionary and despotic authority. . . . The tenants and cultivators of the soil have been exposed to rapacity and oppression. The Government had, therefore, decided, in order to induce the cultivators to feel secure to make a three years settlement with them, to be followed by a second for the same period and then by one of four years.²⁸

This, to be sure, must have pleased all the agricultural classes—the peasant cultivators, tenants-at-will, cropsharers,

and agricultural labourers. But their happiness must have proved short-lived. The 'zealous' settlement officers rushed to their lands²⁹ and instead of giving any relief to the peasants, fixed government revenue at more than 50 per cent of the gross produce without consulting or taking consent of the peasants in any way. On the other hand, they tended to use compulsion in their dealings. The testimony of the later settlement officers suggests that when the settlements were made by these early 'zealous' officials the headmen (of the villages) were imprisoned till they agreed to the terms offered and having accepted them, till they furnished security for payment'.³⁰

The contemporary records indicate that in spite of applying coercion of the worst type, the Government could not collect their full dues (Table 1).³¹ This clearly implies that the rates fixed were exorbitant.

TABLE 1
Accumulated Revenue Debt

Year	Land assessment in Rupees			Outstanding balances		
	Rs.	As	Ps.	Rs.	As	Ps.
1811-12	9,87,030	11	6	10,073	6	11
1812-13	10,39,560	0	0	60,304	15	6
1813-14	12,56,502	12	0	18,967	2	1
1814-15	12,15,470	13	6	34,215	8	3
1815-16	13,88,978	0	0	95,913	3	0
1816-17	17,01,663	0	0	1,24,318	0	0
1817-18	17,23,691	0	0	2,68,797	0	0

For many poor farmers the cumulative revenue arrears even when they had good harvests proved an unbearable burden. Consequently, they became defaulters and 'had to visit jails four to five times' in the space of a few years.³²

In the later years, however, when the settlement officers gained notoriety for their high-handedness and their work began to be adversely criticized even in their own circles, some changes were effected in the revenue system. As a result, the settlements began to be conducted somewhat thoughtfully. But despite these modifications the settlement officers continued to be harsh.³³

The mode of collection of land revenue was as extortionate as the assessment was oppressive. The collections were made in February and September long before the harvest. It was but natural that people should have made some protests against such mistimed collection when they had practically nothing with them in cash or kind. The Government, however, did not realise their mistake and made their collection with the help of a large force kept everywhere for this purpose. For instance, in a small tract in Karnal, 136 horsemen were deployed for collecting land revenue while 22 sufficed for police duties in the area.³⁴

The ultimate outcome of such a revenue policy should be obvious. It completely shattered the peasant's economy, and quite a few of them deserted their villages. A settlement officer of Karnal district tells us that in his district 'the inhabitants of some villages, nearly in mass, had abandoned their lands and homes and migrated to distant parts' to escape ruination.³⁵ Equally painful is the picture of the people of Sonapat pargana as drawn in the Settlement Report of the Delhi District: the nine villages of Pabasara, Chidy, Yusufpur, Chasanali, Ghyaspur, Sunpara, Panava, Patti Brahmanan and Begha, settled in 1826, were completely deserted by 1842.³⁶ A similar tale of over-assessment and ruin by previous settlements is mentioned in John Lawrence's report on the settlement of the Rewari pargana which he assessed in 1836. Though he effected a reduction in revenue, the over-oppressed peasantry did not feel relieved.³⁷ Rohtak district also had the same sad tale to tell: a later Settlement Report observes that 'the injudiciously heavy revenues have greatly retarded the progress of the district'.³⁸ The *District Gazetteer* of Hissar gives interesting details about that district:

The demand of the first settlement from 1815-1825 was so high that it exceeded by almost 20 per cent the revenue which has in 1890 been fixed for the same villages; but high though it was and though the actual collections came to have decreased, the demand was increased in the second and third settlements to such an extent that the assessment fixed for the same tract in 1890 is 32 per cent less than the average demand for the last five years of the third settlement, viz., Rs. 4,88,609.³⁹

In short, the colonial Government extorted very high revenues which caused very great hardship to the Haryana peasantry.

The situation was further worsened by the sharp decline in the prices, especially after the forties (Table 2).

TABLE 2
Fall in prices of agricultural products

Years		Price of wheat per maund	Price of Indian corn per maund
1841-51	...	Rs. 2/- ...	Rs. 1/-11/16
1851-52	...	Rs. 1/- ...	Rs. 14/16
1852-53	...	Rs. 1/-3/16 ...	Rs. 1/- 1/16
1853-54	...	Rs. 1/-3/16 ...	Rs. 1/- 2/16
1854-55	...	Rs. 1/- ...	Rs. 13/16
1855-56	...	Rs. 1/-1/16 ...	Rs. 14/16

Thus, between 1851 and 1856, the prices of wheat and corn, (maize, jowar, etc.) declined practically by 50 per cent. This made the condition of the peasants still worse. Their produce in most of the cases could not fetch enough money to pay even their revenue.

In the circumstances, the hard-hit peasantry felt compelled to go to the village Bania, the moneylender to borrow money to pay their land revenue. The shrewd moneylender charged an exorbitant rate of interest, which despite being paid by the poor borrower at every harvest by selling him (the moneylender) his produce and other belongings, at times even the ornaments of his wife, at throw away prices, never got cleared off. And when the poor peasant went to the British courts to seek redress against the extortionate moneylender, he was, in most of the cases a loser, for the moneylender, in the words of Denzil Ibbetson, "was an agency which shall furnish capital to a class who are as a rule, without it, and shall receive the produce of the fields in exchange for the hard cash in which alone Government will receive its revenue". He seemed to his masters an 'air-chamber in a fire engine'. They could never think of destroying him.⁴¹

All these measures struck heavy blows at the Haryana peasantry with the result that many of them were obliged to

leave their hearths and homes. This explains why we come across such remarks in the contemporary revenue records as 'this village is entirely abandoned'; 'half the villagers of this village have run away'; 'only five families are left in this village'.⁴²

The ruination of the Haryana peasantry had a very adverse effect on its village artisans and menials too, for both these classes were not commodity producers and depended entirely upon the peasantry for their subsistence. When the *kisan* (their masters) suffered, they were also bound to suffer.⁴³

In short, the new rulers' colonial policy reduced about 90 per cent of the Haryana population to a precarious and wretched condition. As a result, the suffering, poverty-stricken people became deeply dissatisfied with them.

III

Like their village counterparts, the townsmen, broadly following four major professions (i) services; (ii) trade; (iii) crafts and industries, and (iv) labour, also became victims of British exploitation. In the absence of sufficient contemporary records, it is not possible to paint a full picture of these people's sufferings. We only know this much that by destroying many old states (*raj*s) and reducing the job-opportunities in the rest, as also by recruiting mostly 'imported personnel' from the Bengal Presidency the new rulers rendered hundreds of townsmen jobless; by encouraging their own men to monopolise trade of every type they destroyed the local trade and by flooding markets with cheap, machine-made goods they, ruined the indigenous craftsmen and the labourers whose lot was intimately connected with them.⁴⁴

As a result of the ruinous economic policy the once beautiful, populous Haryana towns became dirty, deserted places, as the following two statements would show:

Thomas Fortescue's description of Haryana towns (1820):

The brick built towns; the numerous stone edifices of ornaments and worship; the spacious walled gardens; the costly and airy pleasure houses; the expensive and lasting masonry of deep wells, reservoirs, and lengthened conduits; the large safe and convenient *sarais* with the *kosminars* for

accommodation and ease of travellers; and above all perhaps the bold and stupendous undertaking of several grand aqueducts which utilized many thousands of bighas and brought crores into the public treasury—are amongst the *infragable* demonstration of former abundance, population, security, wealth and happiness.⁴⁵

Jacquemont's description of a Haryana town (Karnal) (1831):

... the interior, an infamous sink, a heap of uncleanness. Amongst heaps of dung, brick-rubbish, concourse of beasts, are winding paths scarcely passable for horses, and having here and there a few miserable huts. I have seen nothing so bad in India, and it is fair to mention that amongst the natives, its filth is proverbial.⁴⁶

These statements do not require any further comments.

Indeed, the British economic policy in a little over five decades brought about the systematic ruin of the Haryana towns and their dwellers. In consequence, the suffering populace became extremely unhappy with the British Government and barring a few exceptions, it wished to bring its downfall.

IV

Like the servicemen, traders and artisans in the towns, a large number of feudal chiefs were also unhappy with the British Government, for it had either bitten off large portions of their ancestral estates (Table 3) or in some cases their possessions entirely (Table 4).

TABLE 3

Estates subjected to partial reduction⁴⁷

Name of the Estate	Year of reduction	Reason of reduction
1. Rewari	1805	Not helping the British in the Anglo-Maratha War-1803.
2. Farrukhnagar	1805	-do-
3. Ballabhgarh	1805	-do-

TABLE 4
Estates Permanently Confiscated⁴⁸

Name of Estate	Date of forfeiture	Cause of forfeiture
Rania	1818	Revolt of Nawab Zabita Khan.
Chhachhrauli	1818	Rani Ram Kaur's 'failure' to give good Govt. and Jodh Singh's interference.
Ambala	1824	Death of Sardarni Dia Kaur, widow of Gurbax Singh.
Radaur	1828	Death of Sardarni Indkaur, widow of Dulcha Singh.
Dialgarh (Shares of Daya Kaur)	1829	Death of Mai Daya Kaur, widow of Bhagwan Singh.
Thanesar (2/5 shares of Bhag Singh)	1832	Death of Sardar Jamiat Singh, without male heirs.
Bubbeal	1838	Death of Sardar Harnam Singh, without male heirs.
Kaithal	1843	Death of Bhai Udey Singh, without male heirs.
Chalaundhi	1844	Death of Sardarni Ram Kaur, widow of Bhagel Singh.
Ladwa	1845	Revolt of Raja Ajit Singh.
Thanesar (3/5 share of Bhanga Singh)	1850	Death of Rani Chand Kaur, widow of Fateh Singh.
Hallabar	1850	Death of Sardar Fateh Singh, without male heirs.
Dialgarh (1 share of Mai Sukhan)	1851	Death of Mai Sukhan, widow of Bhagwan Singh.

The dispossessed chiefs, their descendants, officials, *panditas* or *ulema*, and a host of other retainers, who enjoyed their patronage became opponents of the British rule.⁴⁹

The ruling chiefs and jagirdars, however, showed a different disposition: they were torn by conflicting pulls. Their present

position obliged them to be loyal to their masters, but the thought of insecure future (especially after seeing the forfeiture of many estates in the cis-Sutlej tract and elsewhere on some pretext or the other), made them unhappy.⁵⁰

V

Another factor that roused all sections of Haryana population against the British rule was its interference in religious matters. As soon as Haryana came under the sway of the East India Company, Christian missionaries, began to appear. These 'white-faced preachers' from England thought that the poor and illiterate people of the region could be converted to Christianity in no time. But their hopes were not fulfilled. Having great faith in their *dharma* and *deen* (i.e., Hinduism and Islam) the village communities well-known for preserving their culture from times immemorial,⁵¹ did not allow the missionaries to interfere with their religious life.⁵² As a result, these Christian preachers failed badly in their mission.⁵³

A few ambitious missionaries, however, undaunted by their failure did not hesitate to take to fraudulent tactics 'to convert the heathens to the faith of their Lord'. As an illustration, the work of the missionaries among the Sadhs, a sect of Hindus popularly called *Satnamis*, who resided in the Rohtak-Narnaul tract may be cited.⁵⁴ We are informed by W.L.Allison that some missionaries had distributed the Hindustani version of the Bible to the poor *Sadhs*, telling them that the book was their own sacred *Pothi* (*Niravana Gyana*) 'which had come from heaven'. The God-fearing, simple Sadhs, who had never seen a copy of their scriptures believed this to be true. Fisher, a chaplain, gives an interesting account of a meeting of these misguided people in a letter dated 6 May 1817 to one of his friends: "Several hundreds of them assembled in the vicinity of Delhi, reading some books which had induced them to renounce caste to intermarry in their own sect and to lead a strict and holy life."⁵⁵

However, Anand (the local preacher), found that the book which they were reading was 'the Gospel of our Lord, translated into the Hindustani tongue'. So he told his misguided brothers to throw it away. But surprisingly, the people had

been misled in such an intelligent and foolproof manner that they did not listen to him. Rather, they stuck to their belief that 'the book was God's gift to them and repudiated Anand's assertion that it was the book of the Sahibs'. Such tricks, however, could not fool the people for long. Anand passed on the information to the more learned ones in his community and they undid the mischief (1827). "Nothing", says Allison, "is heard of these unusual Christians after their (missionaries') tricks were exposed."⁵⁵

In the towns and cities, however, the situation for the missionaries was slightly better. In the city of Delhi, especially, their activities met with some success. Besides a large number of men from the 'lower castes', they succeeded in converting to their faith quite a few men of status belonging to high castes—for instance, Ram Chander (1821-1880), a Kayastha of Panipat.⁵⁷ On completing his education, Ram Chander became a teacher at Delhi College, Delhi, in February 1844. He was a great scholar who wrote as many as 443 essays and seven learned books on different subjects.⁵⁸ He embraced Christianity on 5 May 1852.⁵⁹ The news of his conversion travelled far and wide. The Hindus and Muslims came in hundreds to Delhi to condemn his action. It had a disturbing effect on the minds of still larger numbers who saw these stray cases of conversion as part of a big plan of converting the whole of the country to Christianity. Furthermore, they also believed that it was at the instance of the Government that conversions were going on. This naturally made them disaffected towards the Government which they believed was out to destroy their religion.⁶⁰

Here a question may be posed: how far were the people justified in blaming the Government for conversions? As a matter of fact, there was a good deal of direct and indirect evidence which justified their doing so. The Government officials almost everywhere supported the padris in their evangelistic work, a fact reflected in the following statement of John Lowrie:

... Our missionary friends have enjoyed the confidence of many of the English residents in that country—civilian officers in the army and others. They have seen our

brethren at their stations, engaged in their daily labours. With the best knowledge of the work in progress, they have considered it their privilege to promote it by their sympathy; influence and very liberal gifts. They have done this as a means of building up the kingdom of our blessed Lord; and thus have they greatly encouraged our missionary brethren, and gratified the friends of mission in this country.⁶¹

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan said that some Government officials even sent policemen and peons in their official uniforms along with the missionaries when they went to the countryside.⁶² Besides, the Government gave inducements to the converts; they were given lucrative jobs, and those who were already in government service were given promotions. The converts were treated with respect in or outside office, for 'every Hindu or Muslim converted to the gospel of peace' was regarded an additional security for the permanence of British power.⁶³ Apart from this, an age-old law of the land sanctioning forfeiture of patriomony to the converts was suppressed by the Act 21 of 1850. Syed Ahmed Khan lashed out at the Government and charged it with having meddled with the religious affairs of Indians by adopting this Act. He said:

Act 21 of 1850 was without doubt prejudicial to the professors of other creeds. This Act was thought to have been passed with the view of winning men into Christianity. The Hindu faith, as is known, allows no converts. To the Hindus, therefore, this Act brought no benefit. If a man again becomes a convert to Islam he is forbidden by the laws of his own religion from inheriting property left to him by men of another creed. No Mohammadan convert, therefore, could profit by this Act. To such men, however, as became Christians it offered great advantages. Hence this Act was said not only to interfere with people's religion but to hold out strong inducements to conversions.⁶⁴

There was thus every reason for the people to doubt the integrity of the Government in religious matters, indeed to feel outraged.

VI

The foregoing discussion indicates that the denial of self-rule, severe economic exploitation and religious interference on the part of the British Government drove the people of Haryana right from the peasant to the prince, as it were, to desperation. But they did not know what to do or where to go for a remedy. In the second week of May 1857, however, the sepoys, those 'peasants in uniforms' showed them the way to salvation,

NOTES

1. For a detailed study of the village communities see Henry Maine, *Village Communities in the East & West*; Baden-Powell, *The Indian Village Community*; The Origin and Growth of the Village Communities in India; R. K. Mukherji, *Democracies of the East*.
2. Percival Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, p. 117.
3. Minutes of the Board of Revenue, 17 November 1830.
4. Fortescue's observation in this regard is very graphic. "We found," he said, "a perfect equality amongst the people in rank and fortune. Though some amongst them had more bighas of land and wealth than others within their society, yet the owners thereof had no proportionate power, nor did excess of either procure any. . . ." See his Report, *vide The Punjab Govt. Records*, Delhi Residency and Agency Records (hereinafter *Delhi Residency*), Vol. I, p. 121.
5. For details see Chicherov, *India: Economic Development*, pp. 15-43.
6. *Ibid.*; Spear, p. 123.
7. *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, pp. 82, 121.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 117, 121.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
12. R.C. Dutt, *Economic History of India*, Vol. II, p. 89.
13. *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, p. 121.
14. Richard Temple, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 81.
15. *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, p. 121.
16. Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India*, pp. 149-51.
17. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 9. Cf. the following statement of Thomas Fortescue: "I have not been able to discover myself nor do the proprietors seem disposed to believe that our tribunals, whether revenue or judicial, are better calculated to secure them their shares and rights than the awards of their own brotherhood, and I am with the natives . . . that it would be the best plan to leave the

proprietors to adjust their differences in their own way in such cases." *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, p. 121.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.

19. Temple, Vol. I, p. 81.

20. Dutt, Vol. II, p. 89.

21. *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, pp. 82-86.

22. For a detailed discussion on the nature of revenue system in vogue before the advent of the British, see besides *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I; Moreland, *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*; Baden-Powell, *The Land System of British India*, Vol. II.

23. Irfan Habib, p. 264.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-65.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, p. 115.

The following couplet became current after these days:

दिल्ली पाछे मरद भतेरे
बसै देश हरियाणा ।
आपे बोंवें, आपे खावें,
किसै ने दें न दाणा ॥

29. The early settlement officers believed in collecting the best price from their subjects. They enhanced revenue on every settlement without much rhyme or reason. As a result, the farmers became over-assessed. The evil was unfortunately increased by the dutiful zeal of public officers to obtain full dues of government at every settlement. Quoted in Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India*, pp. 53-54,

30. *SR Karnal*, p. 46

31. Panigrahi, p. 47.

32. *SR Karnal*, p. 47.

33. Despite effecting reduction the revenue charged was still heavy. After 1857, however, the government seem to have given a serious thought to the problem and made substantial reductions, as the following table, comparing the revenues of the pre-Revolt and post-Revolt days of the Hissar district would show :

<i>Tehsils</i>	<i>Pre-Revolt Revenue</i>	<i>Post-Revolt Revenue</i>
Bhiwani	81,181	73,206
Hansi	1,60,209	1,41,739
Hissar	1,01,204	89,885
Barwala	63,743	56,438
Fatehabad	79,066	69,438
	<hr/> 4,85,403	<hr/> 4,30,739

It is pertinent to point out here that the general area of the tehsils in both the periods under study was the same. But of course, the

cultivated area in the post-Revolt period had increased roughly by over 33%. There is all the more reason now to feel that the earlier settlements were really ruinous. See *DG Hissar*, p. 255.

34. *SR Karnal*, p. 47; *IGI*, Punjab, Vol. II, p. 310.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *SR Delhi*, p. 141.
37. Douie, *The Panjab Settlement Manual*, p. 10.
38. *SR Rohtak*, p. 138.
39. *DG Hissar*, pp. 236-37.
40. *Selections from the Records of the Govt. of India*, No. XVIII, p. 28.
41. Ibbetson, *SR Karnal*, pp. 111-12.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
43. For economic interdependence of the village artisans and craftsmen on the peasants, see Ashraf, *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan*, pp. 113-63; Chicherov, *India: Economic Development*, pp. 15-95.
44. See Chicherov, pp. 15-95 for the impact of the British rule on the townsmen.
45. *Delhi Residency*, Vol. I, p. 113.
46. Quoted by Ibbetson, *SR Karnal*, p. 221.
47. See chapter VII; and appendix I.
48. Assessment Report of Pipli Tehsil (1888), pp. 31-32; *DG Hissar*, p. 34 (for Rania); Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, p. 127; Hamilton, *Statistical*, Vol. I, p. 464 (for Chhachhrauli).
49. For a specimen of the feelings of the dispossessed dynasts see *Mutiny Papers*, box no. 34, dec. no. 12 (1857).
50. Kaye, *A History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. I, p. 154.
51. Minutes of the Board of Revenue, 17 Nov. 1830.
52. They were called *Kristan* and *Maleksha* (maleksha) by the people and any intercourse with them was considered a socio-religious offence.
53. No instance of conversions are reported from Haryana villages during the period under study.
54. For Satnamis see Yadav, *Ahliwal Ka Itihas*, pp. 43-46.
55. Allison, *The Sadhs*, pp. 103-5.
56. *Ibid.*
57. His father's name was Sunderlal who was a tehsildar at Delhi. For details regarding his life and activities see Syed Jafar, *Master Ram Chander Aur Urdu Nasra Ke Irtiqa Men Unka Hissa* (Hyderabad, n.d.).
58. He was considered a well-known authority on Urdu language. His essays are, by all standards, fine pieces of literature (Qadri, *Dastan-i-Urdu*, p. 311; Jafar, p. 52). The names of his books are as follows: *Usle-Jabra-o-Muqabala*, *Tazkira tulkmulin*, *Ajalb-i-rozagar*, *Bhut-nihand*, *Aijazi Quran*, *Usuli-ilme-habyyat*, and *Ilm-i-Tabi*. See Jafar, pp. 15-26.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

60. A good account in this regard is furnished by Ramvilas Sharnā, *1857 ki Rajya Kranti*, pp. 49-66.
61. Quoted in Webster, 'American Presbyterian Missions and Revolt of 1857', *Proceedings of Panjab History Conference*, Vol. I (1965), p. 149.
62. Syed Ahmed Khan, *An Essay on the Causes of the Revolt*, pp. 17-18.
63. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 536.
64. Syed Ahmed Khan, p. 24.

CHAPTER III

THE OUTBURST

I

At the close of the year 1856, the Government of India introduced in the Indian army an improved type of fire-arm, the Enfield rifle, in place of the 'Brown Bess' on grounds of expediency.¹ The cartridges for the new rifle were greased with an ingredient containing 'cow's fat and lard'² to make them slip readily into the barrel.³ A large number of such cartridges were manufactured at Fort William⁴ in Calcutta and supplied to the three depots started at Dum-Dum, Ambala and Sialkot for instruction in the use of the new weapon.⁵

No sooner was the new weapon introduced than a complication arose. In the early days of January 1857, a Bengali clerk at Calcutta had been assigned the task of translating into vernaculars details regarding the make and use of the cartridges for the Enfield rifle. While going through the original text in English he learned to his great surprise and horror that the grease used in the lubrication of the cartridges contained animal fat of cows and goats.⁶ The clerk spread the news. It was later on confirmed by a 'Khalasi' attached to the magazine at Dum-dum where cartridges for the Enfield rifles were manufactured. The news literally spread like wild fire among the sepoys of the Bengal Army.

On 22 January 1857 the military authorities at Dum-Dum came to know of this strange hysteria that had seized the native sepoys.⁸ Denials, explanations and reasoned arguments were put forward by persons in authority. But the belief proved hard to remove, so much so that very efforts made to root it out only fixed it more ineradicably in the popular mind. The sepoys firmly believed that the Government was determined to convert them to Christianity. And the first deliberate

attempt in that direction, they said, was to "destroy the caste, both of the Muhammadans and Hindoos, by making them use the fat of hog and cow".⁹ There is enough evidence to show that the sepoys' fear of the violation of their religions by the greased cartridges was not completely unfounded. The cartridge did contain cows' fat and hogs' lard at first. The fact was conceded by various English writers, and even by the Government in the House of Commons.¹⁰

Naturally the sepoys were in consternation. The question then agitated every mind and that trembled on every lip was: "Shall we tolerate the violation of our religion?" The answer was in the negative. To devise some counter-measures, *panchayats* were formed in every corps.¹¹ They vehemently criticised the Government, openly expressed their resentment and unanimously decided to expel from all communion, those sepoys, who "at any of the Depots, used the cartridges at all".¹² Besides, 'sedition' was vigorously spread from one regiment to another by letters, medicants and such religious agencies as *Dharma Sabha* of Calcutta,¹³ until at last a general spirit of mutiny pervaded the whole of the Bengal Army¹⁴ and northern India.

II

In north-western India the first military station to feel the contagion of the mutiny was Ambala. Besides being a large cantonment, this city was also one of the three Musketry Depots to which detachments from different regiments in the Panjab and the North-Western Provinces had been detailed for training in the use of the 'notorious' Enfield rifle.¹⁵

The sepoys at the Depot had learned of the decision of the *panchayats* 'to regard as outcastes and expel from all communion' anybody who used the greased cartridges.¹⁶ Consequently, there was great alarm and disaffection. Further fuel to the fire was added by *faqirs*¹⁷ and other interested persons. Among the latter was a British military officer who had been cashiered at Meerut. He embraced Islam under the name of Abdullah Beg and then visited Ambala, Ludhiana and Ferozepur, instigating the soldiers not to use the greased cartridges. He used to say: "I know these cartridges are smeared with the fat of pigs

and cows and the Government intends to take your caste",¹⁸ Having vowed not to touch these cartridges, the sepoys went to their officers and lodged strong complaints to the effect that they feared expulsion from their castes on return to their regiments owing to the alleged adulteration of the grease used in the cartridges.¹⁹

On receipt of such reports from various quarters, Col. Birch, Assistant Adjutant General, issued instructions to the Musketry Depots that the cartridges sheathed in yellow glazed paper should therefore be used in the dry state only in lieu of the greased cartridges.²⁰ The new arrangement, however, did not ease the tension in any way. The sepoys still believed that the fat of cows and pigs had been applied on the glossy surface of the paper which made them look different from those formerly used. Another reason for their suspicion was that when burnt, the paper gave out a fizzing sound and smelt as if there was grease in it. So firm was their belief that even the negative report of the chemical examiner, Dr. McNamara, did not satisfy them. This attitude of the sepoys seemed quite intolerable to many, and the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, bursted in anger: "I will never give in to their beastly prejudices".²¹

To Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala, there seemed to be in the sky then a "small cloud like a man's hand which portended the approaching storm".²² Surprisingly, he and his Government remained mere onlookers of the 'small cloud' and did nothing in their power to control the 'storm'. Nor did the Commander-in-Chief take any wise measures, when he first took notice of this discontent during his visit to Ambala in the middle of March 1857.²³

Two non-commissioned officers, Havildar Kasi Ram Tiwari and Naik Jeolal Dube of the 36th Native Infantry, attached to the Depot went to visit their friends who were part of the escort of the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson. Here they were taunted with the opprobrious epithet of 'Christians'.²⁴ It became clear to them, for the first time, in crystal clear terms, that all the persons working at the Depot had been ousted from their respective castes by their comrades-in-arms in their parent units and "the *lotah* and *hookah*, the water vessel and

the pipe, those love-tokens of Hindoo brotherhood were withheld from them for they had touched the grease and became impure".²⁵

On return to their lines the N.C.Os. shared their indignation and alarm with friends. Each man asked his neighbour: "If a subedar in the Commander-in-Chief's camp and on duty as his personal escort can taunt us with loss of caste, what kind of reception shall we meet on our return to our own corps."²⁶

The N.C.Os. approached Captain Martineau, a senior musketry instructor, and placed their 'tale of grief' before him.²⁷ Next day Captain Martineau made a full representation of the case in a demi-official letter to Captain Birch, the Assistant Adjutant General:

The state of affairs is lamentable," he said, "as it discloses the actual feelings of the whole of the Native Army They (sepoys) placed in my hands letters from various regiments which convinced me that a widespread conspiracy was matured."²⁸

The immediate result of this was that General Anson inspected the Musketry Depot on 22 March 1857 and addressed the sepoys in a personal *darbar*, 'a new thing in the history of the Bengal Army', and the people saw for the first time, the Commander-in-Chief condescending 'to explain the action of the Government and the reasons for that action to the native officers'.²⁹

The Commander-in-Chief tried his utmost to convince the native officers that the rumour of the new cartridges affecting the religions of the sepoys was quite baseless.³⁰ But his explanation bore no fruit and soon afterwards Captain Martineau was again approached by the 'Native Officers' with the request that "it is not a mere question to us of obedience or disobedience." The story was so generally circulated and was so generally believed, "not only by the sipahis but by their relations and by villagers all over the country,"³¹ that the sipahis cannot use the cartridges without incurring the certainty of social degradation, the . . . loss of caste."³²

The matter weighed very heavily on General Anson's mind. He was in a fix. At one time he thought of breaking up the Depot and sending back the detachments to their regiments on

the pretext of hot season for the purpose of easing the situation. But that he thought would lower British dignity.³³ Yet something was to be done to soothe the feelings of the agitated sepoys. The General directed the musketry instructors not to proceed to the point of firing until a special report was received from Meerut on the subject of the cartridge paper.³⁴ But this could not be done because to Lord Canning it appeared that any postponement of the target practice of the drill detachments would be a mistake. It would be a concession to unreasonable fears, which would live like an admission that there was reason in them and he telegraphically informed the authorities at Ambala not to give up the target practice.³⁵

Among the sepoys there were a few exception like Subedar Harbans Singh of the 36 N.I., who came out to fire with the dreaded cartridges publicly on 26 March 1867 and saw no objection in doing so.³⁶ But there being great co-operation among the sepoys the "black sheep" were punished at once. We are told that hardly twelve hours had elapsed since the Subedar had volunteered himself for the use of the new cartridges when his house and property were destroyed by fire.³⁷ On 13th and 15th April, two other fires broke out in the night⁴⁰ for identical reasons.

It was at this time that the question was again mooted whether the cartridges should be used at Ambala. It was the unanimous opinion of the officers at the Depot that the cartridges should not be used.⁴¹ But the Commander-in-Chief thought otherwise. On 16 April 1857 he gave his decision that the sepoys should be compelled to fire the cartridges in utter disregard of their prejudices and fears.⁴²

This caused further concern among the sepoys. Trumpet Major Murray of the Horse Artillery, while going to the bazar in the evening of 16 April saw the sepoys in a group discussing their intention to burn the bungalows, stores and barracks.⁴³ But he brushed it aside as mere gossip. The sepoys, however, meant what they said. In the night they successfully attempted two fires and destroyed Government property worth Rs. 30,000. "It was really an expensive amusement", remarked a British official, "teaching the sepoys to fire with the Enfield rifle at least as far as it has turned out at Ambala".⁴⁴

Brigadier Halifax, the station commander, took every possible precautionary measure to put a stop to this arson.⁴⁵ Mounted patrols and *pickets* were begun, and all *faqirs*, travellers and idle persons, not belonging to the station, were expelled.⁴⁶ But there was no effect. The sepoys still assembled and the *faqirs* did come and address the sepoy meetings. One such instance was reported by R. Burnton to the court of inquiry instituted to find out the causes of the incendiary fires. He said:

At about eight on the 17th April, I was walking through the gardens and I perceived there was fire; at the same time my attention was attracted by the murmuring of voices, I went in the direction of the sound and I saw a number of natives collected together. I looked over their shoulders and saw a native, naked with long beard. He appeared to be addressing these natives and every second or third word seemed to be an approval of what he said. I heard the words 'Khuda' 'Ag.' When they saw me, they surrounded me, took hold of me and upon my attempting to shake them off, they spat in my face.⁴⁷

Charles Ball gives details of another such meeting held in the evening of 20 April: "A group of the native soldiers were earnestly discussing some topics . . . the unintentional intruder (a man of the 9th Lancers) upon their privacy was no sooner observed than the discussion ceased and the man was surrounded . . . by an angry crowd." He, somehow, escaped and got safely to his quarters, but he was stabbed while sleeping in his bedroom a few hours later. The sad incident was followed by two disastrous fires in the Indian infantry lines.⁴⁸

This was but a prelude to many such scenes. Fires became almost nightly occurrences. "Suddenly in the dead of night," said Forsyth, "flames would burst out in various parts of cantonment, bungalows, or stables of officers attached to the Musketry Depot, Government buildings containing stores for European soldiers were fired."⁴⁹ Captain Howard, the cantonment Joint-Magistrate has given a detailed account of these fires⁵⁰ (Table I).

TABLE 1
Incendiary Fires

26 March, 1857	Depot Musketry (late 28th Regiment Native Infantry lines)—Attempt to fire the house of Soobadar Hurbuns Singh, 36th Regiment Native Infantry, attached to Musketry Depot.
13 April, 1857	Depot Musketry—Europeans' chuppur burnt.
15 April, 1857	60th Regiment Native Infantry Lines—Riding-Master Boucher's out-houses set on fire.
16 April, 1857	Hospital (late 28th Regiment Native Infantry) in which the Europeans' Musketry Depot were located, but empty when fired.
16 April, 1857	No. 9 European Infantry Barrack in which were 442 casks of beer for European soldiers fired.
17 April, 1857	50 Regiment Native Infantry Lines—Lieutenant Whiting's bungalow fired; attempt to fire Lieutenant Walker's stables, 60th Regiment Native Infantry.
19 April, 1857	60th Regiment Native Infantry Lines House occupied by Lieutenant Graigie, 36th Regiment Ross, 9th Regiment, Corfield, 3rd Regiment, Officers attached to the Musketry Depot, stable burnt: Fired also the house of Sheo Narain Singh, Soobadar, 3rd Company, 5th Regiment Native Infantry Lines, and a Civil Police chowkee on the Grand Trunk Road.
20 April, 1857	Attempt to fire the houses of the Jamaadar and Havildar, 5th Regiment Native Infantry Lines, both attached to Musketry Depot.
21 April, 1857	Six or seven houses, 6th Company, 60th Regiment Native Infantry fired, in which

	was the property of sepoy's proceeded on furlough.
22 April, 1857	5th Regiment Native Infantry Mess Compound, Sheep house set on fire; European Infantry Lines—Major Laughton's stables attempted to be fired.
23 April, 1857	9th Lancers Lines—attempt to fire Captain Sounders' house, 41st Regiment Native Infantry, attached to the Musketry Depot.
25 April, 1857	9th Lancers Lines—Bank Master's house, Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, regimental property burnt.
26 April, 1857	Attempt (during the day) to fire Lieutenant and Riding-Master Shaw's house, 9th Lancers Lines.
1 May, 1857	Baijnath sepoy's hut (5th Regiment Native Infantry Lines) burnt.

Courts of inquiry instituted to find out the minds and hands behind the incendiary fires bore no fruits.⁵¹ The Deputy Commissioner was at work, the military authorities did their utmost and there was an inducement of Rs. 1,000/- to any one who would give any clue of the incendiaries, yet there was no progress.⁵² Captain Howard said:

Were it the act of only one or two or even a few persons; well disposed sepoy's would at once have come forward. Though all and every individual comprising a regiment may not form a part of the combination—that a (organised) League in each corps is known to exist and such being upheld by the majority, or rather arrived at therefore, no single man dares to come forward and exposes it.⁵³

III

Sham Singh a sepoy of the 5th Native Infantry told Forsyth towards the end of April 1857:

The great body of the sepoy's were in highly indignant and excited state under the apprehension that they were all to be compelled to use the offensive cartridge; and

that they had resolved that whenever such an order be issued every bungalow in the station should be in flames. He further exposed a conspiracy giving the details thus: Two native infantry corps were to seize the magazines; the Light Cavalry to seize the guns; the heelropes of the horses of the H. M.'s 9th Lancers were to be cut and the horses let loose; and a general rise and massacre to ensue.⁵⁴

A police official (the Bazar Kotwal) also confirmed the existence of such a conspiracy though in a different way by deposing that a *pandit* had told him that according to Hindu astrological calculations, it was certain that blood would be shed within a week either in Delhi, Meerut, or Ambala.⁵⁵

The matter was immediately reported to the local military authorities as well as to the Commander-in-Chief who was, then, "on a sporting excursion among the hills".⁵⁶ The former took precautionary measures and posted vigilant guards at every point of importance, so much so that the English soldiers hardly got two nights a week in bed,⁵⁷ but the latter could not take any prompt action. He openly confessed that "what was passing at Ambala sorely puzzled him".⁵⁸ "Strange", he wrote to Lord Canning, "that the incendiaries should never be detected . . . Everyone is on the alert there, but still no clue to trace the offenders."⁵⁹

John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, saw grave consequences ahead if the new cartridges were not abandoned. Sounding a note of warning to this effect he pointed out:

This mischief will spread—Disaffection pervades the whole of the native regular army and will extend to the irregulars. Even punishments will not prove effective, for the sufferers will become object of sympathy and be looked upon as martyrs for their religion.⁶⁰

But his warning was not heeded and the Commander-in-Chief still persisted in the use of the new cartridges. As a matter of fact, the greatest breach of military discipline and faith was made by the highest military authority of the land himself by forcing the sepoys at the Depot to use the cartridges, which, as the authorities had said were not to be issued to any 'native sepoy'.⁶¹ Evidence in support of this has been furnished

by Anson himself who said boastfully: "The new cartridges were supplied to the sepoy and the men of all grades unhesitatingly and cheerfully used the new cartridges".⁶² The last part of his statement is quite contrary to facts. There were no cases, excepting a few in the whole of the Indian army, where the sepoy used the cartridges 'unhesitatingly and cheerfully'.

IV

In the first week of May the situation worsened. Sham Singh, a sepoy of the 5th N.I. informed Forsyth that the Musalmans and Hindus were united in the determination to resist what they looked upon as tampering with their religions and that there was clique who held consultation which were not communicated to the sepoy generally.⁶³

A few days later it was reported that "in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Ambala and that a general rising of the sepoy would take place."⁶⁴

There was a great deal of truth in these bits of intelligence. The sepoy at Ambala had planned to rise in open mutiny on 10 May when all the Europeans would be attending the opening ceremony of a new church situated at an open place close to the lines of the 60th N.I. and the 5th N.I. What their plan was like has been described by Cave-Brown in the following words:⁶⁵

The Lancers and artillery men, without horses and guns, with their officers and their families all collected together at a distance from the remaining European troops and they, mostly unguarded or in a hospital would have been an easy prey; and a rush made on the church in the midst of the service, and the unsuspecting congregation would have been at their mercy; surrounded by at least 1,500 armed mutinous sepoy; they would probably have been shot down before they could offer any resistance or help could arrive.⁶⁶

But 'the merciful providence' led to an escape from peril.⁶⁷ Fortunately, it was decided on 9 May that, as the new church was not yet fit for use, the divine service should be held in the old church near the middle of the European lines, the 9th

Lancers on one side and the British artillery on the other.⁶⁸ As such the congregation could not be stormed unnoticed by the European soldiers living in these lines. There the guns too were quite close at hand. So the sepoys' original plan got completely foiled by the change in the programme of service from the new church to the old one.⁶⁹

But the troops seemed to have been quite determined to rebel. The first plan having proved abortive they rebelled haphazardly. Strangely, no official account of their actions is found anywhere in the Government papers, published and unpublished.⁷⁰ However, a private letter of an eyewitness (a British Officer) dated Ambala, 14 May 1857 throws some light on the incident.⁷¹

At approximately 9 a.m. on Sunday, 10 May 1857, about nine hours before the outbreak of mutiny at Meerut, the 60th N.I. openly revolted at Ambala. The sepoys left their lines as one man, seized arms from the regimental kote, and arrested their European officers. But to their great surprise the next moment they found themselves surrounded by a superior number of European forces. Under the circumstances, the sepoys could not proceed ahead with their plan. Nor could the British troops fall upon them for, in the words of the eye-witness:⁷² "They (sepoys) had their officers (Englishmen) as prisoners and threatened to shoot them if we came down." So, both the forces stood still for a while and then bargaining started. In the words of the same eye-witness: "If we (Englishmen) did not (attack them), they (sepoys) would return quietly." The Englishmen had no other alternative but to agree to their proposal.⁷³

The 60th N.I. had not even fully quietened down when the 5th N.I. turned out at 12 o'clock (noon). Having burnt their fingers once, the Britishers immediately rushed to the trouble spot and surrounded the 5th N.I. with cavalry and artillery, superior to them in number and fire-power. So the uprising of the 5th N.I. was also checked.⁷⁴

At the same time trouble burst forth at the third spot, the treasury. Here a detachment of the 5th N.I. was on duty and when they heard that their comrades had risen, they too rebelled. But promptitude on the part of the British again saved the situation.⁷⁵

For the whole day both the regiments stood with their arms and their captive European officers on the parade grounds in open defiance of the law.⁷⁶ In the evening General Henry Barnard came in person and after granting them 'unconditional pardon', 'quietened and induced' them with pledges and promises.⁷⁷ In the absence of any historical evidence, nothing can be said precisely what their pledges and promises were which the General made. But it is clear from some passing references in the government papers that 'unconditional pardon' was one of the pledges⁷⁸ and 'their arms would not be taken' was another.⁷⁹ Both these promises of the General were subsequently confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief, though much against his wish,⁸⁰ when he arrived at Ambala on 16 May 1857.⁸¹

The British military authorities kept their word despite many handicaps and troubles.⁸² But nothing short of an open mutiny could relieve the tension in the minds of the Indian sepoys; and they subsequently rose against the British at Ambala, Rupar and Rohtak on different dates.

IV

It is clear from the above discussion that as soon as the sepoys knew that fats used in the manufacture of the new cartridges were objectionable on religious grounds they organised themselves to take some collective action against their employers in case the cartridges were forced upon them. This action took the form of a general revolt of the sepoys. As far as Ambala was concerned, plans had matured quite long before the outbreak of the Mutiny on 10 May as already indicated by Sepoy Sham Singh to Forsyth.

The Ambala planners also had contacts with their counterparts in other cantonments. Captain Martineau had come to know of this fact as early as March 1857 and he in turn communicated all the information to the higher authorities telling them plainly that a widespread conspiracy had been hatched. Sham Singh, the informant, told Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala that "a general rising of the sepoys would take place" in the second week of May and they (sepoys) had planned to shed blood of the Europeans at Delhi, Ambala,

Meerut, etc. The actual uprisings of the sepoy at Ambala and Meerut on the same day (10 May) confirm that the plan had been worked out by the sepoy leaders in advance. This simultaneity was not a matter of chance or coincidence. Fearing a leakage, the plan was not shared by the leaders with all the sepoys: it was kept a closely guarded secret with a few top leaders.

A study of the events at both Ambala and Meerut indicates that the sepoys' plan was to rise in revolt while the Europeans were attending the Sunday church services. They wanted to catch them unawares and unguarded. The uprising of the sepoys at Ambala in the morning and at Meerut in the evening is explained by this fact. The rest of the details of the revolt were to be worked out locally by the leaders in the two cantonments. (We have given the details of the plot engineered by the leaders at Ambala.) The existence of a premeditated plan of rising at Meerut—the 20th N.I. and 11th N.I. would rise and the 3rd Light Cavalry would follow them after releasing their comrades from the jail, was confessed by a native officer of the 3rd L.C. to Lt. Gough. The final part of the plan involved going to Delhi after completely destroying the Europeans at the two stations. The British were, however, too alert to be caught napping at Ambala, and the sepoys failed to translate their plans into action. But they succeeded at Meerut. Had the Ambala troops succeeded like those at Meerut, the British would have found their work of a century undone overnight.

NOTES

1. Forrest, *Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers*. . . , Vol. I, p. 1. Besides Brown Bess, three other fire arms were used by some native infantry and cavalry regiments. They were Brunswick rifle, Minie rifle and Carbines. For further details see Palmer, *The Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut in 1857*, p. 10.
2. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 263, Vol. XXX, p. 48; Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. II, p. 431; *Times*, February 23, 1857, vide Sen, *Eighteen Fifty Seven*, p. 42; Malleson, *Red Pamphlet*, p. 18; Marriot, *History of English Rule in India*, p. 164.
3. Kaye, Vol. I, p. 439. See also Palmer, pp. 8-14.
4. Forrest, Vol. I, p. 1.
5. *Ibid.* As early as October 1856 about 22,500 greased cartridges were sent to Ambala, See Kaye, Vol. I, p. 520. f. n.

6. This information has been given only by Kanhaya Lal, *Tarikh-i-Baghawat-i-Hind*, 1857, p. 12.
7. For a detailed account see Forrest, Vol. I, pp. 1-3. Religious institutions like *Dharma Sabha* of Calcutta took a very prominent part in spreading the news and disaffection throughout India.
8. Forrest, Vol. I, pp. 1-3. The story was first reported by Captain Wright, commanding the Rifle Instruction Depot, Dumdum to Major General Hearsay on January 22, 1857, who in his turn reported it to the Government of India on January 24, 1857.
9. From Lt. Col. S. A. Abbot, Deputy Commissioner of Hoshiarpur to Maj. Edward Lake, Offg. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Sutlej State, No. 504, dated 7th October, 1857, vide *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 199. Abbot says: "A belief prevailed among men that the Commander-in-Chief had come out with a commission from the Queen of England to enforce Christianity."
10. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 263, Vol. XXX, p. 48; *Times*, February 3, 1857 cited by Sen, p. 42; Roberts, Vol. II, p. 431; Tucker, p. 24; Malleeson, p. 18; Marriot, p. 164.
11. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-II, p. 34.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Forrest, Vol. I, p. 3.
14. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 2.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Parliamentary Papers Relating to the Mutiny in the Panjab in 1857*, pp. 102-3.
18. Metcalfe, *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny at Delhi*, pp. 39-41.
19. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 34.
20. Collier, *The Sound of Fury*, p. 26.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 33.
23. Cave-Brown, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I, pp. 41-2.
24. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 33; Cave-Brown (Vol. I, p. 42) says: "They (N. C. Os) had looked for the wanted greeting 'Ram Ram', but they were branded as outcastes".
25. Cave-Brown, Vol. I, p. 42.
26. Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 554-55.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Malleeson, p. 114; Kaye, Vol. I, p. 554.
30. Kaye, Vol. I, p. 551.
31. Collier (p. 12) says: "All along the G. T. Road village drums throbbed in the night carrying the wild rumour that the lord sahib sought to destroy the caste of the army through new cartridges smeared with cow's fat and hog's lard."
32. Cave-Brown, Vol. I, pp. 44-5; Malleeson, p. 114.
33. Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 558-59.

34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, pp. 6-7.
37. Cave-Brown, Vol. I, p. 47.
38. It was the second incendiary fire. It has been wrongly put as "first incendiary fire in Ambala" in the F.I.R. registered with the Sadar Bazar Police Station which runs thus :
"13th April after 12 o'clock in the night, Pran Lal chokeedar reported that in the middle of the 3rd Cavalry lines, Brij Mohan Sower's house and four others were burnt."
Parliamentary Papers Relating to the Mutiny in the Panjab in 1857, pp. 102-3.
39. Military Consultation, No. 172, July 3, 1857.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 290.
42. *The Friend of India*, April 20, 1857.
43. Military Consultation, No. 172, July 3, 1857.
44. He says: "It has cost, I believe, by the fires alone some 3,27,000/-". See Montgomery, *Indian Empire*, Vol. VII, p. 139. f.n.
45. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 12.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Military Consultation, No. 172, July 3, 1857.
48. Ball, Vol. I, p. III; *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, pp. 13-14; Military Consultations, Nos. 223-25, May 28, 1857.
49. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, pp. 13-14; Military Consultations, Nos. 413-15, May 22, 1857.
50. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, pp. 13-14.
51. As a specimen as to how these courts of inquiry proceeded with their work, see Military Consultation, No. 172, May 3, 1857.
52. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, p. 8.
53. *Ibid.*; also see Kaye, Vol. I, p. 563. Here General Anson speaks of the sepoys' combination in more or less in the same vein.
54. Cave-Brown, Vol. I, p. 48.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
56. Mead, *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 73.
57. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 177.
58. Kaye, Vol. I, p. 563.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Captain H. R. James, officiating Secretary, to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, vide *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, pp. 13-14.
61. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 177.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, p. 35.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Cave-Brown, Vol. I, pp. 186-87.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-88.
67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*

70. A passing reference to them is made in a telegram and in a letter of the Deputy Commissioner (Ambala). See *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, p. 15 and p. 35.

71. The letter has been quoted in full by Martin-Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 177.

72. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 177.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.*; *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 35.

76. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 35.

77. Macmun, *The Indian Mutiny in Perspective*, p. 59.

He says, "In the first place some very definite pledges had been given to them (sepoys) by their officers".

78. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII-I, pp. 5-6.

79. Foreign Secret Consultations, No. 15-31, June 26, 1857.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Ibid.* Anson's first act (after arrival at Ambala on May 16) was to confirm General Barnard's promises and to pardon two native regiments for their behaviour on the 10th May, 1857."

82. John Lawrence suggested immediate disarming of the 5th and the 60th N. I. after the arrival of General Anson at Ambala on 16 May 1857. But Anson did not think it proper to break the military word and preferred to be vehemently criticised by his own countrymen.

CHAPTER IV

HARYANA GOES INDEPENDENT

I

DELHI DISTRICT: Delhi, as noted earlier, was a small district in 1857. It was bounded on the north by District Panipat, on the east by the river Yamuna, on the south by the state of Ballabgarh and District Gurgaon and on the west by District Rohtak, and had an area of 790 sq. miles and a population of 4,35,744.¹ Its headquarters was located at the historic city of Delhi.

Administratively, the district was divided into two tehsils—Delhi and Sonapat. The former was composed of the city of Delhi and its environs with a population of about 1,82,000 out of which approximately 54 per cent were Hindus (Brahmanas, Banias, Khattris, Kayasthas, Rajputs, Jats, Ahirs, Gujars, Sainis, Badhis and Harijans) and 45 per cent Muslims (Sayeds, Sheikhs, Pathans, Rajputs, Kasabs, Kunjaras, Telis, Rangrez, etc.). The Christians numbered only a few hundred. In the Sonapat teshil, a great majority of people—about 70% were Hindus (Jats, Gujars, Rajputs, Ahirs, Tyagis, Sainis, Brahmanas, Barhis, Harijans). The Muslims (Rajputs, Meos, Ranghars, Gujars, Kasabs, etc.), formed less than 29% of the population.²

Occupationally, these people belonged to four major groups: 62% were supported by agriculture, 29% by industries, 6% by trade and business and 3% by services. None of these groups, as a whole, as already indicated elsewhere, were happy with the British rule.³

The powder keg of their disaffection was lit by the sepoy of Meerut, who, having destroyed the British authority at their station, came to Delhi a little after daybreak on 11 May. The Indian troops at the latter place, as pointed out by Robert

Montgomery, the then Chief Judicial Commissioner of Panjab, were already prepared for such an eventuality and 'stood by their comrades'.⁴ The two together easily destroyed the British rule in the historic city of Delhi and placed octogenarian Bahadur Shah on the throne of Hindustan, thus reviving the old political order made defunct by the British.

The news of these revolutionary happenings travelled at a lightning speed all over the district. Except for a few 'loyalists' here and there it was a glad tidings for the disaffected people who obliterated every symbol of the Company's *raj* from their district.⁵ Sen, Majumdar, Mahdi Husain and Rizvi have told the story at great length in their works.⁶ There is, therefore, no need to repeat it here.

II

GURGAON DISTRICT: From Delhi the fire of revolt spread in the Gurgaon district. This district was bounded on the north by the districts of Delhi and Rohtak, on the west by the territories belonging to the states of Alwar and Jaipur, on the south by the Mathura district and Bharatpur and on the east by the river Yamuna, and had an area of about 1939 sq. miles and a population of 6,62,500 persons. The seat of the district administration was located at Gurgaon, then a very small town, little better than a village, about 20 miles from Delhi.⁷

It was predominantly a Hindu district (67%) and the dominant caste was of the Ahirs (25%) who were concentrated, as indicated earlier, in the south-eastern region called *Ahirwal*. They spoke *Ahirwati*, a dialect of Western Hindi named after them. Rewari was their headquarters and they looked upon the rulers of this place as their leaders. They were very good agriculturists.⁸

The other important caste was that of the Jats who lived chiefly in Palwal and the northern parganas. They were also agriculturists like Ahirs. The Rajputs, Gujars, Sainis were other important cultivating castes found scattered almost throughout the district. The artisans and Harijans were solely dependent upon the peasant castes—Ahirs, Gujars, Rajputs and Jats for their subsistence.⁹ The ruinous revenue

policy and other measures of the government had, as we have seen in the second chapter, annoyed both the Hindu peasantry and the dependent castes to a considerable extent. As a result they were everywhere ready to support any movement which aimed at destroying the government.

The Muslims, who formed over 30 per cent of the district population were also disaffected. The Meos, about one-sixth of the population holding large tracts of land in the southern portion of the district¹⁰ called Mewat had particularly strong anti-British feelings. This was due to the fact that the Meos though agriculturists were not well off owing to the barren and rocky nature of their lands. As mentioned above (chapter I), they made good this financial deficiency by resorting to thieving, stealing and plundering. The British administration, however, stood in their way and checked their anti-social activities. This had made their life miserable. The end of British rule at Delhi was, therefore, a heartening piece of news to them and their first natural reaction was to set out on plundering expeditions. But these activities of theirs were soon checked by the *ghazis* and *ulemas* who came to Mewat to seek their cooperation in making the Muslim rule in Delhi and also in India a success.⁹

Thus, when about 300 sepoys from Delhi marched into the Gurgaon district on 11 May (afternoon) they found great support from the local populace. Hundreds of peasants from the neighbouring villages, and artisans and poor people from the town of Gurgaon swelled the sepoys' ranks in no time. A few impoverished feudal nobles like Nawab Ahmed Mirza Khan and Nawab Dula Jan also joined them. It is interesting to note that the rebels did not entrust their leadership to the two newly arrived feudal chiefs, but kept it in their own hands. W. Ford, the Collector-Magistrate of Gurgaon tried to check the rebels at Bijwasan, a small village 12 km. from Gurgaon in the morning of 12 May. But he failed. The rebels next attacked Gurgaon, the seat of the district administration. Ford made another attempt to repulse the rebels, but he failed this time also. Demoralized by his successive defeats, Ford fled to Mathura via Bhondsi, Silani and Palwal, taking the European customs officers of all these places with him. The rebels

occupied the District headquarters, seized Rs. 7,84,000/- from the treasury, destroyed the houses of the Europeans and the loyalists, and released prisoners from the district gaol.¹¹

In Mewat, the sturdy and warlike Mewatis came out in large numbers and formed a *dhar* (a crowd turned into a somewhat organised gathering) to finish the British rule. Sadruddin a tall, handsome Meo peasant from Pinngghwa stood at their head. This peasant leader was a very intelligent and shrewd man, who did his job very seriously.¹²

Sadruddin's first attack was on the loyalist elements living in towns. His men met with little opposition at Tauru, Sohna, Ferozpur, Punhana, and Pinngghwa, but they had quite a tough time dealing with the loyal *Khanzadas*¹³ at Nuh. The struggle went on for quite some time, but ultimately the rebels were successful on account of their superiority in numbers. Thereafter the Rawat Jats of the region near Hodal and the Rajputs of Hathin, 'who were supposed to be on the part of the (British) Government' were attacked with the help of the Surot Jats of Hodal and Pathans of Seoli.¹⁴ The fight continued for several months with the loyalists suffering heavy losses.¹⁵ On receipt of the 'S.O.S.' signal from the Rawats, the British authorities before Delhi despatched a movable column for Hodal to help them, but despite Government help the Rawats were completely routed.¹⁶

In the middle of June, Major W. Eden, the political agent at Jaipur, happened to pass through Mewat at the head of a contingent comprising about 6,999 men and 7 guns on his way to Delhi. But finding Mewat, in a 'most deplorable state of anarchy' he thought it advisable to settle it before going to Delhi.¹⁷ He soon found, however, that the job he had assigned himself was not an easy one. He was offered stiff opposition by thousands of Mewatis between Tauru and Sohna. Had he not been in possession of artillery, his force would have suffered heavy losses.¹⁸

The Major halted at Sohna for three days. Ford and thirty European officers came down from Mohana and joined him here. After that, Eden moved towards Palwal and remained between that place and Hodal for some time.¹⁹ Interestingly, at this stage there was a rebellion among his

own troops and a powerful group of them led by Thakur Shiv Nath Singh, an Ex-minister of Jaipur, even made a murderous attack on him (Eden) on 20 July.²⁰ Under these circumstances, Eden had to return to Jaipur at once, leaving Mewat in the hands of the sons of the soil.²¹

In *Ahirwal*,²² the people waged a gallant struggle under the leadership of Tula Ram and his cousin Gopal Dev, both descendants from the Raos of Rewari whom Aurangzeb had granted a Jagir worth Rs. 20,00,000 per annum. The Raos had helped the Marathas in 1803 in their fight against the British and as a result when the latter came out successful in the struggle, they confiscated their Jagir and gave instead an *Istamarari* grant of about 87 villages worth Rs. 1,00,000 per annum. This was a great blow to the Raos which shattered their position.²³ This made the sufferers unhappy with the British Raj; and the fall of the British fortunes on 11 May 1857 was a most welcome piece of news to them.²⁴

On 17 May 1857, the Raos went to the tehsil headquarters at Rewari with four to five hundred followers and deposed the tehsildar and thanedar. They appropriated the cash of Rs. 8,364.27 Ps. from the tehsil treasury, took all the government buildings in their possession and proclaimed, under the sanction of Emperor Bahadur Shah their rule over the parganas of Rewari, Bhora and Shahjahanpur consisting of 360, 52 and 9 villages respectively. For their headquarters they chose Rampura, a small fortified village, one mile south-west of Rewari.²⁵ Tula Ram, the elder Rao became Raja and Gopal Dev his C-in-C.

Now Tula Ram organised the revenue department, and collected revenue and taxes.²⁶ He took donations and loans amounting to Rs. 1,50,000 from the mahajans of Rewari.²⁷ He raised a big force²⁸ (about five thousand men) and set up a large workshop in the fort of Rampura where a substantial number of guns, gun-carriages, and other small arms and ammunition were manufactured.²⁹ The Rao enforced law and order and defended his State from outside attacks.³⁰

These activities pleased Bahadur Shah and he confirmed Rao Tula Ram in his jagirs of Rewari, Bhora and Shahjahanpur.³¹ Tula Ram in return, rendered all possible help to Emperor Bahadur Shah and the rebels waging war against the

British in Delhi. He sent Rs. 45,000³² through General Bakht Khan at such a critical time when non-payment of the salaries to the sepoy had caused great insecurity and anxiety, though his small sum did not improve the situation.³³ There was a dispute among the soldiers on the distribution of this money. The king in anger took up his cushion from the throne and threw it down saying: "Send the horse harness, the silver *howdahs* and cushioned chairs to Mirza Mughal that he may sell them and pay all with the proceeds."³⁴ The Rao also supplied the Delhi forces with large quantities of necessary commodities. Jiwan Lal says that in August there was a scarcity of opium in the army, and consequently many soldiers died. On 24 August 1857 Bahadur Shah sent a request to Tula Ram to send some opium to Delhi. This may have been supplied because the appeal was not repeated; nor was Tula Ram scolded in any way for non-compliance of the royal orders.³⁵ Again in September a request was made to the Rao for the supply of sulphur for manufacturing powder when "there is none to be procured in the city".³⁶ At the time of scarcity of foodgrains, the Rao sent two thousand sacks and forty-three carts of grain for the 'rebel forces' at Delhi.³⁷ This shows that the Rao kept open the supply line of the besieged garrison in Delhi.

In the south-east the sturdy Jats, Rajputs, Ranghars rose in revolt effectively. At Palwal Mirza Gafur Ali and Harsukh Rai, both small tradesmen,³⁸ led the people against the *Feringhees*. At Faridabad the leadership was assumed by Dhanna Singh Rajput.³⁹ Raja Nahar Singh⁴⁰ and Nawab Ahmed Ali led⁴¹ the people of Ballabgarh and Farrukhnagar respectively. A detailed discussion of their 'exploits' is attempted in Chapter VII. The contemporary records indicate that the people of this district had freed themselves of the British control by the end of the second week of May 1857.

III

ROHTAK DISTRICT: Like Gurgaon the Rohtak district was also affected by 'the air of mutiny' as soon as Delhi fell. Here the Hindus formed the bulk of the population (65%⁴²), the Jats being

the most numerous community (30%) among them. This sturdy community, Jats, was divided into a number of clans separate from and independent of each other except in regard to marriage which could be arranged only outside the clan. Each clan lived in a closed locality comprising several villages—sometimes in a group of 84 (*chaurasi*), 24 (*chaubisi*) or 12 (*barah*).⁴³

On hearing the news of the fall of Delhi, all the Jat clans rose up and finished off all vestiges of the British rule from their localities. Unfortunately, however, no local leader worth the name came forward from amongst them to control the new situation. This resulted in chaos and confusion and different Jat clans started their age-old infights again.⁴⁴

The Ranghars, living in the midst of the sturdy Jat population also rose *en masse*. Their struggle was very intense for two reasons; first, a large number of Ranghar soldiers whose regiments had mutinied came and joined them. Secondly, they found good leaders in Bisarat Ali and Babar Khan. The former was a peasant from Kharkhauda. He had joined the army and by dint of his hard work and ability had become a *risaldar* there. He was brave and clever and had seen many an action during his army service and was thus quite familiar with the principles of military organisation and warfare. Babar was a peasant from Rohtak.⁴⁵

The Ranghars led by Bisarat Ali freed the whole of their region from the British control. But despite their best efforts they could not take Rohtak, the seat of the district administration which was ably defended by Loch, the Deputy commissioner. At this juncture, however, the rebels received help from Delhi. On 24 May there came a movable column under Tafzal Husain. Deputy Commissioner Loch tried to oppose the column with the help of Tehsildar Bakhtawar Singh, Thanedar Bhure Khan, and the local troops, but he was overpowered by them. Having suffered defeat, Loch ran away, leaving the district headquarters in the hands of the rebels.⁴⁶

After three days the Rohtak rebels were joined by a force (Haryana Light Infantry) from Hansi, Hissar, and Sirsa. The latter reported that they saw

the public buildings, the Judge's Court and offices and Collector's treasury had been burnt down and were still

burning. The rebels had torn up all the public records, papers and documents, vast rolls and piles of them and after breaking up the chests and racks in which they had been kept and piling all up in the centre of each building, they had made huge bonfires of the whole.⁴⁷

It is unfortunate that Tafzal Husain did not take any steps to set up administration in the district. He only collected Rs. 1,10,000/- from the district treasury and then returned to Delhi via Meham, Sampla and Mandauthi, plundering the houses of the Europeans and the 'loyalist element' at all these places. Nor did the local leaders like Bisarati Ali do anything worthwhile. In fact Bisarati was a military leader who had no experience of civil administration. In consequence, there was an utter lack of governing institutions in the district which in turn led to chaos and confusion all around.

The news of maladministration reached Bahadur Shah, who at once issued a *firman* to the people of Rohtak warning them:⁴⁸

That one man is not to stretch out the hand of violence against another, and that all are to continue in full subjection to the authority and power of the powerful landholders who are known to be the well wishers of the State; civil establishment and a sufficient military force will very soon be sent to make all necessary arrangements. Anxious concern for welfare and comfort of his subjects is cherished by His Majesty; but all such as shall be guilty of acts of turbulence or disobedience against lawful authority will be most harshly punished.

It seems the royal instructions were complied with and some sort of order was preserved in the district with the help of the local *chaudharis*.⁴⁹

These developments perturbed the British authorities very much and in order to bring Rohtak under control they despatched from Panipat on 28 May⁵⁰ the 60th N.I. of Ambala fame with Deputy Commissioner Loch.⁵¹ Since the Regiment was already disaffected and had risen in revolt against the British on 10 May (at Ambala), Loch undertook this responsibility with a great deal of hesitation. He grumbled: "Despatching a mutinous corps to settle a disturbed district appears

to me to be a new principle of administration.”⁵² But the fact was that it was not a *new principle*. The despatcher of the Regiment had his own difficulties, and he had done so under compulsion. Disaffected as the Regiment was, it could not be left at Ambala after the march of the Delhi Field Force because of fear of a fresh new revolt. Nor could it be taken to Delhi for the ‘European troops would never have fought with confidence with this regiment behind them or by their side.’⁵³ Thus it must have relieved Barnard when Loch made a request to him to send some corps to settle the Rohtak district: he at once agreed to transfer his headache to Loch, believing perhaps that he needed a calmer head for the biggest ordeal, the recovery of Delhi.

Loch marched directly to Rohtak. The rebels apparently did not pose any tough opposition, and he reoccupied the district headquarters easily. However, the rebels made secret negotiations with the 60th N.I. As a result, this regiment rose up in open mutiny on 10 June; ‘not a single man remained true to his colours’. The European officers, too alert to be caught napping, saved their lives by fleeing in time. The rebel-sepoys then left Rohtak and made their way to Delhi, reaching there in full numbers.⁵⁴

The British authorities before Delhi took a serious view of the loss of the Rohtak district. Since the Grand Trunk Road passed through this region, its rebel population could ‘greatly impede’ the passage of men, and material from Panjab to Delhi.⁵⁵ It was, therefore, considered very essential from the military point of view that the Rohtak district be recovered without any loss of time. Accordingly, Major General Wilson commanding the Delhi Field Force sent Lieutenant Hodson with a force comprising 6 European officers, 103 men of the Guides, 233 of Hodson’s Irregular Horse and 25 of the Jind Horse (361 in all), in the early hours of 15 August 1857.⁵⁶

Hodson was checked at Kharkhauda, a village about 20 miles from Rohtak (at about 12 o’clock on 15 August).⁵⁷ The villagers and especially the ‘leave men of the irregular corps who had taken position in one of the strong buildings belonging to a lambardar of the village right in the centre of

the town' opposed Hodson bravely.⁶⁹ Under the inspiring leadership of Risaldar Bisarai Ali⁶⁹ the villagers fought gallantly. Even Hodson admitted: "They fought like devils".⁶⁹ But because of their larger numbers and superior fire power, the British soon overpowered the rebels. Risaldar Bisarai Ali fell fighting along with twenty-five of his men. The British also suffered a number of casualties on their side.⁶¹

Hardly had Hodson finished this encounter when intelligence reached him that Rohtak had become a rallying point of a considerably large number of rebels under a new peasant leader Sabar Khan.⁶² He at once left Kharkhauda and after a short halt and respite at Bohar reached Rohtak at about 4 o'clock the following afternoon.⁶³

Here he formed his men just outside the town and rode forward with two officers and a few *sowars* to reconnoitre.⁶⁴ But his movements were soon checked by fire from rebels collected in large numbers inside a fortified building in the vicinity of the old civil station.⁶⁵ With lightning speed Hodson 'brought up his men and detaching two troops to the right and the same number to the left, with orders to take up defensive position, he made a dash at the main gates'.⁶⁶ The Indians repulsed their attack successfully, and prevented them from entering the building from any other side.⁶⁷ Disappointed and dejected, Hodson withdrew his men to the old Kacheri compound near the junction of the roads coming in from Delhi, Bohar and the town of Rohtak and 'bivouacked there for the night'.⁶⁸

In the early hours of 17 July, Hodson was attacked by Sabar Khan with about 300 Ranghar horsemen belonging to different Irregular Cavalry regiments and a mass of footmen 'certainly not less than 900 or 1,000 in number'.⁶⁹ A fierce fight took place. After some time the rebels left the open field and retired to bushy hides in close proximity of the town and here 'under shelter, they incessantly poured in a galling fire'.⁷⁰ In this position the British cavalry could cause little harm to them: 'their only hope lay in drawing them out'.⁷¹ To accomplish this, Hodson sent out 'one troop to the right . . . second to the left . . . and placed the rest . . . in the centre; pushing the Guides to the front'.⁷² Thus disposed,

they defied the efforts of the rebels to outflank them, presenting a front wherever they appeared. Hodson then ordered them to retire slowly. The manoeuvre succeeded admirably. On seeing the cavalry retiring, the rebels came out, yelling and shouting and followed up Hodson's party. When he had drawn them about three quarters of a mile out in the open Hodson ordered his men to turn about, and charge'. His men immediately 'bore down on the astonished . . . enemy in every direction', and took a heavy toll.⁷³

The Indians retreated but Hodson did not pursue them.⁷⁴ That was the end of the indecisive battle of Rohtak where both the parties broke away without either of them registering a victory.⁷⁵ Hodson tells his story thus:⁷⁶

Unfortunately I had no ammunition left and, therefore, could not without unprudence remain so close to the north of the town and encamped near the first friendly village that we came to.

Leaving some important places, such as Kharkhauda, Sampla, Meham under the care of the Raja of Jind⁷⁷ and some local *chaudharis*, Hodson left the district and went to Delhi.⁷⁸

IV

HISSAR DISTRICT : In 1857 Hissar was in fact not one but two districts, Hissar and Bhatiana. The present district of Sirsa and Fatehabad tehsil were wholly in the latter and the other tehsils of the present districts of Bhiwani and Hissar with the exception of the town of Bhiwani and a few villages around it were in the former. Its total area was 3294 sq. miles and population about 3,30,900.⁷⁹

The entire population of the district, the sturdy Jats, brave Ranghars and bellicose Rajputs, Bishnois and Bhattis revolted against the British as soon as they heard the news of the fall of Delhi on 11 May.⁸⁰ The people of Hissar were lucky in finding good local leaders to guide them. Muhammed Azim, the Assistant Patol of Bhattu, a young, energetic descendant of the royal family of Delhi, proclaimed the end of the British rule and established his authority over most of the regions. At Hansi, Hukam Chand, a middle aged Jain businessman and his young nephew Faqir Chand and a Muslim friend Meena

Beg played an important role and enforced law and order there.⁸¹ Nur Muhammad Khan, the Nawab of the ex-state of Rania began to rule his erstwhile state. All these local leaders accepted the central authority of Emperor Bahadur Shah.⁸²

'The winds of change' blowing in the district were also felt by the troops stationed at Hansi, Hissar and Sirsa. On May 15, the men of the 4th Irregular Cavalry⁸³ revolted at Hansi and made their way to Delhi.⁸⁴ Fourteen days later the entire wing of the Haryana Light Infantry and the detachment of the Dadri Cavalry stationed there mutinied. Major Stafford, the Commanding Officer and other officers who had been informed of the uprising earlier (by a junior commissioned officer and a loyal civilian employee named Murari) managed to escape while others, about eleven men, women and children were massacred. Their bungalows were set on fire, and the town of Hansi was plundered.⁸⁵

In the meantime, on 27 May there was a bloody uprising of a wing of the Haryana Light Infantry under Subedar Shah Nur Khan and another one of the Dadri Cavalry under Rajab Beg at Hissar.⁸⁶ At about 1.00 p.m. a few persons clad in green attacked the Hissar Fort where Wedderburn, the Deputy Commissioner, was living with his family. The men at the gate did not object to their entry into the Fort, and as though the whole thing was pre-planned, led them in. Shah Nur Khan, the Commander, whose tent was pitched just near the sentry-post, also did not check them. Two Englishmen, Hallet and Taylor came out on hearing the noise, but they were shot down before they could do anything. The shots served as a signal for a popular uprising—troops were joined by the civil population in the twinkling of an eye. They broke open the district gaol, released about two scores of prisoners from there, plundered and destroyed the houses and bungalows of the Europeans and seized the district treasury containing Rs.1,70,000. Wedderburn, the Deputy Commissioner and twelve other Europeans were killed. Thereafter the sepoys went to Hansi to join their comrades.⁸⁷

The news of the catastrophes at Hansi and Hissar was conveyed to the European residents at Sirsa before it reached

the rebel Indian troops.⁸⁸ The former became greatly demoralised and fled without losing any time. Capt. Roberts, the Superintendent of Bhatiana, and his family moved to Ferozepur via Dabawali and Bhatinda. Other Europeans, about 17 in all, went to Sahuwala with Donald, the Assistant Superintendent, and took shelter in the Patiala State. Hillard, Officer Commanding of the Contingent, and Fell, Assistant Patrol went into the barracks of the sepoys and tried to keep them from rebelling. But the sepoys did not listen to them at all and asked them to leave at once. Next they occupied the *tehsil* treasury and seized Rs.8,000/- from there and went to Hansi, where all the rebel troops of the district had assembled. After staying there for some time they made their way to Delhi via Rohtak.⁸⁹

Thus by the first week of June the entire district of Hissar was free of the British rule.

V

PANIPAT DISTRICT : The Panipat district, with an area of 1270 sq. miles and population of 3,89,085 persons, was bounded on the north by the Thanesar district, on the south by the Delhi district, on the west by the Jind state and Hissar and Rohtak districts, and on the east by the river Yamuna. Here the bulk of the population was of the Hindus (64%)—Jats, Rajputs, Gujars, Tyagis, Brahmanas, artisan castes and Harijans. The Muslims (35%) lived mostly in the towns. They were also divided into a number of castes, Rajputs, Rangbars and Gujars being the most important.⁹⁰

Both Hindus and Muslims were by and large agriculturists or otherwise depended upon this profession for their subsistence. The ruinous revenue policy of the British government, referred to earlier, had hit these people hard and hence they were in their hearts of heart inimical to the British government. Similarly the trading classes and people in services were disaffected towards the government for reasons that have been discussed earlier.⁹¹

The news of the outbreak of the Revolt at Meerut and Delhi was a glad tidings for these people. Their instant reaction was to rise in open revolt against the government and

so they did. But in the big towns where the government had made great arrangements with the help of the chiefs of Jind and Karnal, the disaffected populace could not rise up.

Commenting on the state of the rest of the district, Capt. Mac Andrew informed the Government of India on 1 June 1857: 'I find the country . . . considerably disorganised; the revenue and police officers are in the state of flight; many of the *zamindars* and big villages are quite refractory.'⁹² Especially, the villages of Rohan, Kukeor, Karawari, Shah Partik, Rulowdh, Jagdishpur, Sandhu Kalan, Murshidpur, Malik Sunder Lal, Malik Khairi, Fazilpur, Kuberpur, Sultanpur, Turuf Rajputan, Sunarai, Bursut, Surut, Orlana Khurd refused to pay land revenue and defied the British rule manfully.⁹³

VI

THANESAR DISTRICT : Bounded on the north by District Ambala, on the east by the river Yamuna, on the south by District Panipat and on the west by the State of Patiala, the district of Thanesar had a population of about 4,96,750, sprawling over 2336 sq. miles. The district headquarters was located at Thanesar. The Grand Trunk Road connecting Panjab with Delhi passed through this district, because of which it acquired great strategic importance.⁹⁴

About 52 per cent of the people of Thanesar were Hindus, the Rajputs, Jats, Rors, Sainis, being the important castes. Among the Muslims (38%), Ranghars, Rajputs, and Gujars were important. The Sikhs were small in number (8%). All these people, as noted earlier, were discontented and were hostile towards the British. On hearing the news of the outbreak of the revolt at Meerut and Delhi they lost no time in choosing to take side against the British.⁹⁵

These happenings disturbed the district authorities very much, more so because the Grand Trunk Road in enemies' hands would mar all chances of the Panjab Government to exert pressure on Delhi. They, therefore, made a prompt appeal to the chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Kunjpura and Karnal to help them retain their hold at least over the Grand Trunk Road, if not the whole district. These chiefs, to their good fortune, obeyed them at once. The Maharaja of Patiala came

to Thanesar with 1,500 men and 4 guns on 15 May. On the 17th the Raja of Jind sent 400 men. Kunjpura and Karnal gave 350 and 150 of their men respectively. With these troops, besides their own, the district authorities controlled the Grand Trunk Road and the main towns situated on it.⁹⁸

The rebel army in Delhi took a serious view of the developments in the Thanesar district. In the third week of May, they despatched a movable column to undo the work of the Thanesar authorities, and also to check the British advance to Delhi. Although no writer of the Uprising mentions this fact, a contemporary Indian named Tajuddin, a well informed man from Panjab has stated clearly that this column fought a pitched battle with the British forces around Panipat, near Karnal and killed a large number of their men, including their Commander-in-Chief, General Anson⁹⁷—I have elsewhere questioned the truth of the contention of the historians that General Anson had died of cholera at Karnal.⁹⁹ In utter haste, under the heavy pressure of the Indian column, the retreating British forces buried the old General 'without military honours'.⁹⁹ Soon afterwards, however, their position improved with the arrival of fresh reinforcements from Panjab, and Karnal again fell into their hands, but not the rest of the district. The people in the distant parganas of Ladwa, Pehowa, Kaithal, Pundri, Asandh rose up *en masse*. They drove out the revenue and police officials, made the loyalists surrender, and destroyed all traces of the British rule in their localities.¹⁰⁰ Later the British had to wage a stubborn struggle for sometime in order to restore their rule in these parganas. A detailed study of this struggle has been attempted elsewhere.

VII

AMBALA DISTRICT: In 1857 Ambala was a small district. It was bounded on the north by District Ludhiana, on the west by the State of Patiala, on the south by District Thanesar and on the east by the river Yamuna. It had an area of 293 sq. miles and a population of 67,134, of whom 60% were Hindus (divided into several castes), 30% Muslims, and 9% Sikhs. There were a few Jains, Buddhists and Christians also.¹⁰¹ All the communities in the district, except a few Christians, were unfriendly towards the British.

Like the civil populace, the Indian soldiery stationed at Ambala was also ill-disposed towards the British.¹⁰²

The British authorities knew the gravity of the situation, and took immediate measures to control it. After making arrangements to check the civil populace, John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Panjab, requested the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, to disarm the Ambala troops at once.¹⁰³ The Commander-in-Chief reached Ambala on 15 March to carry out the work. But when he took the matter in hand, the local military authorities pointed out 'that they had pledged themselves not to disarm the sepoys'.¹⁰⁴ Under these circumstances General Anson did not think it wise to carry out the suggestion of the Chief Commissioner and devised another plan which involved dividing the troops into small detachments and despatching them to far off places.

After the fragmentation the 60th N.I. was included in the Delhi Field Force and accompanied it as far as Panipat, whence it was sent to Rohtak, 'to operate against the insurgents in that district'. But shortly after their arrival at Rohtak, the entire regiment mutinied and marched to Delhi.¹⁰⁵ The 5th N.I. was left behind by the Commander-in-Chief. But as soon as the Delhi Field Force left Ambala, about one-fourths of the N.I. men deserted at night.¹⁰⁶ To dilute the strength of the remaining sepoys, two companies were sent to Rupar under Captain Gardiner. After reaching that place, the sepoys made an alliance with Sardar Mohar Singh, a rebel *Kardar* of that place,¹⁰⁷ and both (the *Kardar* and the sepoys) instigated the people in the neighbourhood. Gardiner, who tried to intervene, was openly insulted. Now Gardiner reported the matter to the Ambala authorities, who at once called the troops back. On their way to Ambala a considerable number of the sepoys absconded. The remnant were tried by a court martial on reaching Ambala; they were discharged from service without pay and their Indian officers were sentenced to death.¹⁰⁸

The remaining companies of the 5th N.I. created trouble on 27 May when the siege train from Phillapur arrived at Ambala. They approached the Gurkhas who escorted the siege train and urged them to take the supplies to Delhi

for the rebels. Had both the regiments—the 5th N.I. and the Gurkhas captured the siege train, it would have meant an irreparable loss to the English military strength. The Gurkhas however, refused to help them in such a venture and reported the whole story to their Commanding Officer, Major Bagot. The latter in turn informed Major Maitland, the Commanding Officer of the 5th N.I. and Barnes, the Commissioner of the Ambala Division. These officers saw the seriousness of the situation and disarmed the Regiment on 29 May with the help of two European companies. This cleared the Ambala cantonment of the rebels.¹⁰⁹

In the rest of the district, the people, irrespective of their caste, creed, religion or profession, stood against the English. In the words of Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner: "The district population had decidedly not enlisted themselves warmly on the part of the Government."¹¹⁰ He was surprised to find that even the *Jagirdars* and landlords who derived great benefits from the English rule showed sympathy to the rebels. His astonishment knew no bounds when he found that not a man came forward from the whole of the district who could give him any clue regarding the Jullundur mutineers when they passed through the district in the month of June. If somebody gave information 'for the fear of the loss of his *Jagir*', the facts tended to be inaccurate.¹¹¹ Even the feudal nobles like

the Mir of Garhi Kotah showed great lukewarmness, for which the Deputy Commissioner fined him one thousand rupees in the month of June. This Mir entertained and helped the Jullundur mutineers. Consequently his fort was dismantled by the order of the Chief Court and heavy fine was imposed upon him. Similarly the Pathans of Khizarbad and the headmen of villages of Ferozepur, Narsinghgarh, Thuska and Govindpur were heavily mulcated for rebellious behaviour.

The wealthy bankers of Jagadhari 'displayed a spirit of disloyalty and closefistedness unworthy of a class who owe all their prosperity to the fostering care and protection of the British Government'.¹¹²

Despite their hatred for the British, the civil population of

Ambala could not rise in open revolt against the British except at Rupar where Mohar Singh, an *ex-Kardar* of the former ruler of Rupar, made a vain attempt to end the English rule from that place.¹¹³ The reason for general civilian inactivity was that heavy precautionary measures had been adopted by the British authorities. A large number of military and police personnel belonging to the Raja of Patiala, Nabha, and Jind had been stationed throughout the district.

VIII

Thus, except for some parts of Ambala district a few towns of Thanesar district and Jind state, the whole of Haryana was free from British control by the end of May 1857. In the words of Cave-Brown: "Hurrianah that land of fertility was in a blaze".¹¹⁴

NOTES

1. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 514.
2. For details see *IGJ*, Vol. XI, pp. 223-27; and also the *DGS* of Delhi and Rohtak.
3. *Ibid.* For disaffection among various sections of the population, see chapter II.
4. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VIII, Part I, p. 401.
5. Dr. Spear wrongly believes that there was no rising in the countryside (*Twilight of the Mughals*, p. 202). In fact, the whole of the countryside had freed itself of the British control and the village folk except for a few loyalists here and there, stood for Bahadur Shah. Even the *Distict Gazetteer* (1912) of Delhi admits this truth "Yet on the whole, of course, the dark side predominated. The district generally appears to have been mutinous (p. 46)".
If there was no rising in the countryside (as suggested by Dr Spear) then why did these people get "sharply punished". And why did the "Delhi district receive a lesson which will never be forgotten (*Delhi DG*, p. 46)"? Dr Spear is also contradicted by the statement of Cave-Brown based on the accounts of the 'Delhi fugitives (Europeans)': "The village Demons were found more fiendish than the monsters they had left behind in Delhi". *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I, pp. 88-89. See Zakaullah, *Tarikh-i-uruj-i-Ahod-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishia*, pp. 691-95; Mehdi Husain, *Bahadur Shah II...*, pp. 196, 209-17, 253, 258, 260, 270, 278; Metcalfe, *Two Native Narratives*, . . . , p. 113.
6. Sen, *Eighteen Fifty Seven*; Majumdar, *The Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of the People*; Mehdi Husain, *Bahadur Shah II*; Rizvi, *Swatantra Dilli*.

7. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 514; Kaye and Malleeson, *A History of the Sepoy War in India*, Vol. VI, p. 139.
8. अहीर : खेती की तदवीर : *SR. Rohtak*, p. 55; *DG Gurgaon*, p. 62. Also see *IGI*, Vol. XII, pp. 402-5; Yadav, *Ahirwal Ka Itihas*, pp. 8-17.
9. *DG Gurgaon*, pp. 59-66.
10. *Ibid*, pp. 59-61, Ashraf, *Meo Qaum aur Mewat*, pp. 137-46.
11. See PSA, File R-191; Jwala Sahai, *The Loyal Rajputana*, p. 260; Mead, *The Sepoy Revolt*, pp. 97-98; *DG Gurgaon*, p. 5.
12. Jwala Sahai, *Sketches of Mutiny* (Gurgaon District), p. 7
13. They are an allied caste of the Meos, and claim to have sprung from the Rajputs of the Yadava clan. For details see Sharaf-ud-din, *Tarikh-i-Mewat*, pp. 79-134; *DG Alwar*, para 18, p. 168.
14. The compiler of the *DG Gurgaon* (pp. 24-25) has tried his best to twist the facts to show rebels' risings were acts of looting and plundering. But he fails to hide the truth completely.
15. *Ibid*.
16. The *DG Gurgaon* records this episode thus (pp. 24-25) : "Suddenly a strong hostile force of mutineers appeared. British troops had to retreat and many Rawats were surprised and killed."
17. Jwala Sahai, pp. 258-9.
18. Jwala Sahai described it thus : "(Major Eden's) artillery opened fires to different quarters, burnt villages and destroyed a number of the Meos." *Ibid*.
19. *DG Gurgaon*, pp. 24-25.
20. Khadgawat, *Rajasthan in 1857*, p. 173; Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 440-52, 18 December 1857.
21. *Ibid*.
22. Ahirwal literally means the 'Abode of the Ahirs', an agricultural caste which is found in great majority in this region. Its headquarters, for socio-cultural purpose is Rewari. For details see chapter I.
23. For details see Yadav, *Undoing the Bondage*, pp. 1-14; Ahirwal chapter IX; 'History of the Rewari State (1555-1857)', *Journal of the Rajasthan Institute of Historical Research*, April-June 1965, pp. 23-26.
24. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 34, document no. 12.
25. *DG Gurgaon*, p. 21; *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 34, document no. 34, petition of Rao Tula Ram to Emperor Bahadur Shah (Persian), without date; PSA, File R-192, pp. 281-83.
26. PSA, File R-192, pp. 281-83.
27. *Ibid*.
28. Man Singh, *Abhirkuldipika*, p. 169; *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 256.
29. Hodson, *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India*, pp. 331-2; *The Bombay Overland Times*, in its issue of November 1857 spoke very highly of the brass guns which were manufactured in the gun foundry of Tula Ram at Rampura.

30. PSA, File R-180, pp. 47-53.
31. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 34, document no. 3, n. d.
32. *Trial*, p. 256.
33. India Office, Home Miscellaneous, p. 725, quoted by Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, p. 209.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Nizami, p. 225
36. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 7.
37. PSA, File R-192, pp. 281-2.
38. For short life sketches of these leaders, see Appendix I.
39. *Ibid.*
40. See chapter VII.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Montgomery, Vol. I, p. 514; Kaye & Mallseson, Vol. VI, pp. 140-41 give somewhat different figures, which are incorrect.
43. *DG Rohtak*, pp. 32-42.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Cave-Brown, Vol. II, pp. 142, 144. Also See Appendix 1.
46. *SR Rohtak*, p. 37.
47. Gen. T. Seaton, *From Cadet to Colonel*, Vol. II, chapter IV, quoted in *Rohtak DG* (1910), p. 34. Also see Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September 1857.
48. *SR Rohtak*, p. 37.
49. *Trial*, p. 19.
50. Keith-Young gives 26 May (morning) as the date of their departure (vide his letter to his wife, dated Ambala, 26 May 1857—*Keith-Young*, p. 25). But 28 May is more acceptable on account of its coming from a more authentic source, Loch, the Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak who accompanied the corps from Panipat to Rohtak (Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September 1857).
51. The Regiment was sent from Ambala along with the Delhi Field Forces to Delhi. General Bernard detached it from the Field Force at Panipat on 28 May and sent it to Rohtak. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September 1857. Norman observes (vide Forrest, *Selections*, Vol. I, p. 433) that this regiment was despatched from the Field Force at Karnal; but the more authentic source of information, Loch, the Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak, contradicts him and gives Panipat as the place of actual detachment. He says : "I remained at Panipat till the 28th when at the desire of Sir Henry Bernard I returned to Rohtak in company with the 60th Regiment N I." Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September 1857.
52. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September 1857.
53. See Forrest, Vol. I, p. 433.
54. *Ibid.*
55. It was feared that the people would also lay their hands upon the 'Siege Train' from Ferozepur (to Delhi). Their leader was Babar Khan. See Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 144.

56. Forrest, Vol. I, p. 352; Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 144
57. Forrest, Vol. I, p. 352; and Hodson, *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India*, p. 265.
58. Forrest, Vol. I, p. 352.
59. The Risaldar had earlier been decorated with the Order of Merit. See Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 145.
60. Hodson, p. 265.
61. Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 145.
62. Forrest, Vol. I, p. 352.
63. Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 145.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Forrest, Vol. I, pp. 352-4.
66. *Ibid.*
67. Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 145.
68. Hodson, pp. 267-8.
69. Cave-Brown, Vol. II, pp. 146-47.
70. *Ibid.* 80 persons were killed and 150 wounded.
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*
74. Cave-Brown wrongly says that Hodson's men followed them up to the very walls of the town. This has been denied by Hodson.
75. Forrest, Vol. I, pp. 352-7.
76. Hodson, pp. 267-8.
77. Forrest, Vol. I, pp. 352-7.
78. File R/131 contains a long list of such local *chaudharis* of Rohtak, Meham, Gohana and Sampla tehsil, who extended all sorts of help to Lt. Hodson with money and material. After Hodson's retreat they held their local places for the British. These *chaudharis* were handsomely rewarded for these services after the Uprising was crushed. These loyal persons did not belong to one or two particular castes or communities; but to many, such as Jat, Ranghar, Mahajan, Bhat and Brahmana.
79. Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 514; *DG Hissar*, p. 33.
80. Chick, *Annals of the Indian Rebellion*, p. 713; Also see Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September, 1857; *DG Hissar*, p. 35; Kanhaya Lal, *Tarikh-i-Baghawat-i-Hind*; pp. 196-99; Jwala Sahai, *The Loyal Rajputana*, pp. 290-91.
81. Cave-Brown, Vol. I, pp. 275-78; Chick, pp. 714-15; Jwala Sahai, p. 290.
82. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July, 1857; *Crisis in the Panjab* (by a Punjab Employee), pp. I-II.
83. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 204-7, 9 July 1857; *DG Hissar*, p. 35; Cave-Brown, Vol. II, pp. 274-75; Chick, pp. 710-12.
84. The entire force comprised two companies of the Haryana Light Infantry, 96 sowars of the 4th Irregular Cavalry and some 80 sowars of the Dadri Cavalry.

85. Foreign Secret Consultation, Nos. 100-3, 25 September 1857; *DG Hissar*, p. 33; Chick, p. 760.
86. For details see, 'Narrative of Events at Hissar' by an eye witness (Munshi Bakhtawar Singh) *vide* Kanhaya Lal—*Tarikh-i-Baghawat-i-Hind*, pp. 196-9; Report of Capt. Stafford, *vide* Chick, pp. 706-7; Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 100-103, 25 September 1857.
87. *Ibid.*
88. Chick, pp. 706-7.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 710-12; *DG Hissar*, pp. 34-36; Jwala Sahai, p. 47
90. Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. VI, p. 139.
91. See chapter II. For details see *HRJ*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1966, pp. 37-38.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*
94. Montgomery, Vol. I, p. 514.
95. Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. VI, p. 139; Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 162-3, 26 June 1857; McAndrew informed the Govt. of India on 7 June: "I find the country... considerably disorganised; the revenue and police officers are in the state of flight; many of the Zamindars and big villagers, are quite refractory".
96. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VIII-I, pp. 27-8.
97. See Tajuddin's statement dated 29 May 1857 *vide* *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 201-6; Reference to an expedition to Panipat is also found in the Mutiny Papers, Box No. 69, Doc. No. 71, n. d.
98. *Proceedings of the Bhartiya Itihasa Parishad*, Delhi, 1967.
99. Montgomery Vol. II, p. 179; Collier, *The Sound of Fury*, p. 81.
100. Yadav, *Haryana Men Swatantrata Andolan Ka Itihas*, p. 98.
101. Montgomery, Vol. I, p. 517.
102. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 15-31, 26 June 1857.
103. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VIII, Part II, p. 329.
104. *Ibid.*
105. See the account of Rohtak above.
106. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VIII, Part II, p. 329.
107. *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, I, p. 39; Cave-Brown, Vol. I, p. 212.
108. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VIII, Part II, p. 11.
109. *Ibid.* Cave-Brown, Vol. I, p. 213.
110. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 41.
111. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
113. See chapter VIII for a detailed account of this rising.
114. Cave-Brown Vol. I, p. 226.

CHAPTER V

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

I

After the end of the British administration in Haryana, the local leaders and Emperor Bahadur Shah made significant efforts to develop a bureaucratic apparatus.¹ The new administrative structure which they built was based on two sets of functionaries: the local chiefs and the central government servants. Both the functionaries worked under the command of Emperor Bahadur Shah.

II

Bahadur Shah sent special *shuggas* to the chiefs in Haryana² confirming them in their respective paternal jagirs with specific instructions

to rule over and administer their territories and to impart justice, decide the cases of litigation and to award punishment to the unlawful citizens to the extent of *Qasas* (execution) . . . and to make endeavours to be just in admonishing and punishing the mischief-mongers, scoundrels, thieves and those who take law into their own hands in the light of canons of Justice.³

How far these chiefs were successful in their efforts to operate the administrative machinery cannot be said with certainty except in one case of Rao Tula Ram of Rewari. Praising his administration of the pargana of Rewari, Bahadur Shah himself said that "the efficient administration of the said pargana and the chastisement and elimination of bad characters and looters⁴ and the care and the welfare of the inhabitants of the said place have won you the royal favour."⁵ That this was not merely a formal compliment is shown by the praise bestowed on Tula

Ram's administration by W. Ford, the Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon in the following words :

I would respectfully bring to the notice of Government, the great benefit which the town of Rewari and its neighbourhood derived from the attitude assumed by Rao Tula Ram, since the plundering of Mewatees was thus kept at a distance and life and property reserved and order preserved on the Jeypore border.⁶

He declared with no reservation that "society received many benefits even when that rebel (Tula Ram) was in arms against the government."⁷

III

The districts previously held directly by the British were entrusted to central government officers, called *ziladars*. These officers were appointed by Bakht Khan, Lord Governor-General Bahadur, on behalf of the Emperor.⁸ It is not entirely clear whether *ziladars* were appointed uniformly at all the districts but references to their appointment to the districts of Gurgaon, Hissar and Rohtak are found in the trial proceedings of Bahadur Shah.⁹ To assist the *ziladars* in the preservation of order and collection of revenue, several *tahsildars*, and subordinate revenue collectors were appointed.¹⁰ The appointment of *tahsildars* at Palwal, Hodal, Gurgaon, and other places¹¹ was testified to by Ahsanullah Khan during his evidence in the king's trial.

For the preservation of law and order, police officers were appointed throughout the region. What their work was like can be seen from the following instructions that Jang Bahadur Khan, the Police Officer of Alipur, received from the 'Imperial Government' on 20 May 1857:

You will conduct the duties after this appointment with all integrity, honesty and care and you, moreover, will under all circumstances, maintain such efficient management throughout your jurisdiction that pillage, highway robberies and murders may not occur.¹²

There was a serious dearth of able men who could cope with the administrative problems of the districts. Bahadur Shah himself admits that "no *tahsildars* and no police officers are

available.”¹³ Under such circumstances, the Emperor issued appeals to the people to manage their own affairs. Some time in the month of June, he issued a proclamation as follows:

It is essential that all the Hindus and Muslims should perfectly unite in this struggle and should arrange to ensure their safety under the leadership of some good men of their locality. If that arrangement will be good, and whosoever does that, he will be given highest authority there.¹⁴

Accordingly, in the *pargana* of Mewat, the local leaders and *chaudharis* undertook the management of their localities.¹⁵ And so did the people of Gurgaon. But the local leaders failed to manage their affairs properly. Thereupon the district people of Gurgaon addressed a petition to Bahadur Shah “bringing to the notice of the King the disordered state of the district and begging that an officer might be deputed to assume the administration.”¹⁶ After much looking about, the Emperor found a suitable person—Abdul Haq¹⁷—for the job. But it seems he could not find any suitable officer to manage the affairs of Rohtak. Nevertheless, on learning that there was disorder in the district, he issued a proclamation which ran as follows:

Proclamation is made that one man is not to stretch out the hand of violence against another and that all are to continue in full subjection to the authority and power of the powerful landholders who are known to be the well-wishers of the state; civil establishment and a sufficient military force will very soon be sent to make all necessary arrangements. Anxious concern for welfare and comfort of his subjects is cherished by His Majesty; but all such as shall be guilty of acts of turbulence or disobedience against lawful authority, will be most severely punished.¹⁸

The revenue administration was in bad shape, because there was neither sufficient time nor money at the disposal of the Emperor for its proper organization. As far as princely states were concerned, efforts were made to collect revenue from the people through their chiefs. The Mutiny Papers, and diaries of Munshi Jiwan Lal, Moinuddin, Abdul Latif, and Chuni Lal show that the Emperor regularly asked all the chiefs to collect land revenue in their respective states, and to furnish accounts as to “how much account of *tahsil* revenue received before 10 May 1857 was deposited in the royal treasury under the head

amanat (cash deposit not to be spent without the prior sanction) and how much account of revenue has been received thereafter'.¹⁹ However, there is enough evidence to show that none of the chiefs of the Haryana region complied with the instructions of the Emperor. They made some pretext or the other and notwithstanding enough money being available in their treasury either sent no money or very little of it to Delhi.²⁰

In the districts the *zildars* and local *chaudharis*, who were incharge of the administration were required to collect revenue. But if they failed to do that as it appears they did, the Emperor sent troops to collect his share from their district treasuries. The following amounts were reported to have been brought to Delhi by the troops by June 1857; Rs. 2,00,000/- from Gurgaon, Rs. 1,00,000/- from Rohtak and Rs. 1,10,000/- from Hissar.²¹ The diary of Jiwan Lal, dated 21 August 1857, shows that whenever such troops were sent, the people were informed by the Emperor to give their land revenues, and taxes to them. For instance, Jiwan Lal tells us that the Emperor wrote *firmans* to the farmers, *zamindars* and cultivators of the villages of the parganas of Sonapat, Najafgarh, Bahadurgarh and Mewat to the effect that "they should collect the revenue and hand it over to the Emperor's grandson Abdul Bahadur and Muhammad Bakht Khan who were going in that direction."²²

V

In the extraordinary situation that existed during the Uprising and afterwards the administration in the liberated areas had to struggle with a series of difficulties. There was paucity of money in the treasury; the army was indisciplined; and above all the region was infested with many hereditary thieving races. Although the bulk of the population belonging to these races did not pursue their traditional occupation and tended to oppose the British, as though if moved by some higher sentiment, yet a number of them took advantage of the situation and attacked and plundered their neighbourhood.²³

Such difficulties necessarily appear at the initial stage of establishing an administrative system, particularly in such abnormal circumstances. There was, however, every possibility of overcoming these difficulties with the advent of better days.

But, unfortunately with the passage of time the situation went on deteriorating instead of improving and Bahadur Shah was entirely helpless to effect any improvement in it. His government was a 'sort of constitutional monarchical milocracy. The king was king and honoured as such like a constitutional monarch; but instead of a parliament, he had a council of soldiers in whom power rested and of whom he was in no degree a military Commander'.²⁴ He was openly disobeyed and defied by the army. Despite his best efforts to send troops out to manage the administration, 'the sepoys did not proceed to the countryside to look after the functioning of the government machinery'.²⁵ Thus loose and faulty administration led not only to his failure but also of the entire movement.

NOTES

1. Many scholars have described the administrative arrangements made in the city of Delhi in 1857, but unfortunately none has endeavoured to give such details regarding Haryana, which formed the most important part of the Delhi Kingdom (See, for instance, Rizvi, *Swatantra Delhi* (Hindi); Mehdi Husain, *Bahadur Shah II and His Times*). Spear has no doubt given some account in his *Twilight of the Mughals* of it, but that is too brief to be of any use to an inquisitive reader.
2. 'Chuni Lal's Diary', dated 14 May 1857, vide *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 110.
3. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 43, document no. 3, dated 1 August 1857.
4. In the beginning, no doubt, the rowdy and *goonda* elements, who were hitherto kept in check by the British Government, rose up and exploited the situation. In consequence there was a great deal of disorder and anxiety. No one's possession was safe.
5. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 34, document no. 12.
6. PSA, File R/180, pp. 47-53.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Statement of Ahsan Ullah Khan, vide *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 175.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 173.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 175.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Metcalfe, *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny at Delhi*, p. 112.
14. *Sultan Akhbar*, 10 June 1857.
15. See next chapter.
16. *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 173.

17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. See *Mutiny Papers*, bundle, no. 34, document no. 12 without date.
20. See Chapter VII for evasion of payments on the part of these chiefs. In some cases the Emperor was so much displeased by such a behaviour of these chiefs, as in the cases of the Nawabs of Jhajjar, Pataudi, etc., that he had to send troops to collect money.
21. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI, 10 October 1857, p. 10.
22. Metcalfe, p. 112.
23. *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 11.
24. Letter of an Englishman written after the fall of Delhi, vide Ball, *History of the India Mutinies*, Vol. I, p. 534.
25. Metcalfe, p. 112.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM

I

For a fair understanding of the communal problem in 1857, it is necessary to note the conditions that prevailed in the Indian society in the period just preceding the Uprising. Briefly speaking, the picture was as follows:

- (i) A feeling of *bhaichara* (brotherhood) prevailed among the Hindus and Muslims almost everywhere in the villages throughout the country. Both the communities followed common social, cultural and ritual customs; worshipped common village deities; and showed respect towards priestly classes (*Brahmanas*, *Sadhus*, *Faqirs* and *Pirs*), irrespective of their religious faiths.¹
- (ii) Unlike the villagers the city or town dwellers usually had feelings of communal discrimination in their hearts. Among the educated or rather literate persons, such feeling were more deep-rooted and their jealousy and contempt for faiths other than their own and their quarrels over trivial religious matters often came to notice.²
- (iii) The British, believing in the age-old Roman imperial dictum of '*divide et impera*', strove hard to disturb the placid waters of communal harmony wherever they could. This helped them in conducting Indian affairs effectively and comfortably.³
- (iv) Conscious efforts on the part of the people to prevent the British and their agents who widened the gulf of difference between the two communities were conspicuous by their absence.⁴

II

In these circumstances it was not possible that the general masses would play any significant role unitedly against the British in the Uprising of 1857. But thanks to the efforts of the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah and the like minded leaders of the Movement, the situation improved. On 12 May 1857, the Emperor issued the following *firman*:

To all the Hindus and Muslims of India: Taking my duty by the people into consideration at this hour, I have decided to stand by my people . . . It is the imperative duty of Hindus and Musalmans to join the revolt against the English. They should work and be guided by their leaders in their towns and should take steps to restore order in the country.⁶

After a few days he issued another *firman*:

It is my conviction now that if the English continue their rule in India they would kill all of us and destroy our religion. You Hindus are solemnly adjured by your faith in the Ganges, Tulsī and Saligram and all you Musalmans by your belief in God and Koran, that it is your bounden duty to kill the English and thus protect your religion and yourself. The English will try to raise the Hindus against the Musalmans and vice versa. Do not give heed to what they say; drive them out of the country.⁷

Contemporary accounts show that the situation, as it existed then, was not so simple that mere appeals and *firman*s could have served the purpose. Some fanatic Muslims ignoring the *firman* actually started inciting their coreligionists against the Hindus. On 19 May some *ulemas* declared a holy war (*Jihad*) against the Hindus. They issued a *fatwah* (religious edict) at the Jama Masjid, Delhi, giving religious sanction to their *Jihad*.⁸ The activities of these fanatics annoyed the Emperor very much and he became 'angry' with them. To a deputation of Hindus who came to complain against the anti-Hindu crusade of these *mujahids*, he said: "The holy war is against the English; I have forbidden it against the Hindus".⁹ And on 21 May the Emperor advertised that Hindus and Muslims should not quarrel.¹⁰

To respect the religious sentiments of the Hindus the Emperor prohibited cow-slaughter in his *raj*. It could not take place even on the occasion of such religious festivals as *Id*. It was ordered in July "that anyone who slaughters a cow, an ox or a calf ... openly or secretly, shall be punished with death".¹⁰ To make sure that his orders were carried out the Emperor instructed the city Kotwal thus:

Kotwal of the city should get the list of all the Muslims who own tamed-cows prepared through thanadars and bonds and securities should be executed to the effect that they would not openly or secretly sacrifice cows. Those who have cows in their houses should keep them there in the same manner and feed them till three days (*i.e.*, after *Id*) by keeping them unmoved, not going to the pastures even If after three days the number of cows does not tally with the list and if anyone is found to have sacrificed them openly or secretly, he shall be sentenced to death.¹¹

The Emperor was helped in this matter by the Commander-in-Chief of the forces at Delhi and other civil and military officers. Besides, the religious leaders, *panditas* and *maulvis*, also played a significant role. The newspapers too tried to influence public opinion and made moving appeals to the people to unite.¹² As a result, the communal situation in Delhi as well as other towns, such as Gurgaon, Rewari, Ballabgarh, Pataudi, Rohtak, Jhajjar, Dadri, Dujana, Sirsa, Hansi, Hissar, Panipat, Karnal, Thanesar and Ambala improved considerably. The local leaders of the movement spared no pains for improving it still further. The example of Raja Nahar Singh of Ballabgarh is a case in point. He gives a detailed account of the measures taken by him for fostering communal unity in his state to Emperor Bahadur Shah thus :

Although I, in my heart, profess the Hindu religion, still I follow the dictates of the Muhammadan leaders, and am obedient to the followers of that creed. I have gone so far as to erect a lofty marble mosque within the fort (of Ballabgarh). I have also made a spacious *Idgah*. . . close to my fort.¹³

Besides this, the Jat Raja appointed many Muslim officials to responsible posts in his administration. The Muslim chiefs of Jhajjar, Dadri and Pataudi also treated their Hindu subjects in a like manner, and gave them high posts in their states.¹⁴

In rural Haryana there existed almost an ideal communal atmosphere everywhere. A contemporary account paints a lively picture of the joint endeavours of the Haryana villagers against the British and their allies. For instance, the Meos (Muslims) attacked and killed the 'loyal khanzadas', their own brethren at Nuh (District Gurgaon).¹⁵ Next, the Rawat Jats of Hodal village and the Rajputs of Hathin 'who were supposed to be on the side of the (British) Government' were attacked by a large gathering of the Surat Jats of Hodal, Pathans of Seoli and the Meos.¹⁶ On another occasion, the Meos joined with Ahirs and attacked the turbulent Rajputs of the Bhora pargana.¹⁷ In Panipat district we find an instance of the Muslim Ranghars coming to the rescue of their Hindu Jat brethren of the village of Bulleh when they were attacked by a British force under Captain Hughes on 14 July.¹⁸ In Hissar Hindus and Muslims assembled and fought under Prince Muhammed Azim. In the third week of November all the rebels of Haryana assembled at Narnaul under a common banner, irrespective of caste, creed or religion, and fought bravely against the British (16 November 1857).¹⁹

The fact of the matter is that the communal relations in Haryana during the Uprising (1857) were very cordial. The Hindus and Muslims stood side by side and made joint efforts to oust the British from their land.

III

A perusal of Indian history since the advent of the British shows that it was the mutual jealousy and rivalry among the Indians which more than anything else helped the British to establish their supremacy in India. Indians were sadly lacking in national consciousness necessary for purposeful efforts to drive the foreigners out of the country. But in 1857 there was a welcome change in the situation. The people made joint positive endeavours, irrespective of caste, creed or religion, in the great struggle against the British.

NOTES

1. In Haryana villages the communal atmosphere was still more congenial. The Muslims here — Rajputs, Gujars, Jats and Meos — presented a striking example of a happy combination of Hinduism and Islam. They avoided sagotra marriages; retained their Brahmana purohīts in most of their socio-cultural ceremonies; celebrated the Hindu festivals of Holi, Diwali, Dushera, etc., and put on clothes of Hindus style. The Hindus on the other hand showed marked respect for Muslim pirs and saints and went regularly to their shrines for making offerings. They treated Muslims as their brothers. See Yadav, 'Socio-cultural Homogeneity in Haryana in the 19th Century, *Glimpses of Haryana*, Ed. Buddha Parkash, pp. 115-19.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. Delhi was founded by the Tomara rulers of Haryana in the early medieval period. Since then it has been taken as an integral part of Haryana. See *Ibid.*, p. 19.
5. Nigam, *Delhi in 1857*, pp. 55-56.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.
7. Metcalfe, p. 98.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 100
10. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 31.
11. *Ibid.*, bundle 120, doc. no. 143; *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 94.
12. For details see Rizvi, pp. 105-10.
13. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859.
14. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 34, doc. No. 2.
15. *DG Gurgaon*, pp. 23-25.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Foreign Political Consultations, No. 581-86, 6 August 1858.
18. Cave-Browe, *The Panjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. II, p. 37.
19. Yadav, *Undoing the Bondage*, pp. 28-40.

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF THE PRINCES

I

In 1857 there were in all ten princely states in Haryana: seven in the lower region—Jhajjar, Bahadurgarh (or Dadri), Farrukhnagar, Ballabgarh, Pataudi, Dujana, and Loharu and three in the upper region—Buria, Kalsia and Jind. Besides these, there were about 11 *jagirs* (Kunjpura, Arnauli, Karnal, Shahabad, Dhanaura, Tangaur, Jharauli, Shamgarh, Panipat, Shahzadpur, Mustafabad).¹ As noted earlier, all these states and *jagirs* were either created by or existed on the sympathies of the British. Naturally, the princes and *jagirdars* could not afford to think of the world without their creators or patrons.

But what happened in 1857 obliged some of them to depart from their 'natural' stand. The common people in their territories rose *en masse* and asked them to lead them in accordance with the command of Emperor Bahadur Shah. These princes were too weak to resist these proposals and willy nilly assumed the leadership. But at the same time, they opened their account with the British too. They wanted to please both the sides, at least so long as they were not sure which side was likely to win.

This was, in fact, the worst feature of the Uprising. The masses turned to the feudal nobility, which in most of the cases betrayed them.

II

ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN OF JHAJJAR : Jhajjar was the biggest state in Haryana. It had an area of 1,230 sq. miles and a population of about 1,10,700 people, the majority of whom were Hindus.² The state was a creation of the British who

gave it to Nawab Nizabat Ali Khan, a Baharaich Pathan of Kandhar side in 1806, for his meritorious services during the Anglo-Maratha strife of 1803. Nizabat was succeeded by Faiz Muhammad Khan in 1824. He was a good ruler and people liked him very much. He died in 1835 and was succeeded by Faiz Ali Khan. He ruled for only five years and was succeeded by Abdur Rehman Khan (1845).³

Abdur Rehman was a man of taste and ability, but he spoiled his reputation by giving himself up to 'gross debauchery'. Besides, in revenue collection his little finger was thicker than his father's loins and many villagers fled from under his oppression.⁴

In 1857 Abdur Rahman did not play any positive role, though his subjects rose *en masse*. Immediately after the outbreak of the Revolt, he contacted Colvin, the Lieutenant Governor of Agra, asking him to issue instructions as to what he should do. The Lieutenant-Governor appreciated the move of the Nawab and asked him to extend as much help as possible to Harvey, his Agent at Delhi.⁵ He contacted Harvey and assured him of full support in the form of men, money and material. On 13 May, he sent a detachment of cavalry to Gurgaon at the request of W. Ford, the Collector and Magistrate of that district.⁶ He also sent a detachment to Rohtak at the request of Scot, the Joint-Magistrate. On 14 May, C.T. Metcalfe, Judge of Delhi, came to Jhajjar with another Englishman. The Nawab gave them shelter and deputed his own father-in-law Samad Khan, and Imad Ali to look after them.⁷ But when the people in the town came to know that the Nawab had given shelter to some Englishmen, there was a hue and cry.⁸ Consequently, the Nawab ordered their removal to Chhuchhakwas—his hunting resort some seven miles off. They were put up in a state building which had not been in use for long. Tired and exhausted, these Englishmen at once went to bed. But they had hardly slept for a while when they were again aroused at about 8 or 9 a.m. and shown a peremptory order from the Nawab that they should leave the place immediately. Two unarmed guides escorted them through the Jhajjar territory.¹⁰ At this, Metcalfe felt greatly insulted and swore: "If the British survived and he (Nawab) was alive, he

would account for this treachery".¹¹ When the reaction of Metcalfe was made known to the Nawab he felt very sorry, and sent his *sowars* in search of the 'guests' in every direction.¹² Later on the Nawab tried to make good the loss by saving the lives of six or seven English women and children whom he safely sheltered in the Jhajjar territory till 26 July, when they were sent to the English camp before Delhi.¹³

Naturally Emperor Bahadur Shah was unhappy with the Nawab. He sent an urgent *firman* to him asking him to march at once to Delhi with all his troops to join him in the fight against the English.¹⁴ But the Nawab did not carry out the royal orders and offered some excuse or the other in evasion. Next, the Emperor sent pressing calls for the supply of money and material. But this too fell on deaf ears.¹⁵ Infuriated, Bahadur Shah then sent his trusted agent, a relative of Samad Khan, the General and father-in-law of the Nawab, who contacted the officers of the Jhajjar forces and other influential persons and impressed upon them the desirability of helping the Emperor with money, men and material. The officers and the troops who apparently were already inclined to favour Bahadur Shah, joined with the Agent and went to the Nawab along with Samad Khan and pressed him to proceed to Delhi with his treasure, magazine and all his troops.¹⁶ In view of the strong anti-British attitude of the people, the army and its officers, including the General, Samad Khan, the Nawab could not afford to displease them. He at once sent a part of his forces—some 300 *sowars*, with General Samad Khan and his grandfather Ibrahim Ali to Delhi on 21 May¹⁷. He also sent his accredited Agent, Ghulam Nabi to the Imperial Court.¹⁸

In the month of June, Bahadur Shah again requested the Nawab to send money, but the Nawab did not pay any heed to the royal *firman*. In the second week of July he was again asked to extend a loan of the value of Rs. 3 to 5 lakhs.¹⁹ The Nawab again did not send any reply to it. This offended the Emperor and he sent a threatening order to the Nawab, saying: "If the money was not sent, he (Emperor) would take other steps to enforce his orders". The Nawab gave a prompt reply to the imperial threat and showed his inability to send money as he had spent all the revenue on his army. He addressed

many letters of excuses and pretences to the Emperor couched in highly flattering terms.²⁰

The tall and empty promises of the Nawab could not satisfy Bahadur Shah. He sent a small force under Risaldar Mujahid Ali Khan to realise the amount by force.²¹ The Risaldar quarrelled with the Nawab who refused to pay 'even a single cowrie to him'.²² When the Risaldar returned to Delhi empty handed,²³ the Emperor sent Azim Khan and Mirza Khuda Bakhsh to Jhajjar with a small contingent to collect the money by force. The Nawab, deeming further resistance inexpedient, yielded a sum of Rs. 60,000 to them and promised another Rs. 40,000 within fifteen days. Thereupon the Emperor called back the force from the Jhajjar territory.²⁴

But once the troops were out of the Jhajjar territory the Nawab forgot his promise. Instead of money he sent letters saying that he had practically no money, although his treasury contained gold and silver coins of the value of Rs. 11 lakhs.²⁵ He also turned down the order of Bahadur Shah to come to Delhi in person with his retainers and followers.²⁶

In actual fact the Nawab had no nerve to take an open stand against the British. Nor did he dare to displease Bahadur Shah. Thus, throughout he played a double game paying lip allegiance to the latter while he extended help with money, men and material to the former. But this pleased neither of the parties. The British in particular viewed him as their enemy. After the recapture of Delhi (20 September 1857), the Nawab was tried under Act XVI of 1857 by a special military court constituted under the presidency of General V. Chamberlain at Delhi. The charges against him were that he had

- (1) aided and abetted rebels and others waging war against the British Government in places being at that time under martial law;
- (2) furnished troops, money, food and shelter to the rebels;
- (3) entered into treasonable correspondence with them.²⁷

Metcalf, Loch and Ford, together with some other European officers and Indian witnesses, gave evidence against the Nawab.²⁸ On 14 December 1857, the Nawab presented his statement of defence. Pleading himself 'non-guilty' he stated:

All the officers, my troops and Abdus Samad Khan came

in a body to me resolved on going to Delhi, and plainly told me that I should proceed thither in person, with the treasure, magazine and the whole of the forces, and on no account seemed to hear a refusal. I, without hesitation, told them in answer that I would never go.

He further said that on finding him hesitant to go, Abdus Samad Khan "required that Ibrahim Ali Khan should accompany him (to Delhi) and requested that I should write a petition. Feeling my perfect helplessness, I wrote a petition and despatched him with 50 horsemen". He further stated that whatever money he paid to Emperor Bahadur Shah was "very small in quantity and he did so under extreme compulsion". Moreover, it was a way to evade the full payment demanded by the Emperor. To quote his own words:

Had I really intended to give money, I would have done so without any delay. . . . I had in possession, treasure in gold and silver coins to the extent of 11,00,000 of rupees, as well as stores of ammunition. Had I been in combination with the rebels I should have given them not promises but the treasure itself.

He further pleaded:

It had been my resolve, if I would have got any portion of my soldiers to accompany me, to have presented myself in camp before Delhi, but . . . I was helpless . . . If I went away the mutinous soldiery would have taken possession of the treasure and magazine and proceed with them to Delhi.

Giving an account of his other acts of help, such as giving shelter to some Englishmen, women and children, he said at the end : "I have through every vicissitude remained the staunch and devoted subject and servant of the British Government."²⁰

The defence taken by the Nawab was undoubtedly very strong. Being in close proximity to Delhi, with all his people against the British, and his soldiery and the commanders having 'full sympathy for the rebels' cause, he could not be expected to have played any substantial role in favour of the British. But the military court did not take any such factor into consideration, probably on the testimony of C.T. Metcalfe who had earlier sworn that if he were alive and the English came out successful in the struggle, he would make the Nawab suffer for the maltreatment

he had received at the Nawab's hands during the Revolt.³⁰ In an atmosphere surcharged with the spirit of revenge and vindictiveness, the Court gave its verdict against the Nawab thus:

Having found the prisoner guilty of the charges preferred against him, do sentence him, Abdur Rehman Khan, Nawab of Jhajjar to be hanged by the neck until he be dead, and the court further sentences him to forfeit all his property and effects of every description.³¹

A graphic description of the details of the execution of the Nawab on 23 January 1858 is furnished by Zaka Ullah Khan, a summary of which is as follows:

The time of hanging was evening (*sahpahar*). All the gates of the city were closed. A company of the European band came playing on their musical instrument and stood before the Kotwali (Chandni Chowk). The prince was brought from the (Red) Fort on a wooden cart. He was made to sit on it on his feet (*ukarun*). His hands were tied on back (*mashken kasna*) and covered with a piece of cloth. The European spectators sat on all sides. When the prince was brought to the gallows and the plank was removed, and the prince suffered death, the Europeans sitting nearby felt jubilant and joyful.³²

Another eye-witness, a European army officer, observes that the Nawab was humiliated even at the gallows. During such executions, he remarks, the Europeans used to bribe the executioners to keep them (*Mutineers*) long time hanging as they liked to see the criminals dance a 'pandies horn pipe', as they termed the 'dying struggles' of the victims'. The Nawab was also a 'long time dying'.³³

III

AHMAD ALI OF FARRUKHNAGAR: Farrukhnagar, a small state with an area of 22 square miles and a population of 4,400,³⁴ was founded in 1714 by one Dalel Khan Biloch of Bashirpur, near Farrukhnagar, as a grant from Emperor Muhammad Shah. It was a big state then, but on account of the failure of its fourth ruler Ise Khan to render prompt service to the British in 1803 during the Anglo-Maratha struggle the British reduced its size.³⁵ Ise Khan was succeeded by Yakub Ali who

proved to be a good ruler. But his successor, Ahmed Ali, who came to the *gaddi* in 1850 was made of a different fibre³⁷—by all standards a mediocrity.

During the Uprising of 1857 Ahmed did not play a significant role. As soon as he heard of the Delhi outbreak and the revolt of the local population, he decided to cast his lot with Emperor Bahadur Shah. He personally paid a visit to Delhi on 12 May and presented a *nazr* to the Emperor.³⁷ A careful study of the petitions and other documents pertaining to his dealings during the year 1857 reveals that the Nawab, along with his uncle Ghulam Muhammad Khan, consumed all his energy in fighting with his neighbour, Rao Tula Ram of Rewari,³⁸ in furtherance of his selfish interests, instead of rendering some substantial help to the rebels' cause with men, money and material.³⁹

After the recapture of Delhi, the British put the Nawab on trial on 12 January 1858. The charges against him were that he had entered into treasonable correspondence with the rebels; had helped them with arms, other necessary things and; had usurped authority over the pargana of Bhora, a British territory.⁴⁰

The Nawab pleaded 'not guilty' and presented his statement of defence on 22 January 1858. He stated:

My uncle Ghulam Muhammad Khan is and has been a seditious character. . . . When the outbreak of the rebellion took place at Delhi, depending upon the influence and support of his father-in-law, Mohammad Hussain Khan, who had become Adjutant in the army, Ghulam Muhammad Khan accompanied by some 50 or 60 *sowars* or infantrymen came forcibly to Farrukhnagar, removed me from my seat as chief of the estate, made me a prisoner, seized my seal and constituted himself master of my territory. . . . Correspondence must have been maintained by Ghulam Muhammad Khan. . . I had not the power nor the presumption of power that I should have taken possession of Bhora.⁴¹

This statement of defence did not contain a grain of truth. No substantial evidence was put forward in support of the contention that he was actually a helpless prisoner in the hands

of his uncle Ghulam Muhammad Khan. On the other hand, many of the petitions written by him to Emperor Bahadur Shah bore his signatures and seal impressions. One of his petitions to the Emperor dated 2 September 1857, asking for a title of distinction, is enough to prove that these petitions were written by the Nawab himself and none else.⁴³ There is also the evidence of Munshi Jiwan Lal that he had presented himself in the court of Emperor Bahadur Shah on 31 July.⁴⁵ Occupation of Bhora by his troops under his uncle Zafar Yar Khan is quite well-known. He was driven out from Bhora by the forces of Tula Ram in the month of August 1857, against whom he made several representations in the court of Emperor Bahadur Shah.

On 22 January the Court gave its verdict against the Nawab. He was held guilty of the charges preferred against him and in consequence thereof the sentence of death by hanging and forfeiture of all property and effects of every description was passed. The Nawab was hanged at Kotwali in the Chandni Chowk of Delhi at 4 p.m. on 23 January 1858.⁴⁴

IV

NAHAR SINGH OF BALLABHGARH: Ballabgarh, a small state in the vicinity of Delhi, with an area of about 190 sq. miles and a population of 57,000,⁵⁷ was founded in the first decade of the 18th century by one Gopal Singh Jat. Raja Nahar Singh the ruling chief at the time of the Uprising was a descendant of his. But unlike his forefathers Nahar was timid and weak-minded.⁴⁶

When Nahar heard the news of the outbreak of the revolt on 11 May, he did not think it proper to rise against the 'invincible' British power. But since he was very close to Delhi, the centre of the rebels, and his entire state was up in arms against the British, he had no choice but to cast his lot with Emperor Bahadur Shah.⁴⁷ He addressed several letters to Bahadur Shah.⁴⁸ He also sent a detachment of his cavalry consisting of some 30 *sowars* under Dafedar Kalandar Bax to Delhi⁴⁹ and deputed his confidential agent to the Imperial Court.⁵⁰ But he did not present himself at the Court, despite several requests of the Emperor to this effect, and avoided

going there by extending some pretext or the other.⁵¹ Nor did he comply with Bahadur Shah's requests for the supply of money.⁵²

If fact, the Raja wanted to play a safe game, and the only safe game at that time was a double game. Accordingly, he extended help to the British authorities too. He managed the main road between Ballabgarh and Delhi in accordance with the instructions of Emperor Bahadur Shah,⁵³ but allowed the British officials and fugitives to go without check. Nor did he prevent them from passing through his territory.⁵⁴ His men took care of the comfort and safety of W. Ford, who travelled through the region.⁵⁵ Harvey, the Commissioner of Agra, met the same treatment when he came near Ballabgarh with his force. He was supplied with rations and other necessities. Besides, he was personally requested by the Raja to stay in his fort at Ballabgarh.⁵⁶

He wrote letters to nearly all the British officials around him. On 24 May he wrote a letter to Ford informing him that the parganas of Palwal, Pali and Fatehgarh had been occupied by him on behalf of the British Government.⁵⁷ Later he wrote letters to Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra,⁵⁸ General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces,⁵⁹ Canning, the Governor-General,⁶⁰ Harvey, the Commissioner of Agra Division,⁶¹ Keith-Young, the Judge Advocate-General in Delhi,⁶² Greathed, the Agent in Delhi,⁶³ "professing extreme loyalty to the British Government and conveying occasional state scraps of information regarding the state of affairs in Delhi and the progress of the siege".⁶⁴ He sent his accredited agent to the British Camp before Delhi⁶⁵ and sent 'daily news' to them through him after collecting the same from his men stationed in Delhi.⁶⁶ A few days before the fall of Delhi, he sent three elephants, 97 horses, 27 bullocks, 25 guns and accoutrements of many sorts to the British.⁶⁷

But all these steps could hardly please the British who were aware of the Raja's double dealing. Consequently, they apprehended him after the fall of Delhi, and brought him to trial on 19 December 1857.⁶⁸ The charges against him were that he held treasonable correspondence with the rebels;

helped them with men, money and material in waging war against the British and; usurped unlawful authority over the British pargana of Palwal.⁶⁹

The Raja pleaded 'not-guilty' and presented his statement of defence through his Attorney, H.M. Courtney. The Raja confessed that a few messengers from Emperor Bahadur Shah had gained admittance to his presence, replies had been sent to the royal *shuqqas*, and in one case a present of a few gold *mohars* had also been sent to the king. His Attorney put forth convincing reasons to account for this kind of behaviour of his client:

This was from actual compulsion when in case of a refusal to comply with the demand of a small *nazr* or present to a king, backed by an army of 40 to 50,000 men, would have been considered as a mad, desperate, and hopeless task for my client to be placed as he was so close to the headquarters of the rebellious army, when in case of refusal he might any morning have beheld the march of a portion of that army against his devoted self and family from whom he could expect no mercy.

He posed the whole problem before the court in a personal way asking them the solution thereof:

What would you yourselves have done—had you had the ancestral property and dominions of the prisoner now before you and (had) been situated like him in so precarious a situation, with treacherous and evil advisors surrounding you on every side, your own little troops in mutiny and wanting every moment to take the road to Delhi and join the '*Deen Ki Larai*' or religious war?⁷⁰

The Attorney gave account of the Raja's efforts at saving the lives of several Europeans and Christians, such as, Michael Taylor, Reeds and Spencer. He explained in detail how his client had apprehended and sent to the British authorities at Delhi, Bisha Singh and Risha Singh, chieftains of the Gujars of Dadri (for whom an apprehension reward of Rs. 14,000 had been offered) along with 83 other rebels. Next, he denied his client's having sent any help to Emperor Bahadur Shah except a small detachment of cavalry under Risaldar Kalandar Bax, who instead of rendering any service to the Emperor sent 'Delhi intelligence' to the Raja who in turn

passed it on to the British authorities.⁷¹ In reply to the charge that the Raja had usurped the British territory of Palwal, his Attorney produced his (the Raja's) letters sent to the high British officials. For instance, he wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra: "As a chief and ally of the British Government, I have taken measures for the protection of the district contiguous to mine, as all the British civil officers have fled through fear of being murdered."⁷²

The solid and weighty defence put forth by the Raja could not extinguish the fire of revenge burning in the hearts of the Britons who constituted the commission. It was unanimously decided by them on 2 January 1858 that "the Raja is guilty of the charges preferred against him, with the exception to the word 'money' of which the Court acquit him". In consequence, they sentenced him to "be hanged by neck until he be dead and further to forfeit all his property and effects of every description".⁷³

On 9 January 1858 Raja Nahar Singh was hanged at Kotwali in Chandni Chowk, Delhi,⁷⁴ in the same manner as the other chiefs of the Division.⁷⁵

A careful reading of the trial proceedings of the Raja of Ballabhgarh shows that the Raja was not 'at heart a traitor to the British Government'⁷⁶ and 'vindictiveness and hasty judgement' led to the unjust loss of life and property of 'an ally of the British'.⁷⁷ The people, in and outside India, severely criticised the Government, who 'in the presence of stubborn facts of aid and protection offered by the Raja of Ballabhgarh', did not deem him 'worthy of pardon or a punishment lighter than that of beheading'.⁷⁸

V

AKBAR ALI OF PATAUDI: Pataudi was a small state with an area of 74 square miles and a population of 6, 600, mostly Hindus.⁷⁹ The state was a creation of the British, a gift to a Faiz Talab Khan by Lord Lake in 1806 for his meritorious services during the Anglo-Maratha strife of 1803.⁸⁰ Nawab Akbar Ali succeeded him in 1829.⁸¹

During the Uprising of 1857 Nawab Akbar Ali addressed several letters to Bahadur Shah showing him entire devotion

and faithfulness. But this was only lip allegiance because he did not help the Emperor by men, money and material.⁸² On the other hand he showed full loyalty and faithfulness to the British, and gave protection to army European fugitives for several days.⁸³ The British authorities took a lenient view of his activities during the crisis and he went unpunished.

VI

HASSAN ALI KHAN OF DUJANA: The state of Dujana with an area of 100 square miles and a population of 27,000⁸⁴ was given to one Abdus Samad Khan in 1806 for his services during the Anglo-Maratha strife of 1803.⁸⁵ He was a good wise chief who managed the affairs of his state well. He was succeeded by Dunde Khan who remained in saddle until 1850 when he was succeeded by his son Hasan Ali Khan.⁸⁶ Hassan Ali was a kind-hearted Nawab and his subjects liked him very much.⁸⁷ In the Uprising of 1857, the Nawab did not play any significant role. Except for his visits to the Court of Bahadur Shah,⁸⁸ he does not seem to have rendered any useful service to the rebels' cause. The British took a lenient view of his activities also and let him go free.

VII

BAHADUR JANG KHAN OF BAHADURGARH: Bahadurgarh, a small state with an area of 48 square miles and a population of 14,400 persons,⁸⁹ was founded by Ismail Khan, the younger son of Nawab Nizabat Khan, the founder of the Jhajjar state.⁹⁰ Bahadur Jang succeeded him in 1806, as a minor of 2½ years. The Nawab of Jhajjar managed the affairs of the state during his minority, and when he came of age, he led a dissolute life. As a result the state was in a deplorable condition in 1857.⁹¹

On 13 May, Emperor Bahadur Shah sent a message to the Nawab directing him to come in person to the Imperial Court. To this he sent a reply thirteen days later showing his inability to attend the Court on account of chaos, confusion and disorder in his state. However, he promised to come to Delhi as soon as law and order was restored. He did not seem to have rendered any service to the Emperor except paying a *nazr* of four gold *mohars* through his physician Pir Badhshah Khan and lawyer Lachhman Singh.⁹²

These facts were taken note of favourably by the British⁹³ after the fall of Delhi (20 September 1857) and the Nawab was not put before the Military Court on the recommendation of the Commissioner of the Delhi Division. He was tried by an ordinary court instead.⁹⁴ The court deprived him of his territorial estates, the total revenue of which amounted to about 1½ lakh of rupees per annum. In return the Nawab was given monthly pension of 1,000/ rupees, plus Rs. 4000/ per annum to be given to his mother, widows of his father and other blood relations.⁹⁵ The Nawab was not permitted to reside at Dadri and was removed to Lahore.⁹⁶

VIII

AMINUDDIN OF LOHARU: Nawab Aminuddin of Loharu, a small state measuring 280 sq. miles with a population of 18,000⁹⁷ behaved like his other fellow-princes. He played a game of duplicity: on the one hand he paid lip allegiance to Emperor Bahadur Shah⁹⁸ and on the other he was in secret communication with the British.⁹⁹ After the fall of Delhi, the British did not take any serious view of his activities and pardoned him.¹⁰⁰

IX

RAJA BAHADUR SINGH OF JIND: The state of Jind (area 376 sq. miles and population 56,024)¹⁰¹ enjoyed a big name in Haryana and Panjab.¹⁰² It was founded, with other Sikh states in the region, in 1763 by Gajpat Singh, a great-grandson of Phul, the founder of the Phulkian *Mis* and the maternal grandfather of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.¹⁰³ In 1857, Raja Sarup Singh,¹⁰⁴ the fourth descendant of Raja Gajpat Singh was on the *gaddi*. He was a brave man with an ordinary intellect, certainly a type who would behave conservatively at the time of crisis.

On hearing the news of the Delhi Uprising, Sarup Singh chose to take sides with the British (12 May). He despatched two messengers to the Commissioner of the *cis-Satluj* States to solicit orders for him. On May 14, the Commissioner asked him to proceed to Karnal with his troops. He at once collected some 800 of his men from the infantry and cavalry regiments and reached Karnal on May 18. Here he undertook the

defence of that city and its cantonment.¹⁰⁶ From Karnal the Raja sent a detachment to secure the bridge of boats at Baghpat, 20 miles north of Delhi, enabling the Meerut force to cross the Yamuna and join the Delhi Field Force under General Bernard.¹⁰⁷ Besides, Jind troops secured the Grand Trunk Road from Karnal to Delhi.¹⁰⁸

Besides this, the Raja made a substantial contribution of supplies of various kinds for the use of the Delhi Field Force. These were despatched by him in three instalments: first of all he sent 77 hackneys, 191 camels, 50 donkeys, 10 bearers and 1,000 maunds of *atta*, 115 maunds of *ghee*, 100 maunds of *dal* and 1,000 maunds of gram to commissariat department at Ambala;¹⁰⁹ then he sent 144 hackneys, 207 camels, 97 donkeys, 5 buffalows, 13 bearers and 1,118 maunds of *atta*, 31 maunds of *ghee*, 22 maunds of *dal* and 165 maunds of gram to Karnal a few days later;¹¹⁰ and finally he despatched 200 bullocks for artillery guns, 600 carriages, 50 hackneys, 62 donkeys, 13 mules, 7 tatus, 966 maunds of *atta*, 36 maunds of *ghee* and 5 maunds of *dal* to Alipur near Delhi.

On June 7, Sarup Singh personally joined the British camp at Alipur and fought the following day at Badli-Ki-Sarai. His troops behaved very well in the battle and were complimented by the Commander-in-Chief who sent one of the captured guns to the Raja as a present. On June 19, the Jind troops helped in repulsing the Nasirabad forces which had attacked the camp; and on the 21st they repaired the bridge of boats at Baghpat though later it had to be destroyed as the Mutineers had attacked the Raja in overwhelming numbers, compelling him to retreat. The forces under their Commandant Kahan Singh, took a prominent part in the last assault of the City, sealing the walls side by side with the English troops.¹¹²

Sarup Singh was the only chief present with the British army at Delhi. After the fall of Delhi, he returned to Jind, but not his troops. He left 25 men for service at the Largsoli teshil, and the same number at Delhi. He sent a detachment of 200 men with General van Courtlandt to Hansi and 100 men under their Commander Khan Singh to Jhajjar with Col. Lawrence. Besides these, 250 Jind troops remained stationed at Rohtak, 50 at Gohana, about 20 miles to the north, till

these parganas were fairly settled for good. The Rajaw as greatly rewarded, as we shall see later, for these services.¹¹³

X

OTHER STATES : The ruler of Kalsia state Sardar Sobha Singh also rendered 'meritorious' services to the British. He guarded many ferries on the river Yamuna above Delhi and held a police post at Dadupur. He also provided men for patrolling the main road between Kalka, Ambala and Ferozepur. Besides, he sent 100 of his men to Awadh. The British Government rewarded his son Lehna Singh for these valuable services.¹¹⁴

Similarly Sardar Jiwan Singh, the Chief of Buria state remained loyal and extended all sorts of help to the British. He was also suitably rewarded for his loyal services.¹¹⁵

XI

THE JAGIRDARS: As noted above, there were eleven important *jagirdars* in Haryana during the period under review. In the revolt, all of them, Nawab Muhammad Ali of Kunjpura, Bhai Jasmer Singh and Anokh Singh of Arnauli, Nawab Ahmed Ali Khan of Karnal, Sardars Partap Singh, Kishan Singh and Dharm Singh of Shahabad, Sardars Natha Singh and Amar Singh of Dhanaura, Sardar Kehar Singh and Shamsher Singh of Tangaur, Sardar Jawala Singh of Jharauli, Sardars Ram Singh and Khan Singh of Shamgarh, Nawab Aman ullah Ansari of Panipat, Sardar Jiwan Singh of Shahzadpur, Sardar Rattan Singh of Mustafabad remained loyal, keeping their men under their control and extending whatever help they could by way of supplying men, money and material to the British. They were suitably rewarded for their loyal services, after the Revolt.¹¹⁶

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that during the 1857 crisis the chiefs and *jagirdars* of Haryana behaved in a manner most unbecoming of the leaders of men who fought to oust a foreign power from their land.

NOTES

1. For these states and *jagirs*, see Griffin, *Chief and Families of Note in the Panjab*, Vols. I & II ; D'Cruz, *On the Political Relations existing between the British Government and Native States and Chiefs, subject to the Government of the N.W. Provinces as they stood in 1840*.
2. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July 1857.
3. For details, see Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. VIII, pp. 126-27; *Rohtak DG* (1910), pp. 31-32; Ghulam Nabi, *Tarikh-i-Jhajjar*, pp. 160-61.
4. *Rohtak DG*, pp. 31-32; Ghulam Nabi, pp. 251-52 ; Bhagwan Dey, *Balidan*, p. 125: Statement of a contemporary of the Nawab (Basti Ram).
5. Ghulam Nabi, p. 264.
6. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858, Disaffected as these sepoys were, they did not render any service at Gurgaon.
7. *Ibid.* Instead of helping the authorities in restoring order in the District, these troops excited disturbance and instigated the people to rise.
8. Ghulam Nabi, p. 265.
9. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July, 1857.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. PSA, *File R/192*, pp. 195-9.
14. Metcalfe, p. 85.
15. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid*; Diary of Munshi Jiwan Lal, dated 21 May 1857, *vide* Metcalfe, p. 101.
18. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858.
19. *Ibid*; Diary of Munshi Jiwan Lal, 15 July, *vide* Metcalfe, p. 154.
20. Metcalfe, p. 160.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
22. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Metcalfe, p. 196.
25. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid*: Statement of defence presented by the Nawab.
30. How every European heart was burning with the fire of revenge can be gauged by the following remark made by John Lawrence for Emperor Bahadur Shah : "It is a great pity that the old rascal was

not shot directly he was seen—I would not have taken him prisoner . . . I think that 11 shahzadas and other leading insurgents should be summarily dealt with".

European Manuscripts, Saunders' Papers, John Lawrence to Saunders 30 September 1857, quoted by Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, p. 219.

31. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 176-89, 9 July 1858.
32. Zakaullah Khan, *Tarikh-i-Arui-i-Ahad-i-Sultanat Inglishiya*, p. 710.
33. Coupland, *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior*, p. 269.
34. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July 1857.
35. See *PSA*, File R/163, pp. 5-6, for a detailed account.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Latif, *Qila Delhi Ka Roznameha*, p. 123.
38. See his petitions included in the trial, Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 841-84, 6 August 1858 and Munshi Jiwan Lal's diary, *vide* Metcalfe, p. 219.
39. See Yadav, *Undoing the Bondage*, pp. 75-76 for details.
40. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 581-86, 8 August 1858.
41. *Ibid.*; Statement of defence presented by Nawab Ahmed Ali Khan.
42. *Mutiny Papers*, bundle no. 38, document no. 2.
43. Nizami, *Gadhr Ki Subah wa Sham*, pp. 193-4.
44. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 841-84, 6 August 1858.
45. Gopal Singh was entitled by the Mughals to a cess of one anna in the rupee on the land revenue of the pargana of Faridabad. His successor Charan Das quarrelled with the imperial authority and stopped paying the cess. Consequently he was imprisoned. But Bullam Singh, his son, got him freed tactfully with the help of Raja Suroj Mal of Bharatpur. Bullam made the present village of Bullabgarh his headquarters and got erected a fort there after his own name Ballamgarh, Fort of Bullam Singh, Raja Nahar Singh was a descendent of Bullam Singh. For details see Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, pp. 77-80; *DG Delhi*, pp. 213-14.
46. He was at Delhi when the outbreak of revolt took place on 11 May. (Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859). He at once contacted Emperor Bahadur Shah, who wished him to go and attend to the arrangements in his own territory (*Ibid.*, *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, p. 50). In consequence, he went to Ballabgarh the next day (12 May) (Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859). Chuni Lal, a news writer says that the Raja left Delhi on 11 May (Chick, 153). But he is wrong. The Raja himself gives 12 May in his petition to Bahadur Shah, dated 31 July 1857 *vide* the above quoted document.
47. About 15 of these letters were produced during the trial of the Raja (Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859) and several others during the trial of Bahadur Shah (Garret, pp. 49-61).
48. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid*; Statement of Defence.
52. *Ibid*.
53. *Ibid*.
54. *Ibid*.
55. *Ibid*; Statement of Stanley.
56. Harvey to Saunders, dated 17 December 1857, *vide* Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859.
57. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859: Statement of Defence.
58. *Ibid*: Nahar Singh to Colvin, dated 15 June 1857.
59. *Ibid*: Harvey to Saunders, dated 17 December 1857.
60. *Ibid*: Nahar Singh to Canning, dated 15 June 1857.
61. *Ibid*: Harvey to Saunders, dated 17 December 1857.
62. Keith-Young, *Delhi*, 1857, pp. 112-13.
63. Greathed to Colvin, dated 10 June 1857, *vide* Military Consultations, No. 1459, 26 June 1857.
64. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859: Harvey to Saunders, dated 17 December 1857.
65. *Ibid*: Statement of Stanley, *Records of the Intelligence Department, NWP*, Vol. II, Appendix Nos. 1 and 2.
66. *Ibid*.
67. *Ibid*: Statement of Defence.
68. *Ibid*.
69. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859.
70. *Ibid*: Statement of defence of Raja Nahar Singh.
71. *Ibid*.
72. *Ibid*: Letter of Raja Nahar Singh to Colvin, the Lt. Governor of N.W. Provinces, Agra.
73. *Ibid*.
74. *Ibid*.
75. Zakaullah Khan, p. 710.
76. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859.
77. *Native Fidelity*, p. 75.
78. *Ibid*.
79. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July 1857.
80. Aitchison, Vol. V, p. 3; *IGI, Panjab*, Vol. II, p. 365.
81. *IGI, Panjab*, Vol. II, p. 365.
82. PSA, Delhi Division Records, Judicial Department, Case No. 6 of 1858; File R/192, pp. 196-9; Abdul Latif, *Qila Delhi Ka Roznamcha*, 22 June 1857 and 26 August 1857.
83. PSA, File R/192, pp. 195-6; Delhi Division Records, Judicial, Case No. 6 of 1858.

After the fall of Delhi, the Nawab was apprehended and brought for trial to Delhi. It was proposed that he should also be tried by the same military commission which had tried other chiefs of the Delhi Division. But on the recommendations of the Commissioner of the Delhi Division to the effect that the Nawab did not render

any substantial service, but lip-allegiance only to Emperor Bahadur Shah and saved the lives of several European fugitives, was exempted from the ordeal (*Ibid.*), and later on pardoned and reinstated to his former position. His successors continued to administer the state till its merger with the Indian Union in 1947.

84. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July 1857.
85. Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 4-5.
86. *IGI, Panjab*, Vol. II, p. 365.
87. *DG Dujana*, p. 7.
88. Hassan Ali was at Delhi when the outbreak of the revolt took place. On 12 May, he paid a personal visit to Emperor Bahadur Shah and offered him one gold *mohar* in *nazr* (Latif, 22 May 1857, p. 3). He remained at Delhi throughout the siege and left that place along with his son Shahadat Ali Khan. But he was soon apprehended by the British at Bulandshahar. He was brought back to Delhi on 1 January 1858 for trial (*SR Rohtak*, p. 34). Finding him "not guilty of waging war against the British" or giving any substantial help to the Emperor, the Court acquitted him. Soon after his state was restored to him. In 1947, its ruler went to Pakistan and the state merged with the Indian Union.
89. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July 1857.
90. Ghulam Nabi, pp. 167-234.
91. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 145-53, 2 July 1858; *SR Rohtak*, p. 36.
92. *Ibid.*
93. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 841-47, 6 August 1858.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*, Nos. 153-60, 4 March 1859.
96. *SR Rohtak*, pp. 43-44.
97. The state of Loharu was founded by one Ahmed Bakhsh Khan in 1803. He had been the Agent of the Raja of Alwar in his dealings with Lord Lake and the British Government. He highly impressed both the parties and was granted the pargana of Loharu in hereditary rent-free tenure by the one and the principality of Ferozepur-Jhirka by the other. Amin-ud-din succeeded to the *gaddi* in 1835 when his elder brother Sams-ud-din, the second ruler of Loharu, was hanged by the British for his complicity in the murder of William Fraser in Delhi. See *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 22 July 1857; *IGI Panjab*, Vol. I, p. 364; *Loharu State Gazetteer*, pp. 1-20; Martin-Montgomery, Vol. II, p. 521.
98. He was at Delhi when the Revolt broke out there on 11 May. He at once paid a visit to Bahadur Shah.
99. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 439-47, 13 August 1858.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, No. 215, 23 July 1857.
102. See Griffin, *Rajas of the Punjab*, Vol. II, pp. 282-379; Griffin Massy, etc., *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, Vol. II, pp. 483-87.

103. His daughter Raj Kaur was married to Sardar Maha Singh of the Sukarchakia *Misl*. She became the mother of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.
104. Phul (Founder of the *Misl*, d. 1652)
 - Tiloka
 - Sukhchain (d. 1751)
 1. Raja Gajpat Singh (d. 1789)
 - 2. Raja Bhag Singh (d. 1819)
 - 3. Raja Fatch Singh (d. 1822)
 - 4. Raja Sangat Singh (d. 1834)
 - 5. Raja Sri Sarup Singh (d. 1864)

Raja Sangat Singh had no son and 'the question of escheat arose in the absence of direct heirs' after his death, in 1837. However, the Government granted the State to Sarup Singh of Bazipur, a third cousin of the deceased Raja. But he was held to have no right to succeed to more territory than was possessed by his great-grandfather, Gajpat Singh, through whom he derived his title. This consisted of Jind proper and nine other parganas containing 322 villages having a revenue of Rs. 2,36,000. Estates yielding a revenue of Rs. 1,82,000 was resumed by the British Government as escheats. See Griffin, *Chiefs*, Vol. II, pp. 483-84.

105. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 169-86, 2 July 1858.
106. *Ibid.*
107. *Ibid.*
108. *Ibid.*
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibid.*
112. *Ibid.*
113. *Ibid.*
114. Griffin, *Chiefs*, Vol. II, pp. 555-57.
115. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 62.
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-69.

CHAPTER VIII

RESTORATION OF BRITISH RULE

I

We have seen in the preceding chapters that the people of Haryana had freed most of the region from the British control by the end of May 1857. Unfortunately, however, they could not retain their independence because of inadequate leadership, poor planning, bad organisation and insufficient resources. The edifice of their achievement collapsed, sooner than expected, as the following discussion will show.

II

HISSAR DISTRICT: In the first week of June, General van Courtlandt,¹ the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur, attacked the Hissar district on instructions from John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Panjab. His forces consisted of 670 men and two guns. Captain Robertson acted as a political officer under him.²

The General started his operation with the pargana of Sirsa where he encountered opposition from Nur Samad Khan, the Nawab of Rania.³ A pitched battle was fought at Uddhan, a small village near Rania on 17 June. The Nawab's men fought like dare devils but the British firearms played a vital role in the contest. As many as 530 of the Nawab's men fell fighting as the victory went to van Courtlandt. The Nawab effected his escape, but he was caught while passing through the Ludhiana District and condemned to death by hanging.⁴

On June 18, the village of Chatravan, where Capt. Hillard and his brother-in-law were killed, was attacked. The assault came so suddenly that the villagers could neither come out to fight nor flee away to save their lives. They were ruthlessly butchered and their houses were burnt to ashes.⁵ Next day

the British attacked Khaira. Unlike the residents of Chatra-van, the villagers here were on guard and offered a tough battle to the enemy. But ultimately the British superiority in number and firearms again decided the fate of the battle. As many as 300 villagers died fighting.⁶

Overjoyed with the victory, van Courtlandt went to Sirsa on 20 June. About 800 men and two guns of the Raja of Bikaner joined him there.⁷ The General sent the Bikaner contingent under Capt. Pearse to Hissar *via* Bhadra, whereas he himself stayed back to reduce the pargana of Sirsa. This took the General a little more than a fortnight.⁸ Meanwhile Pearse reached Hissar (26 June) and he reestablished British authority there. On 8 July the General also left Sirsa for Hissar. On the way, he met with stiff opposition at the hands of the inmates of the villages through which he passed. However, he conquered them easily. He reached Hissar on 17 July. The local population, especially the Bhattis, Ranghars, Pachhadas and others in and around Hissar were mercilessly slaughtered. The house of Prince Muhammad Azim was plundered and destroyed and his Begum was captured.⁹

Leaving a strong garrison force under Capt. Mildway at Hissar, van Courtlandt proceeded to Hansi. There the rebels had collected in large numbers. But the arrival of the British force had the desired effect and the rebels fled away without offering any fight. Here van Courtlandt realised that his coming away from Hissar was not worth the gain resulting from the settlement of the Hansi pargana, for as soon as he stepped out of Hissar, Prince Muhammad Azim attacked the city with a big force consisting of 1,500 cavalry, 500 infantry and three guns. His arrival in the region was hailed by the people, and several thousand of them collected round him in a very short time. The Prince was too strong a match for Capt. Mildway and although his men fought bravely and took a toll of 300 of the rebels they could not stand for long against the Prince. However, he did not occupy Hissar for long, because soon after the occupation, General van Courtlandt reached the place and drove him out.¹⁰

After their exit from Hissar the rebels went towards Tosham on 25 September. They attacked the tehsil head-

quarters, killed the government officials (Tehsildar Nandpal, Thanedar Pyarelal and Qanungo Khazan Singh), plundered the treasury and looted the loyalist bankers.¹¹ Next, they directed their attention towards Hansi with a view to attacking and plundering the tehsil headquarters. But van Courtlandt was on guard and he foiled their plan to seize Hansi by checking them at Hajimpur, a village near Hansi.¹²

These reverses were serious enough to cause complete demoralization of the rebels. But fortunately for them, at this critical hour, they were reinforced by the rebel sepoys belonging to the 10th Light Cavalry from Ferozepur and a contingent of cavalry from Jhajjar.¹³ Prince Azim reorganised his force but before he could make adequate plans, he was attacked by a big force under Capt. Pearse while camping at Mangala village. Azim's men fought bravely against the enemy, but again the superiority in numbers and firearms decided the fate of the battle. The Prince lost the day and also 400 of his men. Azim left the field with his followers, but was hotly chased by the enemy. On 30 September he fought the last battle at Jamalpur, where again he met the same fate.¹⁴ Broken-hearted at suffering so many defeats, the rebel Prince left Hissar and moved into the Gurgaon district. Here he joined Rao Tula Ram of Rewari and there both fought against the British at Narnaul on 16 November. Nothing was heard of the Prince after the fall of Narnaul.¹⁵

The rebellious element thus crushed, General van Courtlandt established order throughout the district. The work of persecution also went side by side. The proprietary rights of seven villages—Mangala, Jamalpur, Hajimpur, Udhan, Chatravan, Khaira, and Jodhka were forfeited while heavy fines were levied on scores of other villages.¹⁶ He hanged nearly 133 persons and confiscated their properties. Fearing such a fate thousands of persons ran away to distant places.¹⁷

The clever ones changed their colours and turned into loyalists overnight. The best instances of this type are Hukam Chand and Faqir Chand of Hansi who had earlier organised the rebellion in the Hansi pargana but after the arrival of van Courtlandt, became loyalists and served the British cause with complete devotion and loyalty in the revenue depart-

ment. But unfortunately for them, their correspondence with Bahadur Shah fell into the hands of the British after the fall of Delhi and they were hanged for duplicity.¹⁸

III

THANESAR DISTRICT : In the district of Thanesar the restoration work was comparatively easy. Lt. Pearson and Capt. McNiel (Deputy Commissioner) settled the parganas of Kaithal and Ladwa respectively without any difficulty. Thereafter the combined forces of both these officers attacked the Asandh-Jalmana sector. Unlike the former places, they met with stiff opposition from rebels stationed at the villages of Asandh, Jalmana, Dhatru and Chatura. But finally the villagers were badly defeated. Their houses were plundered and burnt to ashes.¹⁹ The District was restored.

IV

PANIPAT DISTRICT : The British found no big problem in settling the district except at Panipat and Bala. At the former place the *Imam* of the shrine of Bu Ali Kalandar gave a tough fight to the British. But ultimately 'his forces, were defeated; and he was caught and hanged.'²⁰ At Bala, a big village about 25 miles from Karnal, Ram Lal Jat kept the fire of revolt burning with full intensity. Capt. Hughes of the 1st Punjab Cavalry came to the pargana to settle it in the second week of July. When the rebels heard of his approach, several thousands of them collected at Bala. The gates of the village were barricaded with heavy timber and 900 matchlockmen and a large number of people stood ready to give a tough bloody fight to the enemy. When Hughes reached near the village, the rebels opened fire, and brought down one of his men and two or three horses. Hughes made a retreat and after sitting down a short distance on the other side of the village which appeared less strongly defended, he made a desperate dash and carried it, 'the *sowars* dismounting and tearing down the barricades to effect an entrance'. But the very next moment the brave Jats took a quick turn and pounced upon them. There was now no alternative for Capt. Hughes but to flee away. In this action three of his men were killed and many more were wounded.²¹

Capt. Hughes, however, did not give way to despair. He moved towards the jungle and encamped at a short distance from the village. During the night he despatched a messenger to Karnal for reinforcements to fight the rebels. The news of the defeat of Capt. Hughes spread in the neighbourhood, and very soon about 3,000 Ranghars came to Bala and after joining with the Jats launched an attack on Hughes' camp in the morning (14 July). Hughes could not stand the assault and he retreated. But then reinforcements comprising two guns and a number of cavalymen of the Nawab of Karnal, and 50 *sowars* of the Patiala Raja soon arrived.²²

Coming up unnoticed the newly arrived force suddenly attacked the rebels in the front, which unnerved them. On the other hand, Hughes' men felt highly elated and moving up 'by a flank manoeuvre' overpowered them. The rebels lost 100 lives and fled away.²³ The next target was the village of Bala. The defensive walls and the strongly barricaded gates were damaged by the artillery fire of the British. At this the villagers came out in the open. In the grim battle that ensued, the British came out victorious, losing in all two native officers and three troopers.²⁴ This was the last centre of revolt in Panipat. By the end of July the whole of the district had passed under the control of the British.

Meanwhile Delhi fell (20 September). The defeat of the rebels at Delhi, the nerve-centre of the whole movement, had a paralysing effect on all the other centres of revolt and the position of the British improved hundredfold. In high spirits and exalted mood they sent out columns in different directions to subdue the people up in arms against them.

V

ROHTAK DISTRICT: General van Courtlandt,²⁵ the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur, was sent to subdue the Rohtak district. His column consisted of a considerable body of native levies.²⁶ The news of the fall of Delhi had a demoralising effect on the people, and, when the General reached there he found that his job was very easy:

The large villages all over the District submitted without a blow; many mutinous soldiers surrendered to him; the

roads were opened; and on the 26th September he had so far reduced the large district of Rohtak of submission, that it was possible to re-establish the civil authorities, and even to collect revenue.²⁷

VI

GURGAON DISTRICT: On 2 October 1857, Brigadier General Showers led out a column from Delhi of 1,500 men with a light field battery, 18 two-pounder guns and two small mortars, to punish the Gujars in and around Tughlaqabad, Gurgaon and Rewari; to attack and destroy Ranghar insurgent horsemen . . . in the vicinity of the latter place; to attack also and destroy Rao Tula Ram and his followers and to raze his fort (at Rewari); to annex the King's *Jagir* of Kotqasim; and in conjunction with the civil officers, to settle the Gurgaon district . . .²⁸

The column realized its first two aims without any difficulty. The Gujars and Ranghars 'around Tughlakabad, Gutgaon, and Rewari slipped away on its advent.' It had, however, light skirmish with some Rewari-*sowars* on 5 October at Pataudi, 37 miles from Delhi. In words of Hodson, who accompanied the column: "They fired at our advance and bolted at speed".²⁹

The column's next attack was on Rewari which was still held by Rao Tula Ram. The situation was serious and the Rao foresaw that a fight with the British forces in the mud fort of Rampura, in the changed circumstances after the fall of Delhi, would result in the complete destruction of his army without any serious loss to the British. So he left his fort before Showers' arrival.³¹

The British column reached Rewari on 6 October. The fort of Rewari (Rampura) was taken without any opposition. It was found armed with twelve guns and mortars 'all in position at the ramparts ready loaded'.³² Immediately after the occupation of the fort of Rewari Brigadier-General Showers sent a messenger to Tula Ram telling him that "if he would come in and give himself up, as well as his guns and arms, he should be treated on his merits".³³ But the Rao turned down the inducement.³⁴ Showers stayed at Rewari for a week and

settled the villages around it. Then, on 12 October, he left for Jatusana³⁵ where some horse-men of the Nawab of Jhajjar had collected. These *sowars* had no nerve to oppose the columns and they surrendered without resistance.³⁶ Next, going *via* Kosli, Ladain, Matanhail, the column reached Chhuchhakwas (about 10 miles from Jhajjar), the hunting resort of the Nawab of Jhajjar, on 16 October.³⁷ The Brigadier-General contacted the Nawab at once and told him the decision of the Government that he should be arrested and tried. The Nawab surrendered to the Brigadier-General, who made him a prisoner at once.³⁸

Next day (17 October), the British column attacked Jhajjar. In this venture it was helped by a reinforcement from the camp before Delhi sent under Captain Sanford and Mackenzie.³⁹ On hearing of attack, the forces of the Nawab, most of whom had already left the town during the night, fled away.⁴⁰ Thus the fort of Jhajjar, containing 21 guns, 30,000 stand of arms, horses and elephants was occupied without any opposition.⁴¹ The prisoner Nawab was sent to Delhi under C.T. Metcalfe⁴² in the afternoon (17 October) and the administration of the state was entrusted to Col. Lawrence, the officer commanding the Kashmiri troops⁴³ and 600 Patiala foot and 200 horse.⁴⁴

After making these arrangements Showers divided his column into two parts. The first part comprising Hodson's Horse and the 6th Dragon's Guards under Col. Gustance and Capt. Hodson was despatched to Kanond, the treasury fort of Jhajjar Nawab *via* Nahar and Kannia, at 3 a.m. on 19 October. He himself marched with the remaining troops to Dadri. There he arrested the Nawab of that place without encountering any opposition⁴⁵ and having sent him to Delhi, marched to Kanond.

Col. Gustance's men moved speedily (about three miles in an hour) towards their destination (Kanond). They halted for a while at Nahar, 30 miles from Jhajjar, where they were joined by a portion of General Courtlandt's force, some troops led by Dick Lawrence from Rohtak and 120 men of Pearse's Horse.⁴⁶ Here a party of rebels from Jhajjar and Delhi attacked them but they were soon defeated. The rebels lost 40 of their men, 50 cavalry horses and a few nine-pounder guns.⁴⁷

Thereafter, the British forces resumed their march and reached Kanond at about 7 a.m. where they captured one of the strongest, best planned and best kept forts in India without firing a shot.⁴⁸ There 14 heavy guns, one 8-inch mortar, two 6-pounder guns and a large quantity of small arms and ammunition fell in their hands. Besides that, the Nawab's treasure amounting to 5 lakhs of rupees was also seized.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, Showers (with the main column) reached Kanond (20 October) where Col. Gustance welcomed him.⁵⁰ Leaving Capt. Tozer in command of the garrison (comprising a wing of the 23rd Panjab Infantry and 12 men of Tohana Horse) Showers left for Delhi via Rewari, Farrukhanagar, Ballabgarh, Tauru and Sohna on 22 October.⁵¹

It is quite interesting that the fall of Delhi and the presence of Brig. Showers' column in the region had no effect on the people of Gurgaon, especially in the Mewat territory; the fire of revolt was still burning in every village. This made Showers very uneasy and he decided to reduce this region before going back to Delhi. It was not an easy job, however. The difficulties that he confronted are best described in Showers' own words:

From the time I entered the Gurgaon district, I was in enemies' country, that in all my encampments and during every march I was exposed to the attacks by the enemies' horsemen . . . I had to anticipate attacks from every village that I passed, where I had to be continually on alert against an enemy. . . . It may well be understood that the protection of captured property was of secondary consideration.⁵²

Battling with the villagers on the way, Showers went to Farrukhnagar. Ahmed Ali Khan, the Nawab of this place surrendered without any resistance. He was arrested and sent to Delhi.⁵³ After this Showers left for Ballabgarh. On the way, a few miles short of Sohna he met with tough opposition. The villagers attacked the British column and killed about 60 of their men in a hand-to-hand fight. An eye-witness gives an interesting account of the exploits of a brave Mewati in this strife :

A Mewati, a huge fellow, armed with shield and sword was put up half way down the *Khud* (pit) at our feet.

Twenty shots were fired; but no, the bold fellow held steadily on springing from rock to rock, descending to the bottom of the dell, and then mounting the opposite rock.⁵⁴ The brave man, who put up this heroic show for quite a long time, was ultimately killed by the Guides.

The column remained around Sohna and Tauru for a few days and then leaving the tract in the charge of a Gorkha detachment of the late 22 N.I. under Captain Drummond, Showers went to Ballabgarh (31 October). There he sent word to the Raja to present himself and surrender his fort. The Raja complied with the Brigadier's orders. He was at once apprehended and sent to Delhi.⁵⁵ The British troops plundered his fort and palace. The Raja's women folk were deprived of their ornaments and then stripped naked.⁵⁶

The Brigadier-General returned to Delhi in the first week of November with immense booty (valued at £70,000), 70 guns and a large quantity of ammunition, besides the prisoner-chiefs of the region.⁵⁷ But despite all these apparently impressive gains, the Brigadier-General's campaign could hardly be called successful. In any case he had failed to realize his main aim, that of capturing Tula Ram, or his cousin Kishan Singh of Rewari, or General Abdus Samad Khan of Jhajjar, or Muhammad Azim of Bhattu, who had acted as nuclei of revolt in the various districts of Haryana. In a way the attack of Showers came as a blessing in disguise to these persons—they left their respective places on Showers' approach and moved into the northern Rajasthan (Shekhawati) where they met a rebel force, the Jodhpur Legion⁶⁰ and formed a junction with it.⁶¹ Then they marched to Rewari and reoccupied it.⁶² But strategically speaking, Rewari was not a good place to camp, so they abandoned it in the first week of November and occupied Narnaul. This was a strong palace. According to Col. Malleison:

It lay under a hill about four hundred feet high, which formed part of a ridge extending some miles to the south-east. It was covered in front . . . by low walls, forming admirably defensive cover. A large and well-filled tank with steep banks, standing much above the surrounding plain, distant only about two hundred yards from the

village, and commanding the road to it, afforded another strong position which infantry might advantageously have occupied. The ground to the left was broken and uneven, but the plain in front was level and broad, admirably adapted to the movements of cavalry, in which arm the rebels were very strong.⁶³

The British authorities at Delhi (General Penny) were alarmed by these developments. They sent a strong column composed of the 1st Fusiliers, the 7th Panjab Infantry, a troop of Horse Artillery (the 3rd Brigade), a heavy battery of 9-inch howitzers and 18-pounders, a portion of the Corps of Guides and the Multani Horse,⁶⁴ in all about 1,500 in number under Colonel Gerrard, 'an officer of conspicuous merit'.⁶⁵ The column left Delhi on 10 November 1857 and reached Rewari three days later. They at once occupied the fort of Rampura. Here they were joined by two squadrons of the Carabineers.⁶⁶

After a day's rest at Rewari (Rampura), Gerrard proceeded to Narnaul *via* Kanond (Mahendragarh)⁶⁷ and reached there in the evening. In the night he was joined by the Haryana Field Force⁶⁸ comprising the 23rd Panjab Infantry, Patiala Infantry and Haryana Infantry.⁶⁹ At about 1 a.m. on 16 November, Gerrard marched to Narnaul. The distance was about 14 miles⁷⁰ but the sandy nature of the ground made the march rather difficult. The guns could only be dragged along with difficulty and the infantry had to halt again and again to give them time to catch up.⁷¹ In consequence, the column reached Nasibpur, a small village, two miles north-west of Narnaul at 12 o'clock and halted for a short rest.⁷² But they had hardly relaxed for a while when "they saw a little cloud of dust rising over a sloping ground at their front". It was a rebel force advancing to pounce upon the British after having abandoned their strong fort in the centre of that town.⁷³ From military point of view it was really a blunder on the part of the Indians to have become impatient and chosen to take the offensive instead of awaiting an attack by the British, "for so strong was indeed their position that had they had the patience to await attack, Gerrard would have found that all his work had been cut out for him."⁷⁴ Anyway, the British forces at once stood ready at the orders of their Commander Col. Gerrard—the

Carabineers and the Guides on the right linked to the centre by a wing of the 7th Panjabi Infantry and six light guns. In the centre the 1st Fusiliers, the heavy 18-pounders, a company of the Guides Infantry and the 23rd Panjab infantry. Connecting the centre with the Irregular Cavalry and Multani Horse on the left and protected by the Sikh Infantry, were four light Sikh guns.⁷⁶

The action began a little before 12 o'clock.⁷⁶ The first Indian charge was irresistible and the British forces scattered before them like chaff before the wind. The Patiala Infantry and the Multani Horse on the British left were completely disheartened.⁷⁷ The whole of the right flank fled. But at this juncture the Guides and the Carabineers came to their rescue and saved the situation.⁷⁸ A graphic picture of their engagement with the Indian cavalry has been given by Malleeson and Holmes. "The enemies (Indians) met the shock of the Guides and the Carabineers right gallantly", remarked Holmes.⁷⁹ Malleeson said:

It was a gallant conflict. Never did the enemy (Indians) fight better. There was neither shirking nor flinching. Never was there a charge more gallant, and certainly, never were the British cavalry met so fairly or in so full a swing by the rebel force.⁸⁰

This violent action did not last long. The English fire, especially of the artillery was too much for the rebels. The Guides and the Carabineers, under the cover of the artillery fire made a heavy attack; and though the rebels "fought with the courage of despair, though they exposed their lives with resolution which forbade the thought of yielding, they were fairly borne down."⁸¹ Next, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, swooping upon the weak Indian artillery, captured some of their guns.⁸² This encouraged the British cavalry on the right and they pressed through the Indian ranks and successfully overpowered them on right and in the centre.⁸³

But soon the situation took an unexpected turn when Col. Gerrard, the British Commandant, was mortally wounded by a musket ball,⁸⁴ with the result that the British troops were demoralised. Taking full advantage of the circumstances, the Indians swooped down upon them. The British could not

stand the charge and the Multani Horse fled away in bewilderment.⁸⁶ The Indian cavalry recaptured its lost guns and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The right and the left wings of the British forces were thrown into confusion.⁸⁶

Appreciating the gravity of the situation, Major Caulfield, the officiating British Commandant, ordered his artillery to start heavy bombardment on the Indian troops and his cavalry and infantrymen to charge straight on with full force into their front ranks. The Indians fought back furiously and stood their ground. The British artillery fire nevertheless broke their backbone and split their force into two parts—engaged in the close quarter battle and the other fleeing to go out of the range of the British guns. Meanwhile, Kishan Singh and Ram Lal, the two best Indian commanders, received musket shots and died. This disheartened the Indians and they retreated.⁸⁷

The British resumed advance in the same old order until they came to the dry bed of a monsoonish stream flowing between Nashibpur and Narnaul. The British guns were unable to cross the stream owing to sand, so they diverged to the right and took up a position near the Horse Artillery guns, whilst the 23rd Panjab Infantry and Patiala Infantry with other units of the cavalry crossed the stream and advanced towards the Indian camp.⁸⁸

The heavy artillery and infantry fire confused the Indians, and they ran pell-mell in all directions. Mostly, they retreated to the town and hid in the buildings. The pursuit of the fleeing soldiers was quick and inexorable, and they were very soon driven out of the town after a little fighting.⁸⁹ The Indians lost the day and, when the sun went down, there remained none in Narnaul except heaps of corpses here and there.⁹⁰ Though Tula Ram and General Samad Khan escaped,⁹¹ Rao Kishan Singh,⁹² Ram Lal,⁹³ Samad Khan's son⁹⁴ and many other top-ranking officers were killed in the action.⁹⁵ The British took nine Indian guns and other standard arms.⁹⁶ The total loss on the British side was 70 killed and 45 wounded.⁹⁷ They lost their Commander, Col. Gerrard and Capt. Wallace, while Lieutenant Graije, Kennedy and Pearse were severely wounded.⁹⁸

The battle of Narnaul was undoubtedly one of the most decisive battles of the Uprising of 1857. The English felt jubilant over their success in this confrontation,⁹⁹ for, it resulted in the complete rout of all the rebels, and thus marked up the close of the crucial period of the struggle in the Haryana region and northern Rajasthan.¹⁰⁰

But the region of Mewat was not yet quiet; it was still afire with revolt. In the third week of November 1857 Captain Drummond, incharge Sohna Sector received intelligence through the 'native officials' of Sohna, Hathin, and Palwal that 'several thousand Meos and a few hundred cavalry were congregated about Kot and Rupraka and had been attacking the 'loyal Rajput villages' for several days.' Besides, they also were intent on plundering the Government treasury at Palwal.¹⁰¹ Captain Drummond, with a small force comprising a detachment of Hodson's Horse, another of Tohana Horse, some 120 men of the Kumaon battalion, at once proceeded to Rupraka. On the way, he was reinforced by a company of the 1st Panjab Infantry (Coke's) from Ballabhgarh.¹⁰²

Drummond's force burnt all the Meo villages on the Sohna-Rupraka route and destroyed their crops. Panchanka, Geopur, Malpuri, Chilli, Utawar, Kot, Mugla Mitaka, Kullulka, Guraksar, Malluka, and Jhanda, were among these unfortunate villages.¹⁰³ When the column reached Rupraka, 3,500 Meos and others drawn up in front of the village met them bravely. Though the Meos fought heroically, and lost 400 lives, the day belonged to the British who possessed superior fire power.¹⁰⁴ The action at Rupraka, says Captain Drummond, was very important because

not only have the Meos been defeated, their villages and property burnt and destroyed, but the friendly Jat villages who have hitherto been kept in a state of siege by constant aggression on the part of their enemies are relieved.¹⁰⁵

In the Raisina region, Clifford the Assistant Collector of Gurgaon played havoc in order to satisfy his thirst for vengeance. He was told that his sister was

stripped naked at the Palace (Delhi), tied in that condition to the wheels of gun-carriages, dragged up in the 'Chandni Chowk' or Silver Street of Delhi and then, in the presence of King's sons cut to pieces.¹⁰⁶

He "had it on his mind that his sister, before being murdered, was outraged by the rebels". Naturally his heart burned with the desire for revenge. He went from village after village and destroyed the countryside with fire and sword. In his own words : "He had put to death all he had come across not excepting women and children." But he could not carry on his ruthless campaign for long, for he was killed by the Meos of Raisina and Muhammadpur.¹⁰⁷

Sadraddin, as noted above, had collected a large number of Mewatis under his banner. Now he held the pargana of Pinanghwa. The District authorities directed their attention towards him in the third week of November—on 27 November Capt. Ramsay set out with a large force from Palwal in order to crush him.¹⁰⁸ The village of Pinanghwa was their first target, but Sadraddin was not there. The rebels were then at a small village called Mahun. The British force made for that village the next day and reached there at 7 a.m. The Meos took up a defensive position in the village. Exchange of shots continued till mid-day. Then the British troops bombarded the village with guns. At the same time three Gorkha regiments advanced upon the village from three directions, and captured it in a short time.¹⁰⁹ Sadraddin and his men escaped. The British cut down 28 Meos in the village including Sadraddin's son.¹¹⁰ Making an assessment of the fight, Macpherson, the Joint-Magistrate of Gurgaon and the chief actor in the action at Mahun, observed: "Altogether I look upon it as a most successful affair, . . . say about 70 rebels killed The whole number of the rebels assembled was so small that their resistance was to me a subject of the greatest surprise."¹¹¹

Having crushed the last of the uprisings in Mewat, the column retreated, but not before making a severe example of the villages and people suspected to have taken part in the rebellion. The villages of Shahpur, Bali Khera, Kerla, Chitora, Nahirika, Gujar Nangla, Baharpur, Kehri were destroyed and many people were killed in the neighbouring villages.¹¹²

VII

After the Uprising was crushed, the Haryana territory was detached from the North-West Provinces and merged with

Panjab¹¹³ in February 1858. The Panjab system of administration was immediately introduced all over the region, which was divided into two divisions: (1) *Delhi Division*, comprising the districts of Delhi, Gurgaon and Panipat with divisional headquarters at Delhi; and (2) *Hissar Division*, comprising the districts of Hissar, Sirsa and Rohtak along with a portion of the confiscated Jhajjar State, with divisional headquarters at Hissar. Each Division was placed under a Commissioner who had various administrative and political duties to perform. He was also a Sessions Judge for criminal trials and was the sole appellate and controlling authority in every branch of administration. Under him were the Deputy Commissioners. They were incharge of the districts and performed multifarious duties, assisted by a staff of Indian officers who acted as subordinates in every department.¹¹⁴

As regards the 'native states', the policy of the Government was very harsh: except for the petty states of Pataudi, Dojana and Loharu all others were confiscated. Ballabgarh and Farrukhnagar were merged with the Gurgaon District and Jhajjar and Dadri were parcelled out among the eight loyal chiefs of Panjab. Maharaja Narendra Singh of Patiala got the pargana of Narnaul worth Rs. 2,00,000 a year.¹¹⁵ Maharaja Sarup Singh of Jind was given the confiscated estate of Dadri worth Rs. 1,03,000 per year, and some villages in the Kanond (Mahendragarh) pargana worth Rs. 21,000.¹¹⁶ Raja Bharpur Singh of Nabha received the pargana of Bawal and Kanti (Jhajjar State) worth Rs. 1,06,009 per year.

The Panjab Government held the Haryana territory in contempt for a long time. The people at the helm of affairs did not forget the role of Haryanavis in the Uprising of 1857 and denied them the benefits of their rule.¹¹⁸ They were not given educational facilities. Until 1928 there was not even a single college in this region and there were hardly any high schools worth the name. The people in this part of India were almost exclusively farmers, but they received nothing by way of agricultural assistance. The doors of government services were almost closed upon them. Means of communication were neglected. In short, the people were reduced to a deplorable condition.¹¹⁹

POST-REVOLT HARYANA



NOTES

1. He was an officer of European extraction who had served under Ranjit Singh, and who subsequent to the Campaign of 1845-6 had accepted civil office under the British Government. Kaye, Vol. II, p. 107.
2. *DG Hissar*, p. 35.
3. The Stato of Rania had been confiscated by the British Government long before the outbreak of the Mutiny. They provided the rulers with pension. Nur, the ruling chief in 1857 and his relatives got a monthly pension as under : Nawab Nur Samad Khan: Rs. 200/- per month ; Grand mother of the Nawab; Rs. 100/- per month ; Mother: Rs. 150/-; Gohar Ali (uncle): Rs. 125/-; other relatives: Rs. 1,031. See Foreign Secret Consultation, 9 July 1857, Nos. 204-7.
4. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 71, 25 September 1857.
5. *DG Hissar*, pp. 35-6.
6. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 54, 31 July 1857.
7. *DG Hissar*, pp. 35-6.
8. Chick, p. 712.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 714-15 ; *DG Hissar*, p. 36.
11. *DG Hissar*, p. 36.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Chick, pp. 714-16.
14. *Ibid.*; *DG Hissar*, p. 36.
15. See the battle of Narnaul below.
16. Chick, p. 716 ; *DG Hissar*, p. 36 ; PSA, File R/268.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Cave-Brown (Vol. II, pp. 275-76) says : "In the neighbouring Districts of Hansi and Hissar were traitors who had not the courage to own their treachery, who nevertheless, did not escape their richly-deserved fate. Mooncer Beg, one of the principal Moham-madan and Hookam Chand, . . . the chief banker, and one of the most influential Hindoos of Hansi, with Fuqeer Chand, his nephew, a youth of about twenty had at the commencement of the outbreak, . . . had conjointly drawn up a petition to the King of Delhi offering their services and undertaking to place Hansi and the District around it at his disposal. No sooner did general van Courtlandt pour down his quickly raised levies into the District than these men were among the foremost to rally round him with profession of loyalty. van Courtlandt, only too glad, doubtless, to avail himself of their local influence, received them into favour, and gave them valuable appointments. But when Delhi fell . . . every public document . . . found in the Palace was caught up and laid by for future examination; among them appeared the traitorous letter from Sirsa (Hansi). This discovery came like a thunder clap on these now most faithful

- and devoted servants of the Company; they were at once arrested, and tried and all the three condemned to be hanged".
19. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII-I, p. 31.
 20. *Ibid.*; *DG Karnal*, p. 40.
 21. Cave-Brown, Vol. II, pp. 142-44.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. *Ibid.*
 25. *DG Karnal*, p. 40.
 26. *Ibid.* *The District Gazetteer*, however, does not give a full account. I have in this case relied upon tradition.
 27. Kaye, Vol. II, p. 107.
 28. Wilson to Brandieth, 2 October 1857, vide Foreign Secret Consultation, Nos. 440-52, 18 December 1857.
 29. Capt. Hodson, who accompanied the column described Tula Ram's position (in a written letter to his wife from Ballabgarh on 3 October 1857) as follows:
 "Go on tomorrow through Gurgaon to a place called Rewaree where one Tula Ram, a farmer of Government revenue in better times, but who now a affectionates independent authority, has collected a force round his fortlet of some four to five thousand men and shows fight." Hodson, p. 328.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
 31. See K.C.Yadav : "Battle of Narnaul", *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIII, (August 1965) p. 658.
 32. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI (December 1857) p. 574.
 33. Hodson, p. 331.
 34. *Ibid.*
 35. *Ibid.*, pp. 331-2.
 36. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI, 5 (December 1857) p. 575.
 37. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 91, 27 November 1857.
 38. *Ibid.*
 39. For a detailed account of the activities of this column under Capt. Sanford and Mackenzie, see Mackenzie, pp. 113-33.
 40. *Records of Intelligence Department*, Vol. I, p. 216; Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 91, 27 November 1857.
 41. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI (19 December 1857), p. 603; *Records of Intelligence Department*, Vol. I, p. 216.
 42. Nigam, pp. 166-9.
 43. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 91, 27 November 1857.
 44. *DG Rohtak*, pp. 41-3.
 45. Foreign Political Consultation, Nos. 145-53, 2 July 1858.
 46. Hodson, p. 335; Chick, p. 717.
 47. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI (5 December 1857), p. 603.
 48. Chick, p. 718. Hodson remarks regarding the Fort : "Took one of the strategist forts I have seen". Hodson, pp. 336-37.

49. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI, (5 December 1857), p. 603 ; Chick, p. 719 ; Malleson, Vol. II, p. 108.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. PSA, File R/191.
53. Ball, Vol. II, p. 59.
54. *Ibid.*; Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, 31 January 1858.
55. Foreign Political Consultations, Nos. 51-55, 4 March 1859.
56. PSA, File R/270, p. 75.
57. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXI, (19 December 1857), p. 503 ; Holmes, p. 395.
58. For his aims see Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 145-53, 2 July 1858.
59. Chick, pp. 718-19, says about them : "Abdul Samad Khan . . . Tula Ram . . . Mohd. Azim . . . the (ex) Kotwal of Meerut (Kishan Singh) . . . are the brutes that serve as a nucleus to the mutiny of these Districts. These hell-hounds, with their followers fled a day before on hearing of our (Showers') approach to . . . the villages of Singhana and Kheiri and joined the Jodhpur Legion".
60. It was a contingent force of Jodhpur. They broke out at Andia and Abu on 21 August 1857. They subsequently joined the Thakur of Awah who had a quarrel with the Maharaja of Jodhpur. On 8 September 1857 the Legion and the Thakur's troops jointly attacked and ruined the camp of the Maharaja of Jodhpur at Pali. Later they defeated a British contingent force led by General Lawrence. After this victory they quarrelled with the Thakur and left Awah. Their next destination was Delhi. But they had hardly reached Shekhawati when the city of Delhi fell to the British. They were disheartened and confused. But soon they got a new spirit infused in them by the joining of Rao Tula Ram of Rewari. (Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 5, 29 January 1858). Also see *Narrative of Events regarding the Mutiny in India of 1857-58 and the Restoration of Authority*, Vol. II, pp. 219-93.
61. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 5, 29 January 1858 ; Chick, pp. 718-19; Jwala Sahai, p. 219 ; Khadawat, *Rajasthan's Role in the Struggle of 1857*, pp. 49-51, 156.
62. Malleson, p. 319 ; *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. I, p. 261.
63. Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, pp. 110-11.
64. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, NWP, Vol. II, pp. 272-73 ; Malleson, Vol. II, p. 109; Jwala Sahai, p. 219.
65. *Ibid.* ; Holmes, p. 396.
66. Malleson, Vol. II, p. 110.
67. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, pp. 272-73. Kaye and Malleson, Vol. IV, p. 76.
68. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 15-17, 29 January 1858.
69. *Ibid.*, No. 21-27, 28 January 1858.

70. Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. IV, p. 72.
71. Holmes, p. 396 ; Jwala Sahai, p. 219.
72. Holmes, p. 397.
73. *Ibid.*
74. Malleeson, p. 319 ; Holmes and Jwala Sahai also agree with him.
75. Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 113.
76. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, pp. 272-73.
77. Malleeson, p. 319.
78. Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 114
79. Holmes, p. 397.
80. Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. IV, p. 80.
81. Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 115 ; Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, 28 January 1858.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIII, (August 1965), pp. 657-63.
84. Holmes, p. 397; Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 117.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXIII, (August 1965), pp. 272-3.
87. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, pp. 272-3.
88. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, 29 January 1858.
89. Malleeson, p. 320.
90. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, pp. 272-3, 277.
91. *Undoing the Bondage*, p. 80.
92. Man Singh, p. 208.
93. *Ibid.*
94. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, pp. 272-3.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*
97. *Illustrated London News*, Vol. XXXII, p. 18.
98. *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, pp. 272-3.
99. Foreign Secret Consultations, No. 1951, 21 January 1858,
100. *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIII, (August 1965), pp. 658-63.
101. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, 29 January 1858.
102. *Ibid.*; *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, p. 220.
103. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, 29 January 1858.
104. *Ibid.*; *Records of the Intelligence Department*, Vol. II, p. 220.
105. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, 29 January 1858.
106. Griffiths, pp. 96-7.
107. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VII-II, p. 209 ; File R/158, p. 19; File R/194, pp. 89-90.
108. PSA, *Delhi Division Records, Military Department*, Case No. 1 of 1858.
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibid.*
112. *Ibid.*
113. The Haryana region remained a part of Punjab till 1 November 1966, when the State was bifurcated and separate States of Punjab

and Haryana were formed in accordance with the 'Punjab Reorganisation Bill' passed by the Indian Parliament on 10 September 1966.

114. PSA, File R/199 ; *SR Delhi*, p. 158.

115. See Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 238-58, for details.

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 393-408.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 465-68.

118. See *Report of the Haryana Development Committee*, Chandigarh.

119. This resulted in making this region backward in almost every field.
See *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Having brought the narrative to a close we now propose to review some important issues concerning the scope and nature of the Uprising of 1857.

I

The first bugle of the 1857 Uprising blared forth at Ambala on 10 May 1857, about nine hours before the outbreak at Meerut.¹ The Ambala sepoys—the 60 N.I., 5 N.I. and 4 L.C.—had, so to speak, a definite plan of rebelling in the morning of 10 May when the Europeans went to their church:

The two native infantry corps (60 NI and 5 NI) were to seize the magazine. . . the 4th light Cavalry to seize the guns; the heel ropes of the HM's 9th Lancers were to be cut and horses let loose; and a general rise and massacre to ensue.²

Subsequently, having destroyed all the traces of the British rule there, they were supposed to march on to Delhi, 'the historic capital of India'.³

The conspiracy was not confined to Ambala alone but was quite widespread. Captain Martineau, an Instructor at Ambala Depot learnt of this fact as early as March 1857. "They (Sepoys) placed in my hands", he observed, "letters from various regiments which convinced me that a widespread conspiracy was nurtured."⁴ Still further elaboration on the subject is found in the evidence of another important contemporary Ahsanullah Khan, the physician of Emperor Bahadur Shah, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the state of affairs in Delhi:

The Volunteer Regiment (38 NI) of Delhi said that before the breaking out of the Mutiny, they had leagued with the troops at Meerut and that the latter had correspondence with the troops in all other places so that from every cantonment troops would arrive at Delhi. After the defection

of the native army, I understood that letters were received at Delhi, from which it was evident that they had before hand made a common cause among themselves.⁵

Another eye witness, Mirza Ghalib, the great Urdu Poet, also confirms the facts mentioned above. "The watchmen of the city (Delhi) gates . . .", said the Mirza "who had full knowledge of the secret plot . . . welcomed these invited guests (sepoys from Meerut)."⁶ Robert Montgomery, the Chief Judicial Commissioner of Punjab in 1857 also makes a partial admission of this fact: "There is no doubt that the troops at Delhi were prepared for the occurrence at Meerut and were fully resolved to stand by their comrades."⁷ Montgomery's 'Chief', John Lawrence, also admits having been informed of the fact that 'time of the outbreak of the revolt was pre-decided.'⁸ Sham Singh, informant from Ambala is more elaborate and specific in this regard. He told Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala at the end of April that "a general rising of the sepoy would take place in the beginning of May and according to their (sepoy's) plan the blood of the Europeans would be shed at a number of places".⁹

What happened at Ambala and Meerut on 10 May and how the Delhi troops cooperated with the Meerut men lends truth to their statements. As such the existence of a pre-meditated conspiracy to rise in revolt on 10 May between the sepoy, if not everywhere, at least at three places (Delhi, Meerut¹⁰ and Ambala) cannot be doubted.

Dr. S.N. Sen, however, questions the existence of any such pre-meditated conspiracy:

Nowhere did the sepoy's conduct conform to a common pattern and the obvious inference is that they had no pre-concerted plan to follow. . . . The security measures of the Government often drove them to mutiny and they rebelled in self-defence.¹¹

Dr. Sen tries to find these patterns in the Meerut rising and then at the end he says: On the 10th May,

a cook boy rushed to the sepoy's lines with the news that the Artillery and the Rifles were on their way to seize the regimental arms. Caught unawares the sepoy were panic struck. . . . As happens at such crisis the instinct of self-preservation asserted itself.¹²

and the revolt took place.¹³ This might have been the case at Meerut, but why did the sepoy at Ambala rise on the very same day, 10 May? There was no 'cook boy' to spread any such story there; nor was any other reason for the Ambala sepoy to worry about their self-preservation. The Uprising cannot be attributed to chance because clearcut evidence points to the existence of pre-concerted plan on the part of the sepoy to rise at these places.¹⁴

If a pre-concerted conspiracy was there, one question becomes pertinent: Who were the leaders who organised and executed the conspiracy? It is well nigh impossible to give an exact answer, for no direct evidence is available on this point. In the very nature of things the sepoy had to be extra-cautious. Despite their best efforts, the Ambala authorities could not trace the culprits responsible for causing incendiary fires which were almost a daily affair at the station in March-April 1857. General Anson, the British Commander-in-Chief had to express his helplessness to Lord Canning, the Governor-General, in this regard: "Strange that the incendiaries should never be detected. . . . Everyone is on the alert there but still no clue to the offender."¹⁵ The sepoy, it seems, had no individual leaders but *panchayats* to organise the rebellion.¹⁶ Since the *panchas* were chosen by almost all the sepoy constituting the corps, as Howard, the Joint-Magistrate of Ambala observes, no single man dared to come forward and expose them.¹⁷ In spite of their best efforts, therefore, the British authorities could not find any important facts relating to the sepoy's plans. Nor could they know who had engineered them.¹⁸

Did the sepoy in Haryana, like their counterparts at Meerut and elsewhere have any prior understanding with the civil populace? There is no evidence to support such an assumption. In fact, not many regiments were stationed in this region, and the few which were deployed at Ambala, Hansi, Hissar and Sirsa rose up and went to Delhi straightaway. In this circumstance, the only valid conclusion that could be drawn is that the uprising by the civil populace was spontaneous, spurred on by widespread indignation, quite independent of sepoy influence.¹⁹

II

How widespread was the civil rebellion in Haryana? How many people actually participated in it? What was the attitude of the common man to the rebellion? These are some of the questions that seem pertinent. The answer to the first question is simple. As seen in chapter IV, almost the entire Haryana had come within the orbit of the revolt—the districts of Gurgaon, Rohtak, Hissar, Bhatinda and the states of Jhajjar, Ballabhgarh, Farrukhnagar, Pataudi, Bahadurgarh, Dujana, and Loharu by the end of May, and the rest, that is the districts of Thanesar and Ambala, a bit later.²⁰ The only areas that remained calm and unaffected were the states of Jind, Kalsia, Buria and small jagirs in Ambala and Thanesar.²¹

The second question, about the extent of popular participation is difficult to answer with any arithmetical accuracy, for no counting of heads raised against the foreign power during the Uprising was attempted by either side. A rough estimate is not impossible, however. Like any other rising or a revolution, the present rebellion was initiated by a small, militant minority committed to acting on behalf and in the best interest of the great majority.²² These people enjoyed the sympathies and support of the general masses²³ who served their rebel-brethren as best as they could.²⁴

Surprisingly even such sections of the Haryana population as derived personal benefits from the British rule were not prepared to back up their masters during their hour of need. In the district of Rohtak, for instance, about 59 *mafidars* who had been granted rent free tenures and other privileges by the British Government expressed their sympathies for the rebels.²⁵ The *jagirdars* of Thanesar also 'misbehaved' similarly. When asked to assist the British authorities by supplying information regarding the rebels' movements they did not give any. If somebody supplied some information, says the Deputy Commissioner of Thanesar, 'for the fear of loss of his *jagir*', it was all to deceive them.²⁶ The attitude of the *mahajans* of Jagadhari gave a rude shock to the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala. "On this occasion", he says, "The wealthy bankers of Jagadhari displayed a spirit of dis-

loyalty . . . unworthy of a class who owe all their property to fostering care and protection of the British Government."²⁷

In the light of the foregoing, it is difficult to accept Dr. Sen's blanket observation that "outside Oudh and Shahabad there is no evidence of that general sympathy which would invest the mutiny with the dignity of a national war."²⁸ The Uprising certainly had popular backing in Haryana which, therefore, deserves to be classed with Awadh and Shahabad.

Who were the leaders of this popular movement? The contemporary accounts give names of 22 leaders whose status-wise break-up is as follows:

Feudal chiefs=10 (7 ruling and 3 dispossessed)

States and British Govt. officials=4

Small traders and Peasants=7

Maulvi = 1

A perusal of chapters IV, VII and VIII would indicate that out of the ten feudal leaders four played very insignificant roles, two behaved dubiously, and only three (who were dispossessed) were active and effective. Out of the four government officials, three did their jobs well, whereas one indulged in double dealing. The small traders, peasants etc. (7) played their parts most effectively and kept the flame of freedom burning until their last breath.²⁹

There is nothing on record to substantiate the generalization of Sir Jadunath Sarkar, so far as the Haryana leaders are concerned, that 'dispossessed dynasts,' had made the 'simple folk their cat's paw in a gamble for recovering their thrones.'³⁰ In fact in Haryana the people chose their leaders on their own initiative; and in three cases we find them applying a little pressure too on the feudal chiefs to assume their leadership.

Similarly, Dr. R.C. Majumdar's generalization that the leaders of the movement were representatives of an 'obsolete aristocracy and centrifugal feudalism of the medieval age'³¹ does not hold good in the case of Haryana. Here a little over 36% of the leaders belonged to the lower strata.

Nor does the finding of Dr. S.N. Sen that the leaders of the Revolt were 'counter-revolutionaries' who 'would have set the clock back,'³² seem to be correct when tested in Haryana. We do not have any evidence to indicate that the people of Haryana

rebelled in support of the forces of feudal reaction. Their basic aim in so doing was 'the rooting out of the alien domination and elimination of oppression. And thus, as rightly suggested by Prof. Hiren Mukherjee:

There is no warrant for assuming dogmatically that if the uprising had not been crushed, new ideas and new strength more appropriate to the changing times would not have been generated among the people. It is more likely that Indian advance in the contemporary world would have been, after trials and tribulations, no doubt more genuine and effective if foreign rule had not deeply disturbed and distorted the very perspectives of the advance.⁴¹

III

Another very important aspect of the Uprising was communal amity which we have discussed at length in chapter VI. Throughout Haryana, the rebels cooperated with each other irrespective of their caste, creed or religion, in making their venture a success. The contemporary records show that there was not even a single instance where a Muslims's hand might have extended to desecrate a temple or a Hindu's towards destroying a mosque. Rather they lived or fought and perished like brothers, fighting for a common cause, against a common enemy.⁴² In the face of this evidence Dr. R.C. Majumdar's view that "the difference between the Hindus and the Muslims loomed large even in the territories where the revolt of the civil population was most widely spread"⁴³ needs at least partial modification.

IV

A word regarding *goondas*, *badmashas* and traditional thieving communities *vis-a-vis* their role in the Uprising, for many historians believe that 'they played a large role in the outbreak, which has been mistaken as a fight for freedom by some writers'.⁴⁴ The contention echoes the generalisations of some British writers, contemporary as well as later, who without making any critical study of the material available based their accounts on one sided reports and memoirs of their countrymen who had participated in the Revolt. Does

it not underlie all human nature to draw pictures, in regard to the participation in such a struggle of their enemies, as also of their own, in colours which are by no means true to history?

This is, however, not to deny the existence of anti-social elements during the Uprising. When the British administration collapsed, some undesirable elements did try to make capital out of the prevailing confusion. But their number was very small. And to say that most of the rebels belonged to the class of *goondas* and thieves, and that their share in the Uprising was quite vital is to draw wishful conclusions unsupported by historical evidence.⁴⁵

Moreover, it is also unhistorical to mix up the misdoings of anti-social elements with the Uprising of the people. There is no relationship whatsoever between the two except in terms of contemporaneity or simultaneity. The acts of the *goondas* or thieves were private acts of individuals, in no way linked with the public acts of the rebels. It is desirable, therefore, to differentiate between the public and private acts of the individuals.

V

Finally we discuss the nature of the Uprising. There is no unanimity among historians on this point. They adhere to various theories of which three are more important: that it was a sepoy mutiny; that it was something more than a sepoy mutiny with some limited help from disaffected civilians; and that it was a national struggle for independence. Fortunately, Haryana throws some useful light on this highly controversial problem. But here a technical question may arise: Haryana, is "too small an area to decide the question one way or the other".⁴⁶ But bigness or smallness of a region should make little difference in the present context. The movement in Haryana formed part of a bigger, more or less an all-India movement just as a molecule formed part of an element. It is not to be supposed that the molecule does not and cannot carry the properties or qualities of the parent element owing to its smallness.

Our narrative clearly refutes the first and the second theories of the 1857 events. Almost the whole of Haryana had

become independent of the British rule, and the sepoy played only a small part in the process. Almost everywhere it was the civil populace alone that destroyed the remnants of foreign domination in the region. An Uprising of this type could not be dismissed as mutiny by any stretch of imagination. Nor could it be mutiny with a limited popular backing. In Haryana at least it was nothing short of a popular upsurge.

But whether it also was a national revolt is indeed a complicated question. In order to get an adequate answer on this issue one has first to evaluate the nature of nationalism. For that Mill's celebrated dictum quoted by Dr R. C. Majumdar in his *History of Freedom Movement in India* comes in handy :

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others, which make them cooperative with each other more willingly than with the other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be governed by themselves or a portion of them exclusively.⁴⁷

In 1857 the people of Haryana, at least a vast majority of them, stood together and thought alike forgetting their age-old communal differences.⁴⁸ They fought side by side, like brothers, without caring whether it was a Hindu who led them or a Muslim. They had a common goal to achieve—which was to get rid of foreign domination and to supplant it by an Indian order of which the King of Delhi was to be the supreme representative. Does this kind of concerted action on the part of the people, all intent on the achievement of a common ideal, not have all the elements which go to make a revolt a national effort for independence?

NOTES

1. How little we know about the Ambala rising can be seen from the following extract from a letter of Dr Majumdar, a well-known historian and author of a standard book on the Revolt, which he very kindly wrote to me on 21 April 1969 :
 "That there was an open revolt of the sepoys there (Ambala) on the morning of the 10th May (1857) before the outbreak at Meerut is, I confess, a news to me and probably to many others. I congratulate you on bringing this point to public notice".
2. Cave-Brown, *Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I, p. 48.
3. *Trial of Bahadur Shah*, pp. 253-54.
4. Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 554-55.
5. *Trial*, pp. 253-54.
6. Ghalib, *Kulliyat*, p. 382.
7. *Punjab Government Records*, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 401.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
9. See chapter III for details.
10. In his latest and meticulous work J.A.B. Palmer holds that the Meerut outbreak had been planned well in advance. *The Military Outbreak at Meerut*, pp. 129-31.
11. See Ahsanullah's statement in this regard. *Trial*, pp. 253-54.
12. *Eighteen Fifty seven*, p. 402.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Palmer (p. 129) has disproved the correctness of the story of the cook boy.
15. This has been already discussed above.
16. Kaye, Vol. I, p. 563.
17. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VII, Part I, p. 8.
18. *Ibid.*
19. See chapter IV.
20. See chapter IV.
21. See chapter IV.
22. This was so in the French Revolution, the American War of Independence and even in the more recent Russian Revolution.
23. For a few loyalists see chapter IV.
24. See chapter IV and VIII.
25. PSA, Mutiny Files, R/131.
26. *Punjab Govt. Records*, Vol. VIII, Part I, pp. 41-42.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Eighteen Fifty seven*, p. 411.
29. See Appendix-2 and chapter IV, VII & VIII.
30. *Punjab: Past & Present*, Vol. VIII, pt. I, p. 62.
31. Majumdar, p. 241.
32. Sen, pp. 412-13.
33. Hiren Mukherjee, 1857, *New Indology*, pp. 109-10.
34. See chapter VI.

35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*
43. *History of Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. I, p. 248.
44. See for instance, Majumdar (Ed.), *British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance*, p. 497.
45. See chapter IV.
46. Majumdar, *Freedom*, Vol. I, p. 257.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
48. See chapter VI.

APPENDIX I

Martyrs and some forgotten leaders of the 1857 Uprising in Haryana¹

The contemporary or near contemporary authors of the Uprising of 1857 are mostly British. It was natural that the writings of these British authors should give the minutest details of the achievements of their own countrymen who had suffered for the preservation of the British Empire. The Indian writers were few and far between; and those few were pro-British and wrote with the object of pleasing their masters. Consequently, the brave spirit of revolt displayed against a foreign order by many Indian heroes has remained undescribed.

Thousands of people of Haryana shed their blood while fighting against the British in 1857. But since there are no records of their heroic exploits, it has not been possible to identify all of them. Here an effort has been made to prepare a list of martyrs and forgotten heroes of the Uprising in Haryana on the basis of whatever little information is to be had in the British records, and a few contemporary and later works.

Abdur Rehman Khan, Nawab : See chapter VII, pp. 88-93.

Abu Rajput : b.² 1821 at Bhora (Gurgaon); s/o Jiya Ram; Rajput; was captured by the British forces and hanged on 16 December 1857.

Ahmed Ali Khan, Nawab : See chapter VII, pp. 93-95

1. The following records and books have been immensely helpful in the preparation of this list :

- (i) NAI, Proceedings of the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.; NAI, Mutiny Papers; PSA, Mutiny Files; PSA, Delhi Divisional Records, Judicial Dept.; District Mutiny Files, Gurgaon, Hissar and Rohtak.
- (ii) Ghulam Nabi, *Tarikh-i-Jhajjar*; Amin Chand, *Tarikh-i-Hissar*; Altaf Hussain, *Tarikh-i-Zila Gurgaon*; Man Singh, *Abhirkuldipika*; *Who's Who of Indian Martyrs*, Vol. III.

2. Abbreviations used

v - village

b - born

s/o - son of

Ahmed Baksh : s/o Amirullah Sheikh of Sohna (Gurgaon); was shot at Delhi on 27 December 1857.

Ahmed Mirza, Nawab : b. 1819; resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested and shot with 98 other persons on 15 December 1857.

Ahsan Beg : s/o Amir Beg; Mughal of Rewari; life imprisonment.

Ajmer Khan : v. Badshahpur (Gurgaon); was shot dead by the British column in an encounter on 10 November 1857.

Akbar Khan : v. Nangli (Gurgaon); was hanged in February 1858.

Akbar Khan : v. Hasanpur (Gurgaon); served in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; mutinied at Gwalior; came home and played active role in the Revolt; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Akbar Khan, Nawab : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and hanged on 15 December 1857.

Albela Singh : s/o Zalim Singh; v. Kasan (Gurgaon); attacked a British party carrying treasure, captured it and distributed the money among the villagers; arrested after the Revolt; was hanged in his own village on 16 January 1857.

Ali Bahadur : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged on 15 December 1857.

Ali Gauhar : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging at Delhi on 22 February 1858.

Allah Baksh : v. Badshahpur (Gurgaon); was captured by the British and executed at Delhi on 1 April 1858.

Allahdad : resident of Gurgaon; was captured by British troops after the Revolt and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Allahuddin : resident of Gurgaon; was captured by British troops after the Revolt and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Amanat Ali : s/o Farzand Ali; a Sayyad of Sultanpur (Gurgaon); served as a soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers; and was hanged on 5 January 1858.

Amir Ali : s/o Mubarak Ali; Meo by caste; v. Barka (Gurgaon); took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested and tried for sedition in December 1857; was found guilty and executed on 6 January 1858.

Amir Khan, Nawab : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested after the Revolt and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Amir Khan : a young Meo of Dist. Gurgaon; well-known for his daring feats; was captured by the British soldiers after the Revolt and hanged in January 1858.

Anwar Khan : v. Nuh (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 26 January 1858.

Asaf Khan : resident of Palwal; hanged on 16 January 1858.

Asalat Khan : s/o Najib Khan; Pathan of v. Hussainpur, (Gurgaon); took leading part in the Revolt in his locality; was arrested after the Revolt and executed by hanging on 13 January 1858.

Auqab Bakht : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British troops in December 1857 and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Azam Ali : v. Rasulpur Dist. Gurgaon; a soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took leading part in the Revolt; was captured after the Revolt and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Azam Beg : v. Khajurka (Gurgaon); a soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was hanged on 30 January 1858.

Azim Ali : a young Meo peasant; v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured; hanged in February 1858.

Azim Ali : s/o Arshad Ali; v. Rasulpur (Gurgaon); hanged on 5 January 1858.

Azim Beg : s/o Mohd. Beg; v. Sohna, Dist. Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities after the Revolt; executed by hanging on 21 December 1857.

Azimullah : a cook with Mr. Kitchen, Gurgaon; revolted; was hanged on 13 November 1857.

Azizuddin, Mirza : an old, respectable man of Gurgaon; took

active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Babar Khan : See chapter IV.

Badla : a Jat of v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was captured by General Showers' Column and shot dead in November 1857.

Badulla : resident of Palwal; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Badullah : a peon at Gurgaon; was shot along with 29 others on 2 December 1857.

Bahadur Ali : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was arrested with the Nawab by Brig. General Showers; and was executed in December 1857.

Bahadur Khan : s/o Khuda Baksh; Sheikh of v. Kanhore, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; arrested and tried for sedition; found guilty and hanged on 30 December 1857.

Bahadur Khan : Dist. Gurgaon, Haryana; was captured by Showers' troops and executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Bahadur Khan : a Biluch of Farukhnagar; s/o Bhikari; arrested and hanged on 16 December 1857.

Bahadur Singh : resident of Gurgaon, Haryana; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Bakhta Ram : s/o Jokhi Ram; Mahajan of v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was arrested by the British and charged with aiding the rebels; was executed at Gurgaon in January 1858.

Bakhtawar Singh : a Jat *Jagirdar* of v. Jharsa, Dist. Gurgaon; owned besides his own village, the villages of Shamaspur, Tigra, Tikli and Dhumaspur; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by Brig. General Showers; executed at Gurgaon Cantonment (in the compound of present Civil Hospital) in October 1857; his entire property was confiscated and given to a loyalist named Chain Sukh Mahajan of Badshahpur village.

Bakhshish Hussain : Colonel in the Jhajjar Army; was killed by the British forces on 18 October 1857 after the fall of Jhajjar.

Ball : s/o Khuda Baksh; resident of Palwal; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Banda Ali : s/o Zorawar Ali; v. Sultanpur, Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging on 5 January 1858.

Bandrah Ali : v. Hasanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; a soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Bathee : v. Rasulpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British after the Revolt and executed at Delhi on 16 January 1858.

Bazid Khan : s/o Maru; a Rajput of Jatusana; hanged on 12 August 1858.

Bhagirath : s/o Sadhu Ram; Jat of v. Patli (Gurgaon); was hanged on 11 November 1857.

Bhagta : v. Badshahpur (Gurgaon); was hanged on 11 November 1857.

Bhikha Ram : s/o Bakhshi Ram; was hanged (n. d.).

Bhawani Singh : Resident of Gurgaon, Haryana; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Bhulla : a daring Meo of v. Nangli; Dist. Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Birda : a Jat peasant of Patli (Gurgaon); was hanged on 7 December 1857.

Bihari Lal : s/o Ram Sukh; a Mahajan of v. Badshahpur Gurgaon; was arrested by the British after the Revolt; charged with having aided the rebels; hanged at Gurgaon on 11 November 1858.

Birja : v. Chhajjunagar, Dist. Gurgaon; took a leading part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 12 January 1858.

Bisarat Ali : See chapter IV

Boohad Ali : a Meo of Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Brija : s/o Sadhu Ram; was hanged (n. d.)

Brij Nandan : s/o Mula; v. Chhajjunagar (Gurgaon); took leading part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 12 January 1858.

Buddha : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Bulaqi Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Bunyad Ali : a resident of Palwal; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Bunyad Ali : a Sayed of Rewari; hanged on 6 May 1858.

Chaina : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed on the gallows in February 1858.

Chaina Ram : a Jat youngman of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed in January 1858.

Chand Khan : s/o Saadat Khan; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Chatroo : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was executed by hanging in February 1858.

Chet Ram : s/o Surja; a Jat of v. Aherowan (Gurgaon); was hanged on 8 December 1857.

Chet Ram : s/o Bhura Ram; a Jat of v. Aherowan (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 8 December 1857.

Chhajia : a lambardar of v. Qadurpur (Gurgaon); was hanged on 7 December 1857.

Chhote Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Chuna : s/o Bhura; v. Chhajjunagar (Gurgaon); was hanged along with 7 persons on 13 January 1858.

Dalel Khan : a Meo of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging in February 1858.

Dalip Singh : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Daulah : a Meo of Palwal (Gurgaon); took leading part in the Revolt; was captured and executed on 16 December 1857.

Daulat Ali : s/o Bakhshi; a Meo of Chhajjunagar, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 13 January 1858.

Dhanna Singh : a Rajput 'dare-devil' of Faridabad (Gurgaon); took very active part in the Revolt; participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British army; was captured after the Revolt and hanged at Delhi on 4 February 1858.

Dhan Singh : s/o Dhanwant Meo of Nangli Adwar (Gurgaon); was captured and hanged with 44 other Meos on 9 February 1858.

Dhiri : a Meo of Tushaim (Gurgaon); was hanged on 24 March 1858.

Dilawar Khan : s/o Islam Khan; v. Farrukhnagar; a Pathan; sentenced to life imprisonment.

Dillay : s/o Khubee of v. Aherowan (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 8 December, 1857.

Diya Ram : s/o Bohru; v. Patli; Jat; was hanged on 11 December 1857.

Dula Jan, Nawab : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt at Gurgaon; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Dulla : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was executed in February 1858.

Duli Chand : a Jat of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed in December 1857.

Faiyaz Shah : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Fakir Chand Jain : nephew of Hukam Chand Jain; resident of Hansi, Dist. Hissar; struggled against the British in the beginning, but later on played a double-game; was arrested after the Revolt; and hanged on 19 January 1858.

Fateh Ali : Lambardar of v. Kherali, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Fateh Ali : s/o Zabardast Khan; Lambardar of v. Khera-Jharsa (Gurgaon); shot on 11 November 1857.

Faujdar Khan : s/o Hidayat Khan; Pathan of Hussainpur, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian army; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 13 January 1858.

Gafur, Mirza : resident of Palwal; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Gama : resident of Dadri; killed many Europeans; arrested after the Revolt; and was hanged in October 1857.

Ganga : a Gujār youngman of v. Rithauj, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Ganga Parsad : a Sunar of Banda (U.P.), living in Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British after the Revolt and executed at Delhi on 24 March 1858.

Gareeba : a Meo of Ghagas (Gurgaon); s/o Chuna; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British and executed at Delhi on 24 March 1858.

Gariba : a Meo of Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Ghazanfar Ali : Sultanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 13 January 1857.

Ghazanfar Ali : v. Hasanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was executed by hanging in January 1858.

Ghisa : s/o Dalel Ajimullah; v. Khera-Jharsa (Gurgaon); a cook with Mr. Kitchen; was shot on 13 November 1857.

Ghiyasuddin Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Ghulam Ashrafi : a Pathan of Karnal; took active part in the Revolt; participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British army; was captured by the British and executed at Delhi on 4 February 1858.

Gulam Baksh : resident of Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British troops; and executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Gulam Mohammad Din : resident of Gurgaon; was executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Ghulam Nabi : v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by Showers' Column; and shot dead in November 1857.

Girdhar Lal Ahluwalia : b. 1827 at v. Fatehpur, Dist. Karnal; killed the British of Kaithal; his village was burnt by British troops. Girdhari Lal gave himself up; British soldiers shot him dead.

Gomesh Singh : resident of Rewari, Dist. Gurgaon; served as Havildar in the British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; participated in the defence of Delhi against the advanc-

ing British Army; was captured by the British after the Revolt and executed at Delhi on 16 December 1857.

Gopal Dev : Gopal Dev, the first cousin of Rao Tula Ram, was born in 1829 A.D. to Rao Nathu Ram at Rewari. At the age of 26, when his father died, he succeeded to his paternal *jagir* of 41 villages. He maintained good relations with his cousin Tula Ram and both stood on "friendly footing towards each other".

During the revolt he served as a general of Tula Ram's forces. He fought hard in the battle of Narnaul. After the battle was over, he escaped into Bikaner State in disguise. He found asylum with one of his relatives at Udairamsar, a village in Bikaner State. He stayed in perfect secrecy for four long years. Offers of surrender were made to him through his friends by the Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon, but he "persistently kept aloof and shunned all enquiries". Consequently, his *jagir* of 41 villages at Rewari was confiscated. He died at Udairamsar in 1862, leaving behind an infant son. The British Government had issued strict orders to the effect that in no case should his family possession be allowed to increase.

Gopal Singh : resident of Gurgaon; was arrested by the British authorities after the Revolt and tried for sedition; was found guilty and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Gurdial Singh : resident of Gurgaon; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Haider Khan : resident of Palwal; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Hakdeo Khan : dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British troops after the Revolt; executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Hanno Khan : resident of village Saral, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 29th March 1858.

Haqdad Khan : v. Badshabpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British soldiers and shot dead in November 1857.

Hardeo Singh : a Jat peasant of v. Garli Patti, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Hardeva : s/o Gulwa; v. Chhajjunagar (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British; and was executed at Delhi on 13 January 1858.

Hardi : a Jat youngman of Dist. Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in January 1858.

Harnam Singh : resident of Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was found guilty and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Harsukh : s/o Radha Krishan; resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt at Palwal; was captured by the British and executed at Delhi on 2 March 1858.

Harum Baksh : v. Hasanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Hasan Ali : s/o Mir Ali; a Sayed of Rewari; hanged on 6 May 1858.

Hasti : a Meo of v. Akhera, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged on 22 January 1858.

Hatia : a Jat of v. Dighot, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in January 1858.

Hayat Ali : resident of Palwal (Gurgaon); was a Thanedar, took leading part in the Revolt; participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 11 February 1858.

Hoshdar Khan : s/o Rehmat Khan; v. Hasanpur, (Gurgaon); soldier in the British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was hanged along with 8 persons on 13 January 1858.

Hoshiar Khan : s/o Rehman Khan; a Sheikh of v. Hussainpur Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; executed by hanging on 2 January 1858.

Hosna : a Meo peasant of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Hukam Chand Jain : b. 1816 at Hansi; s/o Duni Chand Jain; was well-versed in Persian and Mathematics and wrote several

books; was appointed Qanungo in 1841, first at Hansi and then at Karnal; organised freedom struggle in the Hansi region; offered his services to the British after the District had been reoccupied by them; worked as a Tehsildar for them; but later on his letters written to Bahadur Shah landed him in trouble; was apprehended and executed in front of his own house by hanging on 19 January 1858.

Ilahi Baksh : v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British troops after the Revolt and shot at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Imad Ali, Munshi : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was arrested by Showers along with the Nawab in October 1857; was executed at Delhi in December 1857.

Imam Ali : a Sheikh of v. Jharsa (Gurgaon); s/o Mohammad; took active part in the Uprising; was hanged on 4 December, 1857.

Imam Ali : s/o Warish Ali; resident of Sohna (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British troops after the Revolt and shot at Delhi on 27 November 1857.

Imam Baksh : v. Sultanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was also known as Dalla in the locality; took leading part in the Revolt; was apprehended in December 1857; and executed at Delhi on 16 January 1858.

Imam Khan : resident of Palwal; took leading part in the Revolt; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Imam Bakhsh : s/o Sanwat Meo; v. Bas (Gurgaon); also lived at Shingar; was captured and hanged on 22 January 1858.

Imamuddin : s/o Chand Khan; resident of Palwal (Gurgaon); took leading part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 13 January 1858.

Inayat Ali : a Sayad of Palwal; was hanged on 26 November 1857.

Inkar Shah : Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was caught and executed at Delhi on 24 March 1858.

Ishtiaq Ali : v. Rasulpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British after the Revolt and executed at Delhi on 13 January 1858.

Ishtiaq Ali : s/o Ashuk Ali; v. Rasulpur (Gurgaon); soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the mutiny; was captured by the British soldiers and executed by hanging on 5 January 1858.

Jafar Hussain : s/o Babar Husan; v. Rasulpur (Gurgaon); soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the mutiny; was captured by the British soldiers and executed by hanging on 5 January 1858.

Jafar Khan : s/o Bisarat Khan; v. Gudhrana; a Pathan; was hanged on 8 January 1858.

Jagroop : dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Jahangira : v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British troops and executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Jai Ram : a Jat peasant of v. Kasum, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British soldiers and hanged in January 1858.

Jan Mohammad : v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Jangu : a Meo youngman of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Jaswant Singh : a Jamadar in the service of Nawab of Jhajjar; was shot dead by the British forces on 18 October 1857 after the fall of Jhajjar.

Jauhar Beg : a Mughal of Rewari, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 18 January 1858.

Jawabar Singh : Daroga of the magazine in the service of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was shot dead by the British forces in October, 1857 after the fall of Jhajjar.

Jayat Singh : resident of Gurgaon; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Jeva : v. Chhajjunagar, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and executed at Delhi on 12 January 1858.

Jia Ram : s/o Dan Singh of v. Kasan (Gurgaon); was Lambardar of the village; took active part in the Revolt; looted the British treasury and distributed it among the villagers; was arrested after the Revolt; and executed on 16 January 1858.

Kabul Khan : a Meo youngman of v. Jagnali, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the Haryana Light Infantry; took active part in the mutiny; was captured and executed by hanging in March 1858.

Kahan Singh : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Kahera : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged after the Revolt in February 1858.

Kalam Singh : a Jat youngman of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in January 1858.

Kalan Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; was apprehended and hanged on 15 December 1857.

Kallan : s/o Mohan Singh; v. Dighot (Gurgaon); was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Kallu : v. Chhajjunagar, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and executed at Delhi on 12 January 1858.

Kallu : a Meo of v. Nangli (Gurgaon); was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Kallu : a Jat peasant of Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in January 1858.

Kalu Khan : a Sheikh of Sonapat; took active part in the Revolt; and participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 24 December 1857.

Kalwa : s/o Teja; was hanged (n d.).

Karamullah : resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged on 16 January 1858.

Kareemullah : v. Rasulpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was apprehended and executed at Delhi on 16 January 1858.

Karim Baksh : resident of Sonapat; took active part in the Revolt; and participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army, was captured and executed at Delhi on 24 December 1857.

Karim Baksh : v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and shot dead in November 1857.

Karim Baksh : s/o Badan; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Karim Baksh : s/o Abdullah of v. Hussainpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was arrested and executed by hanging on 2 January 1858.

Karim Baksh : a Sheikh of Ballabgarh; took active part in the Revolt in the State; participated in the defence [of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Kewal Khan : s/o Saikhan; Meo of Saral, Firozepur (Gurgaon); was hanged on 29 March 1858.

Khairathi : a Meo peasant of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Khairati : a Sheikh of Narnaul, Jhajjar; took active part in the Revolt and participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 18 January 1858.

Khair Ram : a Jat youngman of Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Khanka : a Meo peasant of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Khizruddin : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt there was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Khuda Bakhsh : a Manihar (Bangle-seller) of Faridabad, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and executed by hanging at Delhi on 22 February 1858.

Khuda Bakhsh : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was apprehended and executed at Delhi in December 1857.

Khuda Bakhsh : a Sheikh of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 16 January 1858.

Khurram Bakhsh : a resident of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 10 November 1857.

Khushal : a Meo of v. Barka (Gurgaon); s/o Khaidu Ram; was captured and hanged in January 1858.

Khushali : a wealthy Ahir of v. Badshahpur (Gurgaon); took

active part in the Revolt and helped the rebels by money and material; was arrested by the British and hanged at Gurgaon on 11 November 1857.

Kishan Bal : s/o Bhoja; Jat; v. Garli Patti; hanged on 1 February 1858.

Kishan Singh : popularly known as Kishan Gopal; second s/o Rao Jiwan Singh, Rais of Nangal, a village near Rewari. He descended from a branch of Rao Tej Singh, the ruler of Rewari; possessed great physical power and courage; had average education. At the age of 20 he went to Meerut to seek employment. Mr. Lawrence, an English Officer at Meerut, who happened to be a friend of his relative Rao Tej Singh, helped him in getting the post of city Kotwal of Meerut.

During the days of the Uprising he showed sympathy with the rebels' cause but not openly. Nobody suspected him of being anti-British until 3 June 1857. On this day (3 June) he was detailed by the Deputy Commissioner to guide a party of Carabineers under the City Magistrate Mr. Turnbull who was going to punish the villages of Gagual, Sirsari and Murunapur south of Meerut. Their inhabitants had been barricading the Agra road in the days of crisis. Kishan Singh deliberately delayed joining the columns and meanwhile the villagers came to know of the ensuing attack and they escaped, leaving empty villages to be burnt by the Magistrate. The Officer felt upset and disappointed at the escape of the people. He severely reprimanded Kishan Singh. Having posted a notice at one of the city gates to the effect that nobody should trust the British, Kishan Singh then left Meerut and came to Rewari. He joined his cousin Tula Ram, who made him colonel in his cavalry. He fought desperately in the battle of Narnaul and died a heroic death. He was 32 at that time.

Kishan alias Khushi : s/o Chandu of v. Barka, Dist. Gurgaon; Meo by caste; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was sentenced to death and executed by hanging on 6 January 1858.

Kishnu : a Jat of v. Garli Patti, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Kundan Singh : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt there; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Kunwar Chand : v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Kutbuddin : s/o Karim Bakhsh of v. Hussainpur, Dist. Gurgaon; Sheikh by caste; took leading part in the Revolt and was executed by hanging on 2 January 1858.

Lachhman Singh : resident of Gurgaon; was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Lachhman Singh : s/o Prijai Singh, Jat of v. Garhi Patti, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Lalji : s/o Moti Ram; v. Aherowan (Gurgaon); was hanged on 8 December 1857.

Lehru : v. Aherowan, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was executed at Delhi on 7 December 1857.

Lekha : v. Chhajjunagar, Dist. Gurgaon; was caught and executed at Delhi on 12 January 1858.

Lekha : a Jat of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in January 1858.

Madal Ali : s/o Hinayat Ali; Sayed of v. Sohna (Gurgaon); was hanged on 1 February 1858.

Maha Singh : s/o Kewal Ram Dhobi; Aherowan; was hanged on 8 December 1857.

Mahbub Ali : s/o Roshan; Sheikh; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Mahfuz Ali : s/o Amanat Ali; v. Sultanpur (Gurgaon); was hanged on 5 January 1858.

Mahfuz Ali : v. Hasanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took part in the Revolt; was captured and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Mahmud Ali : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was arrested with the Nawab in October 1857 by Showers; was executed in December 1857 by hanging at Delhi.

Mahtab : s/o Dalmer Ranghav of v. Shahjahanpur (Gurgaon); hanged on 1 February 1858.

Makhan : a resident of Gurgaon; was hanged on 13 November 1857.

Maluka : a Lambardar of Tusaim, Firozpur; took active part in the Revolt; captured Punhana; was hanged on 24 March 1858.

Man Singh : s/o Kimu; Dhobi of Aherowan (Gurgaon); took part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 8 December 1857.

Mani : resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt; was captured by the British column and hanged in January 1858.

Manawar Khan : Kotwal in the service of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was killed by the British forces on 18 October 1857 after the fall of Jhajjar.

Mansur Ali : Naib-Nazir, Salt Dept., Mathura; resident of Gurgaon; was captured and executed at Delhi on 26 March 1858.

Mata Din : resident of Gurgaon; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Matru : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Mehbub Bakhsh : s/o Roshan Pathan of v. Hussainpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was arrested and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Mehdi : a Meo of Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Mehra : a Gujar peasant of v. Patli (Gurgaon); was hanged on 7 December 1857.

Mehtab : s/o Dalmer Ranghav, v. Shahjahanpur (Gurgaon); hanged on 1 February 1858.

Mir Khan : a Meo of v. Raisina, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Mira : Lambardar of Qadurpur (Gurgaon); took active part in the Uprising; was hanged on 7 December 1857.

Mohammad Ali, Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Mohammad Bakhsh, Mirza : resident of Palwal; was arrested after the Revolt and hanged in December 1857.

Mohammad Habib : resident of Gurgaon; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Mohammad Hairu : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Mohammad Ibrahim : resident of Gurgaon; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Mohammad Ibrahim, Mirza : resident of Palwal; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Mohammad Khan : resident of Palwal; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Mohammad Khan : s/o Kadir Bakhsh; v. Hasanpur (Gurgaon); soldier in the Third Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent in the British Indian Army; took part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged on 31 December 1857.

Mohammad Khan : s/o Sabut Khan of v. Hussainpur; Sheikh by caste; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was executed by hanging on 2 January 1858.

Mohammad Khan : s/o Naib Khan; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Mohammad Khan : s/o Qadir Bakhsh of v. Hussainpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 21 December 1857.

Mohammad Yar : a Biluch of Bahadurgarh, Dist. Rohtak; took leading part in the Revolt at Bahadurgarh; also participated in the defence of Delhi against the advancing British Army; was captured and executed at Delhi on 29 December 1857.

Mohammad Yusuf : resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Mohammad Yusuf : resident of Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt against British; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Mohan Singh : s/o Ram Kishan; v. Birehra Sangata; Ahir; hanged on 13 January 1858.

Mohara : Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 7 December 1857.

Mohrab : a Gujar of v. Kadurpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Mudgur : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British soldiers after the Revolt and hanged in February 1858.

Mozdar Khan : s/o Rehman Khan; caste Sheikh; v. Hasanpur (Palwal); hanged on 13 January 1858.

Mughal Beg : s/o Mirza Jan Beg of Jhajjar, Dist. Rohtak; took a leading part in the Revolt at Delhi in the first week of May; killed Fraser; went underground but captured in 1861; was tried, found guilty and executed in February 1862.

Mukhra : a Meo of Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Munir Beg, Mirza : resident of Hansi; friend of Lala Hukam Chand Jain; wrote a letter jointly with Hukam Chand to the Mughal Emperor asking for arms, ammunition and other supplies for carrying on struggle against the British rule; was arrested by the British after the fall of Delhi; and was executed by hanging at Hansi on 19 January 1858.

Munir Khan : s/o Nasir Khan Meo; v. Raisina (Gurgaon); hanged on 18 February 1858.

Muzaffar Ali : a Sayad of Sultanpur; hanged on 5 January 1858.

Muzaffar-ud-Daulah : resident of Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities after the Revolt and tried for sedition; sentenced to death and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Nabi Baksh : s/o Bakseenullah; Sheikh of Palwal (Gurgaon); hanged on 31 December 1857.

Nabi Khan : s/o Kadir Baksh; a Rajput of Hasanpur (Gurgaon); was hanged on 31 December 1857.

Nahar Singh, Raja ; See chapter VII, pp. 96-98.

Nahar Khan : s/o Gauhar Ranghar of Shahjahanpur (Gurgaon); hanged on 1 February 1858.

Nanda : v. Rithauj, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Nanda : Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 7 December 1857.

Nannu Ram : a Jat of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in January 1858.

Narain Singh : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities after the Revolt and tried for sedition; executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Naseer : a Meo of v. Nangli. Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Nazimuddin : resident of Rewari (Gurgaon); s/o Imamuddin; Sheikh; was captured by British soldiers after the Revolt and hanged on 11 February 1858.

Niamat Ali : resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; captured and hanged in December 1857.

Nizabat Ali : a Sayed of Palwal; was hanged on 8 December 1857.

Nur Baksh : v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Nur Muhammad Khan : Nur Muhammad Khan, the ex-Nawab of Rania (an ancient state in Hissar) was pensioner of British Government in 1857. His paternal state was confiscated by the British in 1818. Naturally, like all other dispossessed rulers the news of the fall of Delhi (to the rebels) on 11 May 1857 was welcomed by him.

Robertson, the Superintendent of Hissar, asked Nur Muhammad to help the British in the hour of crisis. But the Nawab refused to oblige and instead organised a big force of horse and troops to fight against them. Having removed all the vestiges of the British rule from the Sirsa region, he conducted its affairs in the name of Emperor Bahadur Shah.

In the month of June, John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Panjab, sent General van Courtlandt, the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur at the head of a large force to subdue the Nawab. The Nawab on the other hand strengthened his position further and checked the British force at Uddha, a village near Sirsa, on 17 June. The struggle that ensued was quite fierce. The Nawab, however, lost the day due to his inferiority in arms, ammunition and military know-how. About 530 of his men fell fighting. The Nawab, effected his escape, but he was caught while passing through the district of Ludhiana. He was at once put before a court presided over by Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Panjab. The verdict of the Judicial Commissioner went against the Nawab. Montgomery observed :

Of the Nawab's guilt there can be no doubt . . . I consider it, therefore, imperative to make example of such men as the Nawab. The leaders must feel that vengeance will assuredly overtake them . . . I therefore, with the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner sentence him, Nur Muhammad Khan, Nawab of Rania, to be hanged.

The Chief Commissioner's concurrence was not long in coming and the Nawab was hanged at Lahore.

Pir Ali Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the

Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 15 December 1857.

Pir Bakhsh : resident of Bahadurgarh; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 1 April 1858.

Piru : resident of Palwal; was captured by British soldiers and hanged on 16 January 1858.

Pir Das : b. 1800 at v. Rohnat, Dist. Hissar; Lambardar; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British and blown to death with a canon.

Pir Khan : v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Qadir Bakhsh : Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was apprehended and executed at Delhi on 22 May 1858.

Qutbuddin : s/o Karim Bakhsh; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Radha Kishan : s/o Bhakta Ram; a Jat peasant; v. Hodal, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged on 1 February 1858.

Raham Khan : Dist. Gurgaon; a soldier in the British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Rahamtullah ; s/o Niamatullah; Sheikh of Palwal; was hanged on 13 December 1857.

Rahim Bakhsh : s/o Najibullah; Sheikh by caste; v. Garhi Harsaru (Gurgaon); hanged on 30 December 1857.

Rahim Bakhsh : v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged on 12 April 1858.

Rahim Bakhsh : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was arrested by Showers along with the Nawab in October 1857; executed at Delhi in December 1857.

Rahim Bakhsh : s/o Illahi Bakhsh; caste Mirasi; v. Hasanpur Gurgaon; transportation for life.

Rahim Khan ; s/o Hafizullah of v. Hussainpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Raibhan : v. Ranger (Gurgaon); hanged on 22 January 1858.

Raj Nandan : a Jat of v. Garhi Patti, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Ram Bakhsh : Jamadar in Police at Jhajjar; was shot dead by

the British forces on 18 October, 1857 after the fall of Jhajjar.
Ram Bakhsh : s/o Sanwaf; Jat by caste; of v. Garhi Patti; hanged on 1 February 1858.

Ram Lal : Kishan Singh's younger brother Ram Lal was in his thirtieth year when the mutiny broke out in May 1857. He lived with his brother Kishan Singh at Meerut. When Kishan Singh left Meerut on 3 June 1857 he also came along with him and joined Tula Ram at Rewari. He was a first class horseman. Man Singh says that he excelled in horse-riding to such an extent that he could sit on a horse with his hands behind his neck. He held a high rank in the cavalry of Tula Ram under his own brother Kishan Singh.

Ram Lal fought heroically in the battle of Narnaul and fell fighting on 16 November 1857.

Ramdin Singh s/o Kewal Singh of v. Badshahpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British and hanged at Gurgaon in January 1858.

Ram Richhpal : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar, arrested by Showers at Chhuchhak along with the Nawab in October 1857; was executed at Delhi in December 1857.

Ram Sukh : v. Badshahpur (Gurgaon); was hanged on 11 November 1857.

Ramzani, Mirza : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British troops and executed at Delhi on 15th December 1857.

Ranbaz : s/o Malkhan of v. Barka, Dist. Gurgaon; a Meo by caste; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was executed by hanging on 6 January 1858.

Ratan Singh : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Rati : v. Ranger (Gurgaon); hanged on 22 January 1858.

Ratia : s/o Mukha; Meo v. Barka, Sohna (Gurgaon); hanged 6 January 1858.

Ratna : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Raula : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was arrested by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Rehmatullah : resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Reoti Ram : resident of Gurgaon; took a leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Rulia Ram : s/o Mulla Ram; Aherowan (Gurgaon); was hanged on 8 December 1857.

Rura : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Saadat Ali : s/o Nadir Ali, Sayed of Turkia was (Rewari); was hanged on 3 December 1857.

Saba : a Gujar peasant of Patli (Gurgaon); was hanged on 7 December 1857.

Sahaj Ram : s/o Harchand of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 7 December 1857.

Sabaj Ram : s/o Nahar Singh; a Jat of Aherwan (Gurgaon); was hanged on 8 December 1857.

Salibah : Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 7 December 1857.

Salu Singh s/o Dhan Singh; a Rajput of v. Hussianpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 2 January 1858.

Saadat Khan ; s/o Jangli Khan; resident of Palwal; hanged on 24 March 1858.

Sarup Lal : resident of Palwal, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by the British and executed at Delhi on 24 March 1858.

Sayad Hari : s/o Suri Kasaf; of Palwal; hanged on 16 January 1858.

Sedhu Singh : s/o Dal Singh; v. Balwari (Gurgaon); Rajput; hanged on 2 January 1858.

Sedhu Singh : s/o Ranjit Singh; a Jat of Aherowan (Gurgaon); was hanged on 8 December 1858.

Sewa : s/o Johar Singh; v. Dighot (Gurgaon); was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Shaffat Ali : v. Rora, Tehsil Panipat, Dist. Karnal; Jamadar in the Customs Department; took part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in December 1857.

Shafaat Ali : s/o Mir Khuda Bakhsh of v. Kanhore, (Panipat); took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and hanged on 3 December 1857.

Shah Beg : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Shahabuddin : resident of Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Shahamat : v. Rasulpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British and executed at Delhi on 16 January 1858.

Shalamat Khan : resident of Palwal; hanged on 16 January 1858.

Shamsuddin : resident of Palwal; was hanged on 16 January 1858.

Shankar Ram Datt : resident of Gurgaon; took leading part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Sharifuddin : s/o Rahmatullah; resident of Palwal; (Gurgaon) took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged on 13 December 1857.

Sharoba : a Gujar of v. Kadirpur, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Shiv Charan : s/o Gauri Ram; v. Barher (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured and executed at Delhi on 1 April 1858.

Shoram : a Jat of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in December 1857.

Sidhu : a Rajput of v. Balwani, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the Third Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Sita Ram : resident of Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt, was arrested and executed by hanging on 15 December 1857.

Soora : a Meo of Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured and hanged in February 1858.

Sultan : s/o Rehman Khan; v. Bawal; Khauzada; took active part in the Revolt at Rewari; arrested the Tehsildar of Rewari and tortured him; was hanged on 24 March 1858.

Taj Khan : s/o Arshad; was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Taj Khan : a Biluch of v. Hasanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was hanged in January 1858.

Tara Singh : Tara Singh was son of Radha Kishan, Rais of a small village called Lisan near Nahar. He joined Tula Ram in May 1857, and escaped with him from Narnaul in November 1857. He remained with him through all problems, and returned to India on his death. Anxiety, sickness, hard work and unsuitable climates destroyed his health and he died shortly after his arrival. He was survived by a widow and a minor son Sohan Singh.

Tula Ram : b. 9 December 1825 at Rampura (Rewari); father Puran Singh; descendent of the Raos of Rewari enjoying an *istamarari jagir* of 87 villages granted by the British in 1805 in place of a big *jagir* granted by Mughal Emperor Humayun.

Tula Ram became *Jagirdar* in 1839 on his father's demise. He was a very intelligent man; took active part in the Uprising of 1857 (see chapters IV and VIII for details). After the battle of Narnaul (16 November 1857), he moved into Rajasthan; then joined Tantya Tope's forces for one year. After the proclamation of Queen Victoria promising unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offences against the British Government to all except those who directly or indirectly took part in the murder of British subjects (issued on 1 November 1858), he sent a petition to the Governor-General, Lord Canning on 24 December, 1858, stating that he considered himself "an offender, but as he looked upto the Government as his protector, he begged to solicit that an inquiry might be directed to be instituted and that he as well as his followers pardoned." He was refused pardon and, therefore, left India in 1862; went to Iran; then to Afghanistan in the winter of 1862; died of dysentery at Kabul on 23 September 1863 at a young age of 38.

Tulsi Ram : s/o Mughla Ram of v. Aherowan, (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British troops and executed at Delhi on 8 December 1857.

Tulsi Ram : s/o Prem Sukh of v. Kasan, Dist. Gurgaon; soldier in the British Army; posted at Meerut (U. P.); took active part in the Revolt on 10 May 1857; fought his way out and reached

Delhi on 11 May; escaped to his village (Kasan) after the defeat of the rebels at Delhi; was arrested and executed by hanging in his own village on 7 December 1857.

Tuya : s/o Kuri; v. Dighot (Gurgaon); hanged on 13 January 1858.

Uday Chand : a Meo of v. Barka (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers; hanged on 16 January 1858.

Uday Singh : v. Nagina; (Gurgaon); was soldier in the Haryana Light Infantry took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and executed by hanging on 29 March 1858.

Usman Khan : s/o Zahur Khan of v. Sauli, Dist. Gurgaon; took part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 19 December 1857.

Ustad : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Vazir Khan : s/o Samu Khan, Pathan of Gudrana, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested and executed by hanging on 8 January 1858.

Wazir : a Meo of v. Nangli, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged in February 1858.

Wazir Khan : s/o Samu Khan; Gudrana (Gurgaon); was a soldier in the British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and hanged on 8 January 1858.

Zabardast Khan : s/o Haider Khan of v. Hussainpur (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and was hanged on 13 January 1858.

Zafar Khan : Dist. Gurgaon, was a soldier in the British Indian Army; took part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Zafar Khan : s/o Bisharat Khan, Pathan of v. Gudrana, Dist. Gurgaon; took active part in the Revolt; was arrested by the British authorities and tried for sedition; was found guilty and executed by hanging on 8 January 1858.

Zakat Ali : s/o Khuda Bakhsh; a sayed of Garhi Harsaru (Gurgaon); was hanged on 20 December 1857.

Zalim Ali : v. Hasanpur, Dist. Gurgaon; was a soldier in the

Gwalior Contingent, British Indian Army; took active part in the Revolt; was captured by British soldiers and executed by hanging in January 1858.

Zamir Ali : s/o Nasrat Ali; v. Sultanpur (Gurgaon); took active part in the Revolt; was captured by the British; and was hanged at Delhi on 5 January 1858.

Ziaunllah, Mian : an official in the court of the Nawab of Jhajjar; was arrested by Brig. Gen. Showers along with the Nawab; was executed at Delhi in December 1857.

APPENDIX II

Letters of Lieutenant E.M. Martineau, Ambala

I

Sir¹,

. . . The affair is lamentable, as it discloses the actual feelings of the whole of the native army; and I hasten to put you in possession of the information I have subsequently received on the subject, as it is no longer possible to close our eyes to the present state of our Hindostanee regiments.

The rumour has been industriously propagated (how it first originated no native knows) that the rifle-cartridges were purposely smeared with the mixture of cows' and pigs' fat with the express object of destroying caste; in fact, the weapon itself is nothing more nor less than a Government missionary to convert the whole army to Christianity.

That so absurd a rumour should meet with ready credence, indicates anything but a sound state of feeling on the part of our native soldiers. It is, however, generally credited, and 'punchayuts' have been formed in every corps, who have placed themselves in communication from Calcutta to Peshawur, and the army at large have come to the determination to regard as outcastes, and to expel from all communion, any men who, at any of the depots, use the cartridges at all. I find also, that in many of the detachments here all intercourse with their corps is suspended; the men write from this, but receive no answers; their comrades won't deign to notice them. They justly remark, with the evident alarm, 'If a subahdar in the Commander-in-Chief's camp and on duty as his personal escort, can taunt us with loss of caste, what kind of reception shall we meet with on our return to our own corps? No reward that Government

1. Lieut. Martineau to Capt. S. Becher, Asstt. Adjutant-General, dated Ambala, 20 March 1857, *vide* Cave-Brown, Vol. I, pp. 43-44.

can offer us is any equivalent to being regarded as outcastes by our comrades.

I have the honour, &C.&C.,

E.M. Matineau, Lieut., Instr. R. Depot.

II

"Sir,²—In obedience to your verbal orders of today, I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as follows:

The native officers of this Depot have expressed to me, through the medium of three of their number, their sense of the high honour done them by his Excellency, who condescended himself today to personally address them, for the purpose of quieting both their minds and those of their comrades in the army at large on the subject of rifle cartridges.

They respectfully beg to urge that they do not attribute any of the evil intentions to the Government of this country, as described in his Excellency's address. They know that the rumour is false; but they equally know, that for one man in Hindostan who disbelieves it, ten thousand believe it, and that it is universally credited, not only in their regiment, but in their villages and their homes.

They are all ready to a man to fire when ordered, but they would wish to represent, for the paternal consideration of his Excellency, the social consequence of military obedience to themselves. They become outcastes for ever, unacknowledged, not only in their corps but also in their families and their homes. Their devotion to the service, and submission to the military authority, will inflict on them the direst and most terrible punishment they can undergo in this world.

Their being selected as men of intelligence and fidelity thus becomes to them the most fatal curse. They will obey the orders of their military superiors, and socially perish through their instinct of obedience.

That their views are not exaggerated, some knowledge of native character and of the temper of the native mind (non-military as well as military), at this present moment, tends to

2. Capt. Martineau to Capt. S. Becher, dated Ambala, 23 March 1857, *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

convince me. The Asiatic mind is periodically prone to fits of religious panic; in this state, reasoning that would satisfy us is utterly thrown away upon them; their imaginations run riot on preconceived views, and often the more absurd they are, the more tenaciously do they cling to them.

We are now passing through one of these paroxysms, which we might safely disregard, were not unfortunately the military element mixed up in it.

What the exciting causes are that are at this present moment operating on the native mind to an universal extent throughout these provinces, I cannot discover; no native can or will offer any explanation; but I am disposed to regard the greased cartridges, alleged to be smeared with cows' and pigs' fat, more as the medium than the original cause of this widespread feeling of distrust that is spreading dissatisfaction to our rule, and tending to alienate the fidelity of our native army. I would most respectfully venture to solicit of his Excellency, General Anson, to permit a European court of inquiry to be held at this station, to investigate the charges brought by Havildar Kassee Ram, 36th N.I., against Drigpaul Singh, Subahdar of that corps, as to the taunt said to have been thrown out by that native officer; and the refusal of certain of the sepoys of that corps to eat with their brethren at this Depot (if substantiated), affords a very sure index to the real sentiments of the native mind.

In conclusion, I trust his Excellency will not deem my language to be stronger than the urgency of the occasion would seem to warrant, but will give me credit for recording what I sincerely believe to be the actual truth.

My opinions are, I know, shared in by officers of standing and experience at this Depot; and Captain Robertson, the senior officer doing duty at present, will accompany me for the purpose of presenting this report to you.

I have the honour, &C.&C.
E.M. Martineau, Lieut., Instr. R. Dep.

APPENDIX III

Six per cent loan

To overcome the financial stringency during the Uprising, the British authorities of Panjab floated a 6 per cent loan. Though people's reaction was not very favourable and they showed 'disinclination to advance money'¹ 'arguments more powerful than persuasion'² bore some fruits. As a result, the following loans were collected from Haryana districts :

<i>District</i>	<i>Amount of Loan in Rs.</i>
Ambala	10,77,193 ³
Thanesar	2,38,700
Hissar	50,330
Total	13,66,223

Out of the above amount, a major part was donated by the chiefs and *jagirdars* and about one-third came from the merchants.⁴

1. See Cave-Brown, Vol. II, p. 287.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Of this the chiefs of Patiala, Nabha and Jind contributed Rs. 8,35,000 (*Ibid.*, p. 352).

4. *Ibid.*

APPENDIX IV

Leaders in the Uprising

District/State	Locality/Pargana	Name of the leader	Position/Status
1. Delhi	Delhi proper	Bahadur Shah*	Feudal chief
	Sonepat	No leader	—
2. Gurgaon	Gurgaon	No leader	—
	Mewat	Sadraddin	Peasant
	Ahirwal	Tula Ram*	Feudal chief
	Palwal	1 Gafur Ali	Small trader
		2 Harsukh Rai	Peasant
	Faridabad	Dhanna Singh	Peasant
3. Ballabhgarh	Ballabhgarh	Nahar Singh	Feudal chief
4. Farrukhnagar	Farrukhnagar	1 Ahmed Ali	Feudal chief
		2 Ghulam Mohd.	Noble
5. Pataudi	Pataudi	Akbar Ali	Feudal chief
6. Panipat	Panipat	Kalandar Maulvi	Maulvi
	Karnal	No leader	—
	Asandh	Ram Singh	Peasant
7. Thanesar	Thanesar	No leader	—
	Ladwa	No leader	—
8. Rohtak	Kharkhauda	Bisarai Ali	Peasant/Ex. Risaldar
	Rohtak	Sabar Khan	Peasant
9. Dujana	Dujana	Hasan Ali	Feudal chief
10. Dadri	Dadri	Bahadur Jung	Feudal chief
11. Jhajjar	Jhajjar	1 Abdur Rehman Khan	Feudal chief
		2 Samad Khan	Noble
12. Hissar	Bhattu	Mohd. Azim	Noble
	Hansi	Hukam Chand	Qanungo
	Rania	Nur Mohd. Khan*	Feudal chief
13. Loharu	Loharu	Aminuddin Khan	Feudal chief
14. Ambala	Ambala	No leader	—
	Jagadhari	No leader	—
	Rupar	Mohar Singh	Noble
Total no. of leaders			— 22
Feudal chiefs			— 10
Nobles & Servicemen			— 4
Maulvi			— 1
Small Traders & Peasants			— 7

* Dispossessed Chiefs.

APPENDIX V

Details of Administration Suggested by Bahadur Shah to Tula Ram¹

In these times which are associated with prosperity and fortune this highly respectable *Firman* (order) of *Hazrat* (Lord), the Master of the World, which is liable to be executed, is issued to the effect that the pargana of Rewari, Shahjahanpur and Bhora, all the villages *asli*, and *dakhli* and the taxes levied on *rahdari* (transit), the cities and the towns, other than those gardens, daily allowances, rent free holdings, order of which were issued to be rewarded as the manifestation of favour and kindness of our predecessors as a gift to the persons concerned for their loyalty and sacrifice of lives, are hereby given to the charge of Rao Tula Ram Bahadur. The said Rao is also given the power to rule over and administer (*nizamat*) the tehsils and to impart justice, decide the cases of litigation and to award punishment to the unlawful citizens to the extent of *qasas* (execution) and as such it is the duty of the said Rao Tula Ram to remain obedient and submissive to the orders of *Hazrat Qaza Saulat* (the Commanding authority of the order) and to make endeavours to be just in admonishing, punishing the mischief mongers, scoundrels, thieves and those who take law and order into their own hands in the light of those canons of justice which are not contrary to the *Shariat* (laws of Islam) and Muslim community. And it is incumbent on the princes who command high name and reputation, fortune, royal lineage and high racial stock and the ministers endowed with authority, talented chiefs, officers, *amils* observing economy in the state expenditure, revenue clerks attached to the Royal Camps and the bondsmen of the Royal affairs of the parganas referred to above to renew this *Firman* in favour of him (Rao Tula Ram) and after him

1. Mutiny Papers, bundle no. 34, doc. 3, n. d.

family after family, sons after sons, descendants after descendants *khalidan wa mukhallidan* (perpetually) *abadan mubaddan* (for all the time to come) for the lawful possession and to reap the benefits accrued thereon in such a way that after the said Rao his eldest descendant should always be declared his successor for that purpose but in circumstances other than these (if he does not have any child of his own) the nearest relation of his father's descendant. And efforts may be made to comply with this highly sacred order and no change should ever be effected to its intents and purposes, and the above said Rao be extended all sorts of cooperation. Apart from these amenities the said Rao may be exempted to the duties of attending the Imperial hunting, shooting, *begar* (forced labour). Moreover *peshkash*, *nazrs* (gifts and cash to be paid to the chiefs) *zabitana* (amount to be paid under any statutes) and *abwab-i-sultani* (taxes imposed by the Mughal kings in addition to the regular assessment on the land) should not be charged on the said Rao and lawfully be treated free from all these bindings, and these orders should be endeavoured to be invariably adhered to and must not be differed from the contents of the origin of this Royal mandate and great care should be taken in its compliance and these must be obeyed according to the orders laid down herein:

Details of parganas :

Pargana and town of Rewari.

Comprising four hundred and sixteen villages *asli* and *dakhli*.

Pargana Shahjahanpur consisting of nine villages *asli* and *dakhli*.

Pargana Bhora consisting of fifty two villages *asli* and *dakhli*.

Toll taxes (*rahdari*) of town, city, mandi (market for particular commodity or its accessories) and villages.

Written on twenty *Zul hijja*, twenty year of *Julus* (that is Sunday, the first August of Eighteen Hundred and Fifty Seven A.D.).

APPENDIX VI

Plundering of the 'Native States' by the British Forces¹

From

C.B. Saunders, Esq.,
Offg. Commissioner, Delhi.

To

Major General N. Panny, C.B.,
Commanding the Delhi Field Force,
Delhi.

Dated, Place Delhi, the 11th November 1857.

Sir,

It is with considerable regret that I feel it to be my duty to bring this prominently to your notice the fact that on account of the Nawabs of the Jhajjar and Farrukhnagar more especially of the Rajah of Bullubgharh, by the force under the command of Brigadier Showers no efficient measures were taken to prevent the plundering of their effects by the troops employed on the occasion.

When the Nawab of Jhajjar was arrested, the troops were to a certain degree, restrained from anything like indiscriminate plunder, but even on that occasion some hundreds of horses and other cattle were abstracted from the Nawab's stables and appropriated; I am given to understand as well as by officer and men attached to the force.

On the occasion of arrest of the Nawab of Farrukhnagar, the whole of his property, horses and cattle were indiscriminately subjected to plunder, and I am not aware that a single animal or article of property has been recovered.

At Bullubgharh a similar scene was enacted. The Rajah was arrested before the arrival of the troops at Bullubgharh, having

1. PSA, File R/269, p. 75.

came out some distance to meet the column, notwithstanding this, and no opposition whatever having been offered, his fort and palace were subjected to indiscriminate plunder, as though the place had been assaulted and carried by a besieging army after a desperate resistance on the part of the besieged. The Rajah's zananah was entered by the troops and his women were deprived not only of their cash and jewels, but even of their clothes. A great number of the Rajah's horses, bullocks and other property were also carried off and appropriated by the force and the amount of property which now remains under attachment forms but a very small fraction of what actually belonged to the Rajah at the time of his arrest.

I have deemed it to be my duty to bring the above facts without further comment to your notice, not as a question of military discipline, for that it would be but presumptuous in me as a civilian to discuss, but entirely upon the ground of the very great loss of valuable property which has been thus incurred and of the Government interests having been thereby seriously affected and compromised.

I have, etc.,
Sd/- C.B. Saunders,
Offg. Commissioner.

Commr. Office,
Delhi.

The 11th November, 1857

True Copy
Sd/-Head Clerk
Commr. Office, Delhi.

APPENDIX VII

Branding of Mutineers 1857-58¹

No. 3647

Circular No 74 of 1858

From
The Judicial Commissioner
for the Punjab,
Lahore.

To
The Commissioner and Suptd.
Delhi Division.

Dated Lahore, the 11th September, 1858.

Sir,

It has been brought to my notice that by a mistake in carrying out the orders of Government contained in Act XXXII of 1857 followed up by the notification in the Panjab Gazette of the 24th July last, the operation of branding mutineers and deserters has in one district, been performed with hot rod, so badly applied, that it has produced large and dangerous slaughts. Unnecessary pain has thus been inflicted on the individuals branded; and the object of the branding has been defeated for all traces of letters are destroyed by the sores.

(The letters shall not be less than an inch long and such letters and other marks shall be made up on the skin with some ink, gunpowder, or other preparation so as to be visible and conspicuous and not liable to be obliterated.)²

1. PSA, File R. 247.

2. It is in the margin of the original letter.

2. I beg, therefore, to annex in the margin an extract from the Act above quoted, and to request that taking in the manner indicated shall always be resorted to as the mode of imprinting an indelible mark on the persons of deserters and mutineers.

I have &C.,
Sd/- E. Thornton,
Judicial Commissioner
for the Punjab.

Lahore,
the 11 September, 1858.

True Copy
Ch. H. Billings,
Head Clerk.

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